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The need to continue codifying international law i s  apparent . . .  
B ut an even greater challenge for us now-and, in many respects 
an even greater oppot1uni ty-is enforcement. Although i n terna­
t ional law is often caricatured as elusive and abstract ,  there i s  
nothing abstract about i t s  enforcement . . . .  
-Madeleine A lbright 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Traditional models of in ternational law enforcement assume that 
disputes between sovereign States wil l  be adj udicated by a supranational 
tribunal, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) .  S uch models rely on a u nified i nternational 
legal system bound together by a hierarchical appellate authority. A more 
recent development i s  the direct enforcement of i nternational legal rules 
by national courts .  This has taken place in a number of substantive areas 
of law, most notably i n  i nternational economic law, i nternational envi­
ronmental law, and i nternational cri minal law. This Articl e  characterizes 
1 .  Madeleine K. Albright, International unv Approaches the Twenty-First Centlll}'.' A 
U.S. Perspective on Enforcement, 18 FoRDHAM INT' L L.J .  1 595, 1 596 ( 1 995 ). 
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:.md evaluates the di spersed enforcement of international l aw through a 
close analys i s  of international cr imi nal law. 
Despite the ratification of the Rome Statute of the In ternational 
Criminal Court ( Rome Statute) ,  i nternational criminal law enforcement 
authority remains nonhierarchical , distributed throughout the i nterna­
t ional system and largely  centered in national courts ,  not supranational 
tribunals .  For a variety of pract ical and pol i tical  reasons explored herein ,  
the opportunit ies for enforcement of international criminal  l aw are far 
more promis ing at the national than at the supranational leve l .  Interna­
tional criminal law enforcement is effectively migrating from 
in ternational tribunals to national courts .  National courts form the front 
l ine of a system of enforcement. Supranational tribunals act as a back­
stop where national courts are unwi ll ing or unable to adj udicate . 
The emerging system of international criminal justice can be con­
ceived as a community of courts, 2 a set of adj udicatory bodies in 
interdependent, self-organizing relationships .  Thi s  emergent community 
of courts is engaged in  a common endeavor--ensuring accountability for 
serious i nternational crimes .  Within the community, courts-both na­
t ional and supranational-interact i n  numerous ways .  Their j ur isdictions 
often overlap; they are l inked both horizontally  and vert ical ly ;  they apply  
a common se t  of laws. 
Central to this emerging community are semi-internationalized tri­
bunals grafted onto or l inked to the domestic courts of many States .  
Semi-internationalized tribunals ,  the newest members of the community 
of courts,  are being used to enforce international criminal  l aw in coun­
tries recovering from ethnic violence and mass atrocity. S uch courts­
now operating i n  East Timor and Kosovo and under development in 
Cambodia and Sierra Leone-are based i n  domestic legal systems while 
drawing on international judges ,  j urisprudence, and resources.  
This  Art icle argues that, for political reasons, the future of in terna­
t ional crim inal law enforcement wi l l  l argely be at the domestic level .  I t  
anticipates the emergence of a community of courts-domestic, 
semi-international ized, and supranational .  A decentralized system of 
international criminal l aw enforcement may give pause for concern: How 
can such a system be regul ated? How can uniformi ty and effectiveness 
be assured? It is the claim of this Article that, i n  a world i n  which 
2 .  See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supmnorional Adjudication,  1 07 YALE L.J.  273, 372 ( 1 997)  (referring to a "recognition of a 
community of cou11s around the world, units engaged in a common endeavor")� Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, A Real New World Order, 76 FoREIGN AFF. 1 83 ,  1 87 ( 1 997) (noting that citing 
intemational decisions helps courts "gain legitimacy by linking [themselves] to a larger com­
munity of courts") . 
4 Michigon Joumo/ of'!n/emaliono/ Lmv IYol. 24:1 
information is power,' the relationships between these courts-the ex­
change of information, ideas, and personnel-brings order and regular i ty 
to the system. These interdependent rel ationsh ips are defined by  the core 
principles of subsidiari ty and complementarity. Normatively, th i s  decen­
tral ized, horizontal enforcement system is a pos it ive development w ith 
the potential to greatly strengthen the enforcement of i nternational 
crim inal law. Such relationship-based communities of courts may hol d 
great promise for other areas of in ternati onal law enforcement  as wel l .  
The first Part o f  this Article reviews presently available mechan isms 
for i nternational cri minal law enforcement and suggests conclusions 
about their continued effectiveness .  Part I I  draws on international rela­
tions and comparative pol it ics to provide a close analysi s of the pol i t ical 
dec isions behind the creation of international criminal law enforcement 
mechanisms and i ncludes case studies of Cambodia, East Timor, and 
Rwanda. Part I I I  considers the operation and effectiveness of semi­
in ternat ionali zed courts ( i . e . ,  mixed panels of national and i nternational 
j udges applying i nternational law) through a case study of the Special 
Panels i n  the D istrict Court of D i l i ,  East Timor. Part IV provides the 
theoretical basis for this emerging system, cons idering the nature of e n­
forcement in in ternational criminal law and the horizontal and vertical 
relationships i n  the communi ty. Part I V  then presents guiding pr inc ip les 
for regulat ing the system of i nternational criminal law i n  the context of 
in ternational constitutional principles.  Finally, the Conclusion cal ls  for a 
code of conduct i n  i nternational criminal law enforcement and suggests 
that the model of a communi ty of courts  may be effective i n  other areas 
of in ternational law enforcement. 
I .  EXISTING MECHANISMS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
In  the past decade the possibi l i ties for the enforcement of in terna­
tional criminal l aw have expanded dramatical l y. Whi le this Part does not 
seek to provide a comprehensive analysis of all  of these mechanisms,  i t  
i s  i ntended to si tuate the overall argument of this Article i n  the context of 
presently exist ing mechan isms for i nternational cri minal l aw enforce­
ment. To this end, these mechanisms-namely, the In ternational 
Crim inal Court (ICC), the ad hoc tribunals, national courts, prosecutions 
under the universality principle,  mi l i tary tri bunals, and semi­
i nternationalized courts-are briefly rev iewed. Attention is focused, first, 
on structure and j urisdi ction and, later, on the normative considerations 
3 .  See generally JosEPH NYE, THE PARADOX O F  AMERICAN PowER: WHY THE 
WORLD's ONLY SuPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALONE (2002). 
Fall 20021 A ConnnunitY of' Courrs 5 
of effectiveness and appropriateness .  The most novel and potential ly 
most significant development in  international criminal  j ustice is the op­
eration of semi-international ized tribunals in which mixed panel s of 
national and international judges si t  within the domestic j udiciary of the 
host State .  These semi-i nternationalized tribunals are cons idered Ill par­
ticular detail as crucial  constituents of the community of courts . 
A. The Intemation{l/ Criminal Court 
Upon the rat ificat ion of the Rome Statute on Apri l l l , 2002,  many 
world leaders heralded the maturation of international criminal  l aw en­
forcement .  U . N .  Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that 
"[i] mpunity has been dealt a decis ive b low.".j The Nevv York Times re­
ported that the ICC "closes a gap in international l aw" o and the 
Econornist noted the world had ful fi l led "a promise made after the Nur­
emberg trials . . .  [to] provide a permanent forum for trying the world's 
most despicable criminals."() 
Yet ,  not everyone h as considered the emergence of the ICC as a 
pos i tive development.  Pierre Prosper, U . S .  Ambassador for War Crimes, 
described the ICC as "an attempt to i mpose a justice mechan ism" on the 
world. 7 The Uni ted S tates has taken the unprecedented step of repudiat­
ing the Rome S tatute,� wi th one senior administration official  descri bing 
it as  "a product of fuzzy-minded romanticism," and "not jus t  naive, but 
dangerous ."y Writ ing in the Weekly Standard, Jeremy R abkin  described 
the ICC as a "kangaroo court ," an "absurd . . .  poli t ical spectacle ." 1 0 
Whichever s ide of this debate one takes,  when the Rome Statute en­
tered i nto force in July 2002, the ICC became a reali ty ;  the new Court 
wil l  form a significant p art of the newly emergen t  system of 
4. Press Release, United Nations, Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo 
Ciampi of Italy and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Yideoconfer­
ence (Apr. I I, 2002) ( fol lowi ng ratification of the Rome Statute of the In ternational Criminal 
Court in Rome, Italy) .  
5.  Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, Without U.S. Role, N.Y. 
TtMES, Apr. 1 2, 2002, at AJ. 
6 .  A World Criminal Court: Give It a Welcome, THE EcoNOMIST, Apr. 13, 2002, a t  1 4. 
7. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Remarks at the Harvard Col loquium on International Af­
fairs (Apr. 13, 2002) (on file with author). 
8. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. 
TtrvtES, May 5, 2002, at A 1 8 . 
9. John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, quoted in Lewis, supm 
note 8, at A 1 8 . 
I 0. Jeremy Rabkin, Tire International Kangaroo Courr: Get Ready for the lnternmional 
Criminol Courr to Go After Israelis and Americans, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 29, 2002, at 1 4. 
Li kewise, in a Wal l  Street Joumal edi torial Ruth Wedgwood called the court a "bad idea" that 
oilers "no protection against magistrates from abroad." Ruth Wedgwood, An Intemationo/ 
Criminal Court Is Still a Bad Ideo . WALL ST. J ., Apr. I 5,  2002, at A I 7. 
6 !Vlichigun Joumal o(fnrenzational Lavv [Vol. 2-1-:1 
international criminal j ustice. Yet, as i ts detractors often fai l to see, 1 1  and 
i ts supporters regret,12 the role of the Court is l i mited both by i ts statute 
and its l ikely capacity constraints .  The purpose here i s  mere l y  to h igh­
l ight the possible role for the I C C-based on its inherent stre ngths and 
weaknesses-in the emerging system of international criminal j u st ice . 
The l imitations of the ICC ari se largely from two m aj or compro­
mises on j ur i sdiction and admissibi l ity pushed by the Uni ted S tates at 
the Rome Conference. 1 ·' The first compromise imposed temporal , sub­
stantive, and polit ical limits on the Court ' s  j ur isdiction . Jurisdiction 
rotione temporis i s  l imited to crimes "committed after the entry i nto 
force of the Statute .··I.J Likewise ,  the Court ' s  temporal j uri sdiction for 
States that subsequently become Parties i s  l imited to crimes "commi tted 
after the entry i nto force of [the] Statute for that State." 1 5  Thus ,  the C ourt 
wi l l  have no j urisdiction for cri mes committed before July 2002 and, 
wi th respect to States that subsequently ratify, the Court w i l l  not have 
jurisdiction over events before their  respective ratificat ions .  
Substantive j urisdictional constraints l imi t  the ICC to cons ideration 
of only the gravest international crimes. According to art ic le  l of the 
Rome Statute , the Court only has j urisdiction over "persons for the most 
seri ous crimes of international concern." 1 1' Article 5 deems genoc ide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes,  and the crime of aggres sion  to be 
l l . See. e.g., Wedgwood, supm note 10 ( cl aiming that the ICC provides no  protection 
against magistrates from abroad). 
12. See, e.g .. Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look ot rhe Jurisdictional Prm·isions qf' rhe 
Swtwe of rile /nrenwrionul Criminol Courr: The Case for Scrapping rhe Treoty, 20 Wrs. lNT' L 
L.J. 57, 58 (200 l )  (arguing that "'US-intluenced compromises in the final treaty produced a 
fatally-tlawed international criminal court" which is too weak to be effective ) .  
1 3 . See Young Sok Kim,  The Preconditions ro the Exercise of the Jurisdiction of the 
Jnrenwtionol Criminal Court: With Focus on Article 12 (Jj' rhe Rome Stotute, 8 J. I NT' L L. & 
PRAC. 47 ( 1 999) [hereinafter Kim, Preconditions] (descri bi ng the compromi se s  and negotiat­
ing proposals at Rome);  Young Sok Kim, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute (2000) (unpublished J .S .D .  d issertation, University of I ll i noi s  at Urbana­
Champaign, on file with author) (describing the negotiation of the Rome Statute in great de­
ta i l ) .  See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, Fourteenth Waldemar A. SolfLecture in International Lcnv: A 
Negotiator's Perspective on rhe lntemational Criminal Court, 1 67 MIL. L .  R E v  I ( 200 I )  
[hereinafter Scheffer, A Negoriaror's Perspecrivel (describing the U.S .  role i n  the negotiation 
of  the ICC Statute); David J. Scheffer, Staying rhe Course with the International Criminal 
Court, 35 CORNELL lNT ' L  L.J. 47, 68-87 (200 1 )  (discussing the U.S .  negotiating  position at 
Rome and how that is retlected in the Statute) ;  David J. Scheffer, The United Stmes and the 
Jntemotional Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. lNT' L L. 1 2, 1 2  ( 1 999) (considerin g  the United 
States' ''compel l ing interest in the establ ishment of a permanent international crimina l  court"). 
1 4 . Rome Statute of the International Oiminal Court, adopted by the U .N .  Dip lomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establ ishment of an International Criminal Court on 1 7  
July  1 998, art. I I, U.N.  Doc. A/CONF. 1 83/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
1 5 . /d. 
1 6 . See id. art. I; see also Mohamed M .  El Zeidy, The Principle of Complemenwrity: A 
New Mochinel)' to Implement lnternationol Criminal Ul\V, 23 MICH. J. l NT ' L  L .  869, 904 
(2002). 
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among these most serious cr i mes. However, that same artic le  also rei ter­
ates that j uri sdiction shal l  be l i mi ted to the "most serious cri mes of 
concern to the international community as a whole." 1 7  Whi le  it is clear 
that the enumerated l ist of cri mes i s  exclusive, the repetit ion of the seri­
ousness c lause in art ic le  5 has been read by some as a further restriction 
on j urisdiction to those cases of genoc ide, crimes against  humanity, war 
crimes, and aggression that are of concern to the "international  commu­
n i ty as a whole ."18 Under such a reading, relatively isolated instances of 
crimes against humanity wou ld not be cons idered of "concern to the in­
ternat ional community as a whole' '  and would not vest  the Court with 
j uriscl ict ion . 19 Whi le  the effect of this c lause remains ambiguous (pre­
sumably to be c larified through prosecutorial deci s ions and j udicial 
rul ings),  i t  i s  c lear that only a rel ative ly  narrow range of crimes fal ls 
w ithin the ICC's j uri sdict ion.  
Pol i t ical l imi ts on the ICC's j uri sdiction depend on dec i s ions by 
States Part ies .  Where cases are refened to the ICC by States Partiesc(J or 
the prosecutor in i t iates the investigation proprio motu,21 the Rome Stat­
ute imposes significant  preconditions on the exerci se of j urisdict ion.  As 
part of the l ast minute compromise in Rome, art ic le 12(2) requires that 
e i ther the terri torial State (the S tate where the crime occulTed )  or the 
national S tate ( the S tate of national i ty of the defendant) be a S tate Party 
or have accepted j uri sdiction wi th  respect to the i ndividual i n  question. 22 
What emerges then i s  a "consent regi me" based on terr i tor ial i ty and na­
t ionality.23 Thi s  is a rel at ively weak form of j ur isdiction ,  un likely to be 
1 7 . Rome Statute art. 5 .  
1 8 .  !d. ; see also Michael A. Newton. Compamtive ComplementaritY: Domestic Juris­
diction Consistent with the Rolli!' Statute of the International Crimina l  Court, 1 67 MIL.  L. 
REv .  20, 38 (200 I) (noting that "in order to fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, however. 
the offense must be on the high end of a scale of relative severity, and must have some quality 
that warrants the 'concern of the international community as a whole"') .  In dec iding which 
cases to investigate, the Prosecutor is again required by artic le 53 to take i nto account "the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims." Rome Statute art. 53( 1  ) (c ) .  
19. This  reading should be contrasted wi th  one that sees any instances of the enumer-
ated crimes as of international concern. See Madeline Monis,  ComplementaritY and Its 
Discontents: States. Victims, and the International Criminul Court, in INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL C RIMINAL COURT 
177 ,  1 85 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMES] (suggesting a read­
ing of the Statute to l imit  j urisdiction to "grave instances of the del ineated most serious 
crimes" is quite "damaging" and by "no means mandated by the treaty") . 
20. See Rome Statute art. 1 4. 
2 1 .  !d. art. 15 .  
22 .  !d. art. 12. The final text i s  far weaker than proposal s pu t  forward by  the United 
Kingdom and South Korea, which would have allowed j urisdiction if the custodial State ( the 
State who has physical control over the accused) or the victim State (the S tate of national ity of 
the victim of the c1ime), respectively. were a Party. See Kim, Preconditions, supra note 13, at 
59-64. 
23 .  Newton, supru note 1 8 , at 50. 
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triggered frequently because "in internal wars , the most common form of 
cont1 ict today-the present compromise provis ion . . .  does not allow for 
any j urisdict ion unless the S tate in  question i s  a Party to the S tatute ."2� 
Despite ratificat ion by a wide variety of States ,  those S tates most l ikely 
to be the sites of i nternational crimes are al so the least l ikely to be a 
S tate Party.2' 
A stronger form of j urisdiction ari ses under artic le 1 3  of the S tatute 
when the case h as been "referred to the prosecutor by the Security 
Council  acting u nder Chapter VIT."2n In these cases, the requirement that 
the nat ional or terr i torial State be party to the Statute is waived. 27 This 
fol lows from the fact that , according to the U . N .  Charter, S tates are re­
quired to "accept and carry out the deci s ions of the Security Counci l ,""x 
thereby "overrid[ ing] a S tate ' s  inherent nat ional authori ty  to ins is t  on 
using its own j udicial processes ."29 However, for the Security Counci l  to 
refer such a case requires chapter VII authority as well as agreement of 
al l five permanent members not to exercise a veto. This is an unl ikely 
scenario at present given the B ush adminis trat ion's  open host i l i ty to the 
Court. '0 
The second major compromise pushed by the United S tates during 
the Rome negotiations l imi ts the adm issib i l i ty of cases before the ICC 
through the principle of complementarity.11 The Rome S tatute requires 
that the Court find  the case i nadmissible when the case is being " investi­
gated or prosecuted by  a S tate which h as j urisdict ion" unless the S tate is 
"unwil ling or unable to prosecute" or where the case has already been 
i nvestigated by such a S tate and the S tate has decided not to  prosecute . '"  
The principle of complementarity has  a h is tory dating back to the  Treaty 
of Versail les ,  i n  which the "Al l ies agreed to accept Germany ' s  offer to 
try a select number of accused offenders before its Reichsaericht  Su-
24 .  Hans-Peter Kaul, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Trigger Meclw-
nism and Relationship to National Jurisdictions, in THE RoME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 49, 60 (Mauro Politi & 
Giuseppe Nesi eds., 200 1 ) . 
25 .  Examples might include States such as Iraq, the Russian Federation (signed but not 
ratified), North Korea, and Burma. 
26. Rome Statute art. 1 3 . 
27 .  Kaul, supra note 24,  a t  60. 
28 .  U.N. CHARTER art. 25 .  
29 .  Newton, supra note 1 8 ,  a t  49. 
30. Crossette, supra note 5 ,  at A3 (citing War Crimes Ambassador Piene Prosper for 
the U.S. position "that we continue to oppose the treaty and do not intend to become a party"). 
3 1 . See El Zeidy, supra note 1 6, at 896-929. 
32 .  Rome Statute art. 1 7( 1  ) .  Two additional limits o n  admissibility are where (c) "[t]he 
person has already been tJied for the conduct"; and (d) '·[t]he case is not of sufficient gravity 
to justify further action by the court." !d. 
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preme Court sitt ing at Leipzig ."'' Likewise, complementarity appeared in 
the first proposal s for an international crim inal court in  1 943. '� The prin­
ciple reflects the "sovereign right of srates to prosecute their own 
nationals" where thev are able and wi l l inQ: to do so . " D avid Scheffer, - � 
former U . S .  Ambassador for War Cri mes . describes compl ementarity as 
a ''primary deferral to national courts'' and an "extraordinary . . .  protec­
t ive mechan ism . " ' 
The appl ication of  complementarity and , part icularly, the mean ing of 
"unwi l l ing or unable  to prosecute" wil l  rest with the Court i tself;" al­
though the S tatute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence's provide 
some Q:uidel ines . AccordinQ: to the Statute, a State i s  unable or unwi l l i ng  � � � 
to prosecute when the prosecution has been undertaken for the purpose 
of shielding the accused from proceedings before the ICC,  where there 
has been unj ustified delay in  prosecution39 or where proceedings are not 
"being conducted independently or i mpartially."40 In mak ing  such deter­
minations the Court is instructed to "consider whether, due to a total or 
substantial col l apse or unavai lab i l i ty of its national j udicial  system, the 
S tate i s  unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence . . .  to 
carry out i ts proceedings ."41 The Prosecutor i s  required to notify S tates 
Parties of i nvestigations and to g ive those States the opportun ity to init i­
ate their own i nvestigations .  Likewi se, the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence provide an opportun ity for a State to present evi dence that "its 
courts meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the 
33 . El Zeidy, supra note 1 6, at 872 .  
34.  According to the 1 943 draft proposal for an international criminal court : "[A]s a 
rule, no case shall be brought before the Court when a domestic court of any one of the United 
Nations has jllli sdiction to try the accused and is in a posit ion and wil l ing to exercise j uri sdic­
tion . "  London Int'l Assembly, Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal 
Court art. 3 ( ! 943), reprinted in MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, 
HISTORICAL SuRVEY OF THE QUESTION _OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, U.N.  
Doc. NCN. 417/Rev. l ,  U.N.  Sales No. 1 949.v. 8  ( 1 949). 
3 5 .  Newton, supra note 1 8 , a t  26-27 .  
36 .  Scheffer, A Negotiator's Perspective, supra note 13, at l 0 .  
37 .  See El Zeidy, supra note 1 6, a t  899 (observing "some subjectivity had to be retained 
to give the court latitude on its decision on umvi l l ingness") .  
3 8 .  PREPARATORY COMM'N FOR THE lNT'L CRIMINAL COURT, FINALIZED DRAFT TEXT 
or THE RuLES OF PROCEDURE AND EviDENCE, ch.  3 ,  U.N.  Doc. PCNICC/20001 1 /Add . l .  
(2000) [hereinafter ICC R.P. & E v10.] .  
39 .  Such unjustified delay might wel l  apply in situations such as cun·ently seen in 
Cambodia, where domestic prosecutions have been delayed for decades. See infra Section 
II. B. I .  Though, of course, the ICC would not have temporal j urisdiction over the crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge. 
40. Rome Statute art. 1 7(2) (C). 
4 1 .  Rome Statute an. 1 7 ( 3 ) .  
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independent and impartial prosecution of s imi lar conduct," so as to avoid 
ICC j urisdiction .42 
The complementarity provisions of the Rome Statute create a system 
i n  which national courts are given the opportunity to prosecute local ly 
and the ICC serves as a backstop when States are unable  or unwil l ing to 
prosecute. This has been described by commentators as a "tiered 
a l location of authority"43 or as "strat ified concurrent jurisdict ion."44 In 
such a system, the interests of the national State to prosecute are pro­
tected up unti l the point where they confl ict with the "thin preferences of 
the transnational pol i ty in favor of prosecution," at which point  the case 
becomes admissible in the international forum .45 Whi le the rol e  of com­
plementarity in the emerging system of international criminal j u stice wi l l  
be  discussed more thoroughl y  below, 1" i t  i s  sufficient to  observe here that 
the compl ementarity princip le  s ignificant ly  l imits the c ircumstances in 
which cases are admissible before the ICC. While there w i l l  certain l y  be 
cases in which S tates Parties are unable or unwi l l ing to p rosecute, they 
are l ikely  to be few and far betwren . 
In  addition to the two major compromises of j urisdiction and admi s­
s ibi li ty, a third l imitation on the ICC is sheer capacity. The abi l ity of the 
ICC to hear cases is con strained by staffing and resources .  S ince 1 995 ,  
the International  Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugos l avia  (ICTY) 
has only i ssued n ineteen j udgments47 and, whi le some of these h ave cov­
ered more than one individual , an international adj udicatory body is not 
l ikely  to have the capaci ty to hear every case of crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and war crimes that fall s  within its j uri sdiction .  Whi le  future 
h igh level offenders,  such as Mi losevic or Pinochet, could w e l l  find 
themselves before the ICC,  the Court wi l l  presumably l ack  the necessary 
capacity to deal with the hundreds of thousands of poss ib le  defendants 
l ikely to be i ncrim inated after mass genocide or ethnic stri fe such as in 
Rwanda. Commentators have observed that thi s  wi l l  l ikely produce a 
situation in  which "the international forum seeks to prosecute the leader-
42. ICC R.P. & Evm. 5 1 ,  supra note 3 8 .  Prosecutorial decisions on admissibi l i ty are 
reviewable by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. See Rome Statute a11. 1 8 . 
43 . Newton, supra note 1 8 , at 67. 
44. Morris, supra note 1 9, at 1 96.  
45.  Wil l iam W. B urke-White, Reframing Jmpunitv: Applring Liherol International Law 
Theon· to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 H ARY. INT 'L  L.J .  467, 476 (200 1 )  (using 
l iberal international law and international relations theory to justify referencing domestic 
policy choices where they do not conflict with an "international constitution" defi ned through 
the preferences of the transnational polity ) .  
46. See infra Section IV.A.2.  
4 7 .  Judgements. at http://www.un .org/icty/judgement.htm ( last visited Feb. 5 ,  2003 ) 
( !CTY website ) .  
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ship stratum and leaves the lower strata of defendants to be tried in  na­
tional courts .".Js 
Taken col lectively, the two maj or compromises on jurisdiction and 
admissibi l ity along with de facto capacity constraints make the ICC an 
inherently l imited tool . Whi le  the ICC ' s  role  is important, it is unl ikely 
to deal the "decis ive b low . . .  to impunity"  predicted by Kofi Annan . For 
the Court to be truly effective then, it must be part of a larger system of 
international c riminal  j ustice. 
B .  The Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The j uri sprudence, practices ,  and contributions of the two ad hoc tri­
bunal s-the I nternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the I nternational Cri m inal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)-have been 
the subj ect of much scrutiny. It is indi sputable that the I CTY and I CTR 
have handed down important and well-reasoned judgments that have had 
a profound impact on the development of international criminal law. The 
Taclic case articulated the rules of command responsibi l ity, the Kunarac 
case found rape to be a crime against  humanity, and the A kayesu case 
was the first modern i nternational decis ion to find an individual gui l ty 
of genocide.·l'! The s imple fact that S lobodan Mi losevic currently stands 
before the I CTY accused of genocide and crimes again st humanity is a 
s ignificant step in the fight against  impunity.50 Opinions of suprana­
tional tribunals wi l l  conti nue to shape the contours of i nternational 
criminal J aw. 
For the purposes of this  argument, however, the l arger question is 
what role such tribunals will  p lay in the future enforcement of i nterna­
tional criminal justice. The short answer to that question i s  l ittl e  to none. 
While the j urisprudence of the ad hoc tribunal s will have far-reaching 
consequences as app l ied by  other courts ,  the tribunals themselves have 
such l imited juri sdiction that they are unlikely to have a m eaningful role 
in  future enforcement. The ICTR can only hear cases fro m  the Rwandan 
genocide of 1 994' 1 and the ICTY only has j urisdiction over crimes on the 
48. Morri s, supra note 1 9, at 1 96. 
49. Prosecutor v. Tadic,  ICTY Case No.  IT-94- 1 -T, Opinion and Judgment (May 7 ,  
1997), available a t  http://www.un .org/icty/judgement.htm; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case 
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-231 1 -T, Judgement (Feb. 22, 200 I ) , available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Judgement (Sept. 2. 1 998), available at http ://www. ictr.org. 
50. B i l l  Kel ler, The Monster in the Dock, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at A 1 9  (op-ed, ob-
serving that Milosevic 's  trial "would serve as a check on cyclical vengeance, and that i t  might 
even give pause to some future monster" ) .  
5 1 .  Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S .C .  Res. 955 ,  Annex, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. ,  art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 ( ! 994), omended by S.C.  Res. 
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territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 99 1 . 52 While these two courts will 
continue to help resolve the pressing need for j ustice in Rwanda and Yugo­
slavia, they have no abi l i ty to hear cases from other parts of the world.  
As the two ad hoc tribunals were created by the U.N.  Security Council 
acti ng under chapter V I I  authority,"' the Security Council could create ad­
ditional ad hoc tribunals or vest the ICTY with additional j urisdiction in  
appropriate c ircumstances .54 However, given the pol i tical al ignments n ec­
essary for and the expense of creating additional ad hoc tribunals ,  this 
seems most unl ikely. The 200 1 budget for the ICTY was U .S .$96.4 mil­
l ion, with a similar amount spent on the ICTR.'' As these funds come from 
assessed (required) contributions to the U.N. ,  they are the subj ect of much 
crit icism .56 Proposals for an ad hoc international tribunal for East Timor, 
for example, have been scuttled clue to the potential cost.57 The creation of 
further ad hoc tribunals is strictly l imited by politics on the S ecuri ty 
Counci l .  B ecause such tribunals are created under chapter V I I ,  al l of the 
permanent members must agree not to veto the enabling resolution. Given 
the outright hostil i ty that the B ush administration has shown toward in ter­
national cri mi nal j ustice and the recent testimony of the U .S .  War Crimes 
A mbassador that the ad hoc tribunals should end their work by 2008, it 
seems highly unlikely that the Uni ted States would support their prolifera­
tion."s While the creation of an ad hoc tribunal might fall within the 
1 1 65 ,  U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess. ,  3877th mtg. , U.N.  Doc . S/Resl l l 65 ( 1 998) ;  S .C .  Res .  1 329,  
U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess . ,  4240th mtg . ,  U .N.  Doc. S/Res/ ! 329 (2000).  
52 .  Statute of the International Tribunal [ for Yugoslavia] ,  adopted by S .C.  Res. 827, 
U.N.  SCOR, 48th Sess . ,  3 2 1 7 th mtg . ,  art. 8 ,  U.N. doc . S/Res/827 ( 1 993) ,  reprinted in BASIC 
Docu MENTs oF THE ICTY ( 1 998) .  
53 .  See, e.g . ,  S.C .  Res .  827,  supra note 52  (creating the ICTY);  S .C .  Res. 955,  supra 
note 5 1  (creating the ICTR). See generally Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in T H E  C HARTER OF 
THE UN ITED NATIONS:  A COMMENTARY 539 ( B runo Simma et al . eds . ,  2d ed .  2002) [hereinaf­
ter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (discussing the legal basis and history of the ICTY and ICTR) . 
54. This possibi l i ty was raised i n  the wake of September I I  as a "better alternative" to 
the use of mi l i tary tribunals for the prosecution of AI Qaeda members. See Anne-Marie 
S laughter, Terrorism and Justice, FIN. TIMES, Oct. I I , 200 I ,  at 23 . 
55 .  See Key Figures, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm ( l as t  v is i ted Apr. 
I I , 200 I ) ; see also Patricia Wald,  To Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence, 42 
HA RV. l N T ' L  L.J. 535,  536 n.3 (200 1 ). 
56. Patricia Wald ,  the U.S .  Judge at the ICTY from 1 999 to 2002, has criticized the cost 
of the tiibunals given their slow pace. See Patricia Wald, Inside A War Crimes Tribunal :  Does 
International Justice Really Work?, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Feb. 6, 2002 ) .  
57 .  Nelson Be lo  & Christian Ranheim, Prosecuting Serious Crimes in East Timor, 
Address at Justice and Accountabi l ity in East Timor: International Tri bunals and Other Op­
tions 5-7 (Oct. 1 6, 200 I ) , at http://www.etan.org/lh/pdfs/justeng.pdf (last vis i ted  Dec. 6, 
2002) ( report of a one-day Seminar in Dil i ) .  
58 .  Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Statement 
Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 28, 2002) ,  
available at http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rl s/nn/2002/857 l .htm ( testifying that  "this Admini­
stration is cal l ing for action. We have and arc urging both Tribunals to begin to aggressively 
focus on the end-game and conclude their work by 2007-2008 .") .  For further discussion of  the 
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perce ived national in terests of the permanent Security Counci l  members in 
some c ircumstances, i t  appears unl ikely to happen in  the near future. 
Moreover, with the entry i nto force of the ICC Statute, the Security Coun­
cil could simply refer the case to the ICC, pursuant to article 1 4(b) of the 
Statute, rather than create a new tribunal . 
While ad hoc tribunals have served an important role i n  bringing j us­
t ice to some i ndividuals and in the articulation of in ternational criminal 
l aw, their future effectiveness as enforcement mechani sms of interna­
t ional criminal law seems l imited.59 The creation of ad hoc tribunals 
appears to be a particular phenomenon of the 1 990s. Patric i a  Wale!, for­
mer U . S .  Judge at the ICTY, has described the ad hoc tribunals as 
· 'successful weigh stat ions,  warts and al l ,  on the path to permanent and 
effect ive j udicial  mechanisms ."60 She is correct to note the past successes 
of ad hoc tribunals as well as the fact that they are not l ikel y  to be far­
reaching or l ong-lasting mechani sms to combat i mpun ity. 
C. Domestic Courts 
Given the above considerations, domestic courts are p laying and wi l l  
continue to  play a key role i n  the enforcement of  international criminal 
j ustice. Such domestic enforcement comes i n  two principle varieties that 
warrant i ndependent consideration : first, domestic courts operating un­
der the territorial i ty  or nationali ty principles of j urisdiction and, second, 
domestic courts operating under the universality principle .  Taken to­
gether these domestic courts represent the "backbone of the emergmg 
system of global j ustice."61 
1 .  Domestic Courts Exerc is ing Territorial 
and National Jurisdiction 
Every day throughout the world, national courts operate local ly, ex­
ercis ing jurisdiction over their c it izens and those who commit crimes on 
their tetTitory. Thi s  alone is noth ing new. B ut,  many of these courts are 
rapidly expanding schism between the United States and Europe over this i ssue, see Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Human Rights Blame Game; Europe and America Are at Odds over the Ne>v 
Intenwtional Criminal Court. They Shouldn 't Be. , NEWSWEEK ( International Edition), Apr. 
22, 2002, at 26 (noting the ideological divide between European egal i tariani sm and American 
l ibertarianism, whereby "human rights i nstitutions lie c loser to the core .of Europe's interna­
tional identity; uni lateral mi l itary action against perceived enemies lies closer to America's") .  
59.  Jochen Frowein & Nico Krisch, A rticle 4 1 ,  i n  C HARTER COM M ENTARY, supra note 
53, at 735. 91 1 9 .  
60. Wald, supra note 56. 
6 1 .  Wil l iam W. Burke-Whi te, What If? Prosecuting Crimes of Chemical Terror, in 
TREAT Y ENFORCEM E NT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION I N  CRIMI NAL MATTE RS WITH 
SPECI AL REFERENCE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 77, 78 (Rodrigo Yepes­
Enriquez & Lisa Tabassi eds. ,  2002) .  
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also empowered to prosecute serious crimes subject to international 
l aw-namely genoc ide , crimes agai nst  humani ty, and war cri mes .  When 
they do, they become part of the community of courts, the enforcement 
mechanisms of international criminal j ustice . 
Today, nearly all domestic courts are able  to prosecute the consti tu­
ent elements of i ntemational crimes, such as murder. A s ignificant 
proportion of S tates have al so enacted the necessary domestic legi s lation 
to cri minal ize the actual i nternational wrongs .  While U . S .  practice in  this 
regard is  l imited,62 other S tates are far more progressive and have provi­
s ions coveri ng i nternational crimes in their  domestic l aws . �>' 
62. While the Uni ted States has codified the Genocide Convention, U .S .  courts only 
have j urisdiction where the c rime is committed on U.S .  terri tory or by a U .S .  national See 1 8  
U.S .C � 1 09 1 ( cl )  (2000) .  U .S .  couns do not have j urisdiction over crimes agai nst humanity, 
except where they constitute torture or where the perpetrators are mili tary officers subject to 
the Uni form Code of Mi l i tary Justice . See 1 8  U .S .C .  § 2340A(b)(2) (2000 ) ;  see also Douglass 
Cassel ,  Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of' the fnrer­
narional Criminal Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv .  42 1 ,  429 (200 1 )  (observing that "crimes 
against humanity are not codified as such") .  Likewise, war crimes are only partial ly codificd 
in U.S .  law, with the added requirement that the victim or perpetrator be a U.S. national .  See 
1 8  u.s.  c. � 244 1 (b )  (2000) .  
63 . See MARC WELLER & WI L LI A M  B uR KE-WHITE, No PLACE TO HIDE: NEw DEVEL-
OPMENTS I N  T H E  EX ERCISE Of I N TE R NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming 2003) 
(manuscript ch .  3 )  (prov iding the text of the domestic legislation in a variety of States) .  For 
instance, Austral ia  has criminal ized war crimes as we l l  as some crimes against humani ty. See 
War Crimes Amendment Act, 1 988  (Austl . ) .  See also Polukhovich v. Commonwealth ( 1 99 1 ) , 
1 72 C.L.R. 50 I ,  for an Australi an crimes against humanity trial . Austrian courts have juri sdic­
tion to punish those crimes which Austria i s  obligated to punish based on its treaty 
ratifications, including the Geneva Conventions and the Torture Convention. See § 64 Abs 7 
StGB. Belgian courts are empowered to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
as well as crimes against humanity. See Belgian Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, translated in 38 I .L .M. 9 1 8  (Act of June 1 6, 
1 993  conceming the punishment of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1 2  August 
1 949 and their Additional Protocols I and I I  of the Geneva Conventions of 1 8  June 1 977, as 
amended by the Act of I 0 February 1 999 concerning the punishment of grave breaches of 
intemational humanitarian law). Bosnian courts can hear cases of genocide and war crimes. 
See Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ch. XVI ,  arts. 1 5 3-66 ( 1 998) 
(Criminal Offences Against Humanity and International Law) , available at 
http://www.ohr. int/ohr-dept/lega l .  Botswana's courts can hear cases of war c rimes .  See Geneva 
Conventions Act of 1 970, Government Gazette 237 (Supp. F) (Aug. 26, 1 970) .  Canadian 
Com1s have jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity. See Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act, ch. 24, 2000 S.C. ( Can.) ( implementing the Rome Statute) .  
See also R .  v. Finta, [ 1 994] S .C .R .  70 1 (Can . ) ,  in  which the Canadian Supreme Court ruled on 
crimes against humanity committed dming World War II .  Chi le can prosecute war crimes and 
in ternational crimes specified in international treaties. See C6digo Pen al 1 874 (Chi le) ( as 
amended). Croatian courts are empowered to hear any crime that Croatia i s  obligated to pun­
ish under international law. See Penal Code ( Kasnemi Zakon), Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Croatia I I  0/ 1 997 (Oct.  2 1 ,  1 997) .  This  i s  but a smal l sample of the more than one hundred 
States that can prosecute international crimes domestical l y. 
For a more extensive l ist including the text of implementing legislation, i nc luding Czech 
Republic, Denmark. El Salvador, Ethiopia, Germany, Fin land, France, Guatemala, Hungary, 
Indi a, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands, New 
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Examples of local courts being used to prosecute international 
crimes are numerous .  Even in  the United States ,  domestic courts have 
been used for the prosecuti on of internat i onal crimes including pi racy, 
s lave trading,  and, more recently, international  terrorism.1'4 Three recent 
cases are i l lustrative of these possible charges under domestic federal 
and state law. First, Richard Reid, the al leged "shoe bomber" who i s  ac­
cused of attempting to bring down an American Airl ines tl ight from 
Paris to M iami in  December 200 1 ,  has been indicted in U . S .  federal 
cour t  for attempted murder, h ij acking, and use of a weapon of mass­
destruction .65 Second, Zacarias Moussaoui ,  accused of conspiring with 
AI Qaeda as the twentieth h ij acker of September 1 1 , has been indicted in 
the Federal D istrict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on charges 
of conspiracy to commit terrorism, conspiracy to commit aircraft h ij ack­
ing, and conspiracy to ki l l  U . S .  employees.66 Likewise, the 1 993 World 
Trade Center bombers were tried in  U.S .  federal court in  New York for 
terrorism.67 Domestic courts from Rwanda to Kosovo have also been ac­
tive in prosecuting i nternational crimes that occurred locally.  
The reasons why national courts are bound to play a s ignificant role  
in  the enforcement of i nternational criminal l aw are clear. Local courts 
are ubiquitous .  Nearly every S tate has courts of j ustice, though these 
differ in form ,  structure, and procedure. Given the omnipresence of local 
j udicial mechanisms, nearly every i nternational crime is  subject to the 
territorial j urisdiction of the courts of some State . Whether those courts 
are empowered and wi l l ing to exercise j urisdiction is another question. 
Likewise, local courts are close to the acts in question. Given physical 
proximity, l ocal courts often have the best access to information,  evi­
dence, and testimony about the alleged events . 
There are, however, s ignificant  dangers i n  the local prosecution 
of i nternational crimes. First, l ocal  courts are m ore l ikely to be biased or 
political l y  motivated than the i nternational courts discussed above . The 
very proximi ty to the crime, the local press coverage, and the 
searing pain of knowing victims and survivors (al l  the reasons why 
Guinea, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, China, Portugal, Russia, Senegal , Sey­
chelles, S ingapore, Slovenia, Spain,  Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tadj ikistan, Uganda, 
United Kingdom, Umguay, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe, see WEL L E R  & BURKE­
WHITE, supra . 
64. Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,  
200 I ,  at A39. 
65. Indictment, United States v. Reid, (D. Mass. 2002) (No. 02- 1 00 1 3-WGY), at 
http://news.findlaw.com ( last visited Dec .  20, 2002) .  
66.  Indictment, United States v .  Moussaoui , (E. D.  Va. 200 I )  (No. I :0 1 -cr-00455-A), czt 
http ://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov ( last visited Dec. 20, 2002). 
67 . Benjamin Weiser, Suspected Chief Plotter in Trade Center Blast Goes on Trial 
Toda)', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1 997, at B l .  
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venue change is often sought in ordinary trials) may undermine the 
fairness of the procedure . Second, the quali ty of j ustice in local courts 
differs dramatical ly. 'Whi le some States have extremely wel l -developed 
legal systems ,6" others lack even the most rudimentary legal too ls . ('" Third, 
in the prosecution of international crimes, there is often a need to convince 
both a local and a global polity of the fairness of the proceedings and the 
legiti macy of justice rendered. Local courts are least l ikely  to be v iewed as 
fair and unbiased by outside observers . 
Given their ubiquity and the omnipresence of their j urisdict ion,  local 
courts wil l l ikely find themselves on the front l i ne of adj udicat ing inter­
national cri mes .  Vvhi l e  many States may be fortunate enough to avoid 
having internat ional crimes committed local l y, September I I  is i l lustra­
tive of the growing "threats posed by non-State actors . . .  by c iv i l  
confl ict  spil l ing across borders, by shadowy global criminal networks, 
and by chemical , biological , and nuclear weapons."70 However, there re­
mains a gaping hole i n  the abi l ity of States to prosecute i ntern ational 
crimes locally. M any States, i nc luding the U nited States, h ave not e n­
acted the requisite domestic legislat ion to prosecute certain maj or 
i nternational crimes, such as genocide and crimes against humani ty. If 
national courts are to play a s ignificant rol e  in a system of i n ternational 
cri minal justice, there i s  a need to c lose this gap . 7 1 
2. National Cou rts E xercis ing Universal Jurisdict ion 
In  addition to hearing cases based o n  the territorial ity and nationali ty 
principles of j urisdict ion,  many of the ubiquitous national  courts de­
scribed above are also able  (based on the principle of u ni versality) to 
hear cases of the most severe i nternational crimes committed extraterri ­
torial ly. 7 2  When States exercise  u niversal j urisdiction, they become 
"independent actors in the i n ternational arena . . .  app ly [ ing] . i nterna-
68.  Koh, supro note 64 (arguing for the prosecution of September 1 1  crimes and ob-
serving "if any judicial system in the world can handle a case l i ke this fairly, e fficiently, and 
openly, i t  is ours") .  
69. Interview with Gerald Gahima, Attorney General of Rwanda, in  Kigal i ,  Rwanda 
(Aug. 27, 200 1 )  (noting the need for penci ls and paper to record statements in trial s ) .  
70 .  Anne-Marie Slaughter & Will iam Burke-Whi te ,  An Internationa l  Constitutional 
Mornent, 43 HARV.  lNT ' L  L.J. I ,  2 (2002) .  
7 1 .  Cassel ,  supra note 62, at 436. 
72 .  This principle was fi rst articulated by Hugo Grotius in  1 624. See HuGo GRonus, 
DE JURE B ELLI AC PACIS LIBRI IRES, book II, ch. XX, § XL(l) ,  at 504 (James B rown Scott 
ed., Francis W. Kelsey trans. 1 925) ( 1 624) ("[T]he fact must also be recognized that kings ,  and 
those who possess rights equal to those kings, have the right of demanding puni shments not 
only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account 
of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of 
nations, in regard to any person whatsoever . . . .  " ) .  
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t iona! norms impartial ly, without deferr ing to then governments. ' ' ' '  For 
the purposes of this Article,  i t  is not necessary to provide a derailed ac­
count of the exercise of universal j uri sdiction . 7·1 Rather, the goal is to 
consider briefly where and how universal jurisdiction w i l l  be exercised 
and where it fits within the emerg ing system of i nternational criminal 
law enforcement. 
In order for a court to hear a case under the universal i ty principle, 
the State in  which the court sits must make an a priori pol i ti cal decision 
to grant its courts universal j urisdiction . 7' This is  often a contentious 
decision for the domestic legis lature and national executive . Non­
Governmental Organi zations ( NGOs) and victims groups advocate the 
enactment of universal j urisdiction ,  whi le mi l itary and dip lomatic au­
thorities argue the need to protect State sovereignty and to avoid,  in the 
words of Henry Kissinger, "substitut ing the tyranny of j udges for that of 
governments."76 Nonetheless,  many States have enacted the requisite 
domestic l egi slation to exercise universal j urisdiction over the most seri­
ous international offenses. 77 M ore than 1 20 States have adopted 
legislation to prosecute war crimes under the un iversal ity principle78 and 
at least 95 have adopted legis lat ion with respect to crimes against hu-
. 7� mamty. 
73 .  Anne-Marie Slaughter, .Judicial Gluboli-;ation. 40 V11 . J .  lNT' L L. I 1 03 ,  1 1 04 
(2000) (borrowing from the French Insti tute of International Law). 
74. For a more detai led discussion of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, see PRINCE-
TON PROJECT ON UNI VERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION (200 ] )  [hereinafter PRINCETON PRINCIPLES] (offering a framework of guidelines 
for the exercise of universal j urisdiction) ;  AMNESTY I NT ' L, UNIVERSAL J URISDICTION:  THE 
DuTY oF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION, AI No. OIR 53/005/200 1 (200 1 )  
[hereinafter AMNESTY lNT ' L, UNIVERSAL J URISDICTION) (for an exhaustive fifteen-part review 
of the domestic implementing legislation ) ;  WELLER & B UR KE-WHITE,  supra note 63 (review­
i ng the h istory of universal jurisdiction, the crimes subject thereto, and domestic l egislation 
authorizing courts to exercise universal jurisdiction); Wi l l iam J. Aceves, Liberalism and Inter­
national Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of 
Transnational Law Litigation, 4 1  HARV. lNT' L L.J.  1 29 ( 2000) (considering the Pinochet case 
as a move toward more general enforcement of international criminal law ) ;  Kenneth C. Ran­
dal l ,  Universal .Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx .  L. REv. 785 ( 1 988 )  (d iscussing 
the history of universal j urisdiction);  Marc Weller, On the Ha-:.ards of Foreign Travel for Dic­
tators and Other International Criminals, 75 INT' L AFF. 599 ( 1 999) (discussing the impacts of 
the Pinochet case on universal j uri sdiction and accountabi l i ty) .  
75 .  Cf PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, at 30 (tinding that the lack of domestic 
i mplementing legislation should not be a bar to prosecution). 
76. Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF. ,  July/Aug. 
200 1 ,  at 86, 86; cf Christopher Hitchens, Court Time for Henrv, THE NAT ION, Nov. 5, 200 1 ,  
at 9 (argui ng that the time has come for a trial o f  Henry Kissinger under the universali ty prin­
ciple) ; CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER (2000) .  
77 .  For an exhaustive l ist of such States, see WELLER & BURKE-W HITE,  supra note 63.  
78 .  AMNESTY lNT 'L ,  UNIVERSAL J URISDICTION, supra note 74. 
79. See id. ch. 6 (providing a complete chart of  domestic implementing legislation for 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction);  see, e.g. , C.P.M. art. 208 ( B raz. 1 969 ) ;  Code 
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Laws au thori zing the exercise of universal jur i sdiction vary s ign ifi­
cantly in scope and character, from high ly  restrictive app l i cat ions of 
universal j ur i sdiction to legis lation , such as that of Belgi u m ,  which 
opens the door to its nearly unfettered exerc i se .  Because of the broad 
scope of universal j urisdiction legislation, Be lgium has found its courts 
flooded with cases and,  according to i ts  Foreign Min ister, i s  now consid­
ering restricting the exercise of universal j ur i sdiction, at  least  "to rnodify 
the i ssue of immunity for serving pol i t icians.""" The scope o f  leg is lat ion,  
and whether to enact such legislation at al l ,  remains a pol i t ical  choice for 
executives and l egis latures around the globe . 
The second prerequisite for the exerc ise of universal j ur i sdict ion i s  
that a prosecutor, an  investigating judge, or, in the pClrtie civile system , a 
victim must decide to in i tiate a case. There are a growing number of ex­
amples where this has occurred. The most obvious, of c ourse, i s  the 
Pinochet case, i n  which an NGO-the Progressive Union of Prosecu­
tors-filed a complaint  agains t  Pinochet with the Span i sh  Audiencia 
Nac ional . i) 1  A human rights entrepreneur,82 namel y  the Span i sh  magistrate 
Bal tazar Garzon, who was already fami liar with the dirty war in Chi le ,  
catalyzed the i nvestigation of P inochet and eventual l y  sought h is  extradi­
t ion from the United Kingdom.83 Those to whom Harold Koh refers as 
d ' instruction criminel le art. 1 0  and Law of Dec. 3 ,  1 998 (Belg . ) ;  Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act, ch. 24, 2000 S.C. (Can . ) ;  C6digo Penal art. 1 50 ( 1 999) and C6digo Or­
ganico de Tribunales arts. 6, 8 (Chi le 1 990); Penal Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1 957,  
art. 1 7( 1 ) ; C6digo Penal de El Salvador an. 36 1 ( 1 973) ;  Penal Code of Finland ( 1 975 ) ,  ch .  1 3 ; 
§ §  6( 1 ) , § 6, 220a StGB ; Penal Code of Honduras, arts. 5 .5 ,  320 ( 1 984) ; Pena l  Code §§  1 2, 
223-225 ( Nor. 1 902) ;  Penal Code art. 358  ( Rom. 1 968)  (the act must also be cri minal in the 
place of commission for Romania to be able to exercise jurisdiction ) ;  L . O.P.J .  art. 23 .4 
(Spain) ;  Lag om Straff for Folkmord [Law on Punishment of Genocide] art . 1 69 ( 1 964) 
(Swed . ) ;  Swiss Mi l i tary Penal Code art. 1 1 0 ( 1 937)  (Swi tzerland can only exercise universal 
j LIIisdiction if the crime is committed as part of an armed confl ict) ;  C6digo Penal art. I 0.  7 
( Uru . 1 934);  Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ch .  1 6  ( 1 976) ;  see 
also Attomey Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann (lsr. S. Ct. 1 962) ,  reprinted in 36 l .L .R .  277, 299, 
304 (the trial of Adolph Eichmann for crimes against humanity). See generalLy Marianne 
Holdgaard Bukh, Prosecution Before Danish Courts of Foreigners Suspected of Serious Viola­
tions of Human Rights or Humanitarian Law, 6 EuR. REV. PuB. L. 339 ( 1 994) (on Danish 
law) .  
80. Marl ise S imons, Human Rights Cases Begin to  Flood into Belgion Courts, N.Y. 
TIM ES, Dec. 27, 200 1 ,  at AS. 
8 1 .  See Aceves, supra note 74, at 1 62 .  
82 .  See, e.g. , MARGARET E. KEcK & KATHRYN SIKKINK,  AcTIVISTS B E YOND BoRDERS :  
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN  INTERNATIONAL POL IT ICS 3 1  ( 1 998)  ( referring to  "organizations 
and individuals within advocacy networks" as "pol i tical entrepreneurs who mobi l i ze resources 
l ike information and membership and show a sophisticated awareness of the pol i tical  opportu­
nity structures within which they are operating"). 
83. See Aceves, supm note 74, at 1 64 .  For the Brit ish proceedings, see Regina v. Bow 
St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3 ) ,  1 A.C. 1 47 (H .L .  2000) .  
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"international norm entrepreneurs ,"x4 such as Judge Garzon, have been 
fol lowing th i s  pattern around the globe.x' Belgium has convicted numer­
ous i ndividuals of war crimes against civi l ian populations in R wanda'6 
and "targets of other l awsui ts inc lude offic ia ls  from Cuba, I raq, I vory 
Coast, Rwanda, Cambodia, Chad, Iran and Guatemala."x7 To comply 
with the ICJ 's recent Congo decis ion,38 Be lg ium has had to drop prosecu­
t ions of sitt ing otfic ial s such as I srae l i  Prime M i ni ster S h aron .  Germany 
and Switzerland have l ikewi se prosecuted B osnian war crimes under the 
pri nciple of universal j ur i sdiction . x9 I n  l ight of this growing State prac­
tice, M .  Cherif B assiouni has observed that " [u]n iversal j ur isdiction has 
become the preferred technique by those seeki ng to prevent impunity for 
international crimes."00 
Notwithstand ing the Congo decision l imiting prosecutions o f  s i tt ing 
heads of State and fore ign m i ni sters, universal j urisdict ion i s  l i ke ly  to 
p lay a s ignificant role i n  the future enforcement of international criminal 
l aw. Again ,  comparative pol i t ics helps exp lai n  deci sions to enforce in ter­
national criminal l aw. The i n it ial decis ion to enact legislation authorizing 
courts to exercise universal j urisdiction i s  rel atively low cost for the leg­
i s lature and executive of the enacting State. At the t ime the enab ling 
legi s lation i s  passed, i t  i s  unl ike ly  for there to be part icular cases pending 
and therefore fewer entrenched i nterests against passage.  While some 
States such as the Uni ted S tates are un likely to support universal 
84. See. e.g. , Harold Hongju Koh,  How International Hwnwr Rights Low is Enforced, 
74 I N D. L.J.  1 397. 1 409 ( 1 999). 
85. See generally REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE : C R I MI N A L  
PROSECUTIONS I N  EUROPE SINCE 1 990 F o R  WAR CRIMES, C R I M E S  AGAI N ST HUMANITY, TOR­
TURE, .-\ ND GENOCIDE ( 1 999). 
86. Loi relative a Ia  repression des viol ations graves de droit international humanitaire 
ii 7 (Feb. I 0, 1 999) (Belg. ) ,  reprinted in MoNITEUR B E LGE (Mar. 23,  1 999),  allows prosecu­
t ion under the universality principle. Cases have included the trials of two Cathol ic nuns, 
Consolata Mukangango and Jul ienne Mukabutera, who were sentenced to over ten years im­
prisonment. See Appeal of Three Rwandans Convicted of Genocide Put Off to December, 
WoRLD NEWS CoN NECTION, Oct. 1 0, 200 1 ,  available at 200 1 WL 28793236. 
87. Simons, .wpm note 80, at A8 . 
88 .  Given the recent International Court of Justice deci sion in  the Congo case, i n  which 
i t  was found that the Belgian anest warrant for the sitting foreign minister of the Congo vio­
l ates international law, Belgium may wel l  need to carve out an immunity exception for serving 
politicians. See An·est Warrant of I I  Apri l 2000 (Congo v. Belg. )  ( I .C .J .  Feb. 1 4, 2002), re­
printed in 4 1  l .L .M.  536 (2002). 
89. See, e.g. , Public Prosecutor v. Djajic ,  No. 20/96, S .  Ct. B avaria, 3d Strafsenat 
( 1 997),  reprinted in 92 AM.  J. I N T ' L  L. 528 ( 1 998)  (prosecution under the universality princi­
ple for killing unarmed Muslim civi l i ans) ;  see also BGHSt 45, 64 . For the Swiss case, see In 
re G. Mil itary Tribunal, Division I ,  Lausanne, Switz. ,  Apr. 1 8, 1 997, discussed in Andreas R.  
Ziegler, fnternmional Decision, 92 AM. J .  I N T ' L  L. 78 ( 1 998) .  
90. M. Cheri f Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for lntenwtional Crimes: Historical 
Perspectil·es wrd ContemporarY Proctice, 42 VA . J. l NT'  L L. 8 1 ,  82 (200 I ) . 
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jurisdict ion,� ; a suffic ient  number of States al ready have demonstrated 
the exercise of un iversal j ur isdict ion to be a potent tool .  
The second prerequisi te necessary for the exercise of  un iversal j uris­
diction-namely, that a prosecutor, i nvestigat ing judge , or v ic t im in i tiates 
a case-is also l ike ly to be met frequently. Vict ims seek redress in any 
forum avai l able .  For prosecutors, universal j urisdiction sati s fies  humani­
tarian concerns and may prov ide career-enhancing publ ici ty.�" \Vhi le the 
chal lenges of obtaining extradit ion and custody over an acc used remain,  
the Pinochet case demonstrates the possibil i ties for apprehension . ') ;  Thus, 
the procedural hurdles to i n it iating universal prosecutions are rel atively 
low, the pol itical costs thereof to necessary actors are nominal ,  and the 
potential benefi ts to human rights entrepreneurs pursuing such cases are 
extremely high . 
Given the growing importance of universal j urisdic t ion,  a brief nor­
mative consideration is  in  order. The principle benefit of universal 
j ur isdiction is  the provision of an al ternate means of bringing to j ustice 
serious criminals when the S tate where the crimes occurred is unable or 
unwi l l ing to prosecute . In the Pinochet case, for example, C hi l e  was nei­
ther able nor wil l ing to prosecute its former president .  Universal 
j urisdiction offered an alternative recourse to ensure that P inochet was 
held accountable for his crimes . There are, however, drawbacks. First, 
the prosecuting court may be far removed from the locus of the crime, 
making investigation and community engagement with the proceedings 
more difficult and the potential reconci l ing effects of j ustice more elu­
sive. Second, some i ndividuals and groups may not recognize the right 
of the prosecuting State to exercise universal j uri sdiction ,  i mpeding the 
perceived legit imacy of the process. Third, many States h ave not enacted 
the requisite domestic legis lat ion to prosecute crimes universal ly, mak­
ing prosecution impossible in some cases . Finally, as the P inochet case 
i ndicates, such prosecutions are easi ly polit icized and may cause conflict 
between a State ' s  j udicial and foreig n  affai rs functions. Nonetheless, in 
many cases,  prosecution under the universality principle may be the pre­
ferred way to avoid impunity for serious i nternational crim inals . 
D. Military Tribunals 
President George W. Bush's  deci s ion to create mili tary tribunals for 
the trial of Al  Qaeda suspects and detainees raises the possibi l i ty of trials 
9 1 .  See Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Lcnr, 200 I U. CH I .  LEGAL F. 
323.  
92. Before the Pinochet Case, B al tazar Garzon was a relatively unknown regional mag-
is trate; today he travels the world on the lecture circuit in addition to his judicial duties.  
93.  See Regina v. Bow St. Metro .  Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, I 
A.C. 1 47 (H .L .  2000); see olso Weller, supra note 74. 
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by m il i tary tribunals for certa in  c lasses of international crim inals .  The 
President ' s  m i i i tary order of N ovember 1 3 ,  200 1 requires the Secretary 
of Defense to set regulations for and establ ish mi l i tary courts to try any 
non- U . S .  c it i zen who "has engaged in ,  aided or abetted, or conspired to 
commit.  acts of i nternational terrorism.""4 As long as internat ional cri mes 
are included in  that grant of j ur isdiction to mi l itary courts, such courts 
wi l l  be able w enforce i nternational criminal law. 
Whi le  mi l i tary courts are extremely rare, there are some precedents.  
With vary ing degrees of consti tutional legitimacy, the Uni ted States used 
mi l itary courts after the Civi l  War and 'vVorld War I I  to try, for example, 
German nationals who i nfi l trated the Uni ted States v ia  submarine."' The 
U nited Kingdom convened the D iplock Courts to deal with crimes in 
Northern J reland. 'i(· In so doing,  i t  d iscarded many of the tradit ional pro­
tections afforded suspects, notably the right to a jury trial and l imits on 
admiss ibi l i ty of evidence. Abandoning these protections required the 
Uni ted Kingdom to i ssue notices of derogation pursuant to art icle 1 5  of 
the European Convention on the ground that there was an emergency 
s i tuation i n  Northern Ireland. 'J7 N onetheless ,  challenges to the D iplock 
process before the European Court of Human Rights were in part suc­
cessful ,  wi th the Court rul ing that extended detention was i nconsistent 
with the Convention. 'Js I srael has also rel ied on mi l itary j ustice during the 
First Intifada. "" 
94. Mil i tary Order No. 2:?.2, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,83 1 (Nov. 1 6, 200 1 ). 
9 5 .  See Ex Parte Quirin. ] 1 7  U.S . I ( 1 942) .  
96.  See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Northern Ireland's Criminal Trials Without JurY: The 
Diploci..: Experiment, 5 A N N .  S U RVEY TNT' L & COM F'. L. 239 ( 1 999) .  
97 .  John D .  Jackson & Sean Doran, Conventional Trials in Unconventional Times: The 
Dipluck Court Experience, 4 CRIM. L.F. 503, 508 ( 1 993 ) ; see also Communication of the Per­
IJWnent Representation of the United Kingdom to the Council of" Europe, No. 2 ,  1 97] Y.B .  Eur. 
Conv. on H .R. 26-2 8 ;  Note Verba/e. United Kingdom Perman.ent Representative to the Cowz­
cil of Europe Stmshourg, 1 975 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.  1 8 ; 1 97 8  Y.B .  Eur. Conv. on H.R.  22 
(Communication of the Permanent Representation of Turkey to the Council of Europe, No. 
823/ 1 52 ) .  The European Convention provides that duting "war or other public emergency 
threatening the l i fe of the nation," parties may "take measures derogating from [their] obliga­
tions under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation ' '  
Convention for the Protection o f  Human Righ ts and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1 950, art. 
1 5 ,  2 ! ]  U.N.T.S .  22 1 ,  232 [hereinafter European Convention] . 
9 8 .  See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 1 45 Eur. Ct. H .R.  ( 1 98 9 ) ;  see a lso Jackson & 
Doran, supra note 97,  at 509; Wilson Finnie, The Prevention ol Terrorism Act and the Euro­
pean Convention on Human Rights, 52 Moo. L.  RE v . 703 ( 1 989);  Stephen Livingstone, A 
Week Is a Long Ti11ze in Detention: B rogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 40 N .  IR. L.Q. 288 
( 1 989 ) .  
99.  Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism, and the Problem of Administrative De-
tention in Israel: Does a Democracy Hm·e the Right to Hold Terrorists m Borgoining Chips ?.  
1 8  ARIZ.  J. l NT ' L  & COMP. L. 72 1 ,  736 ( 200 1 )  (quoting AMNESTY lNT'L,  ISRAEL' s FORGOT­
TEN HOSTAGES: LEBANESE D ETAINEES  IN ISRAEL A N D  KHIAM DETE NTION CEN TER ( ! 99 7 ) :  
" [ B]etween 1 986 and 1 9 8 8 ,  eleven people were captured in Lebanon and brought to  Israe l .  
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The structures , procedures, i ndependence, and fairness of  mi l i tary 
court s  vary dramatical l y. Preside nt B ush 's  original order was drafted 
-vv ith extreme breadth. al lowi ng for secret tribunal s without g uarantees of 
the core mini mum rights to free and fair tri al . A v igorous pol icy debate 
i n the United States helped shift the posit ion of the B ush admin i stra­
t ion,  1 1 111 leading to the i ssuance of operat ing regulations that provide 
s i gnificantly greater procedural protections i ncluding rights to publ ic 
tri aL to confront witnesses and to representation by counc i l . 1 0 1  Even 
these more l iberal regulat ions ,  however, have been cri t ic ized for 
v io lat ing international legal obl igations . 1 u2 
The prospects for the use of mi l i tary commissions as part of the sys­
tem of international crim inal j ust ice are mixed. On the one hand, 
m i l i tary comm iss ions otTer the promise of short-run effic iency. They are 
easy to create (such as through B ush's  mi l itary order) and can be vested 
with the power to prosecute in ternational crimes.  Yet ,  as the proposed 
use of mi l i tary tribunal s  after September 1 1  i ndicates,  they may produce 
a significant backlash from civ i l  society, imposing a different set of po­
l it ical costs .  Moreover, mi l itary tribunals are often i ncons istent with the 
l iberal motives S tates normally art iculate for the enforcement of in terna­
tional criminal j ustice. If enforcement i s  reall y, as Gary B ass  c la ims ,  the 
product of the "principled i dea" of "legal i sm," then S tates w i l l  presuma­
bly choose enforcement mechanisms which better complement the 
legal i s t  paradigm. 10' Thus, m i l i tary tribunals are only l ikely to be u sed 
where a nat ion feels directly threatened and i n ternational cr iminal j ust ice 
i s  being exerci sed for retribution and i ncapaci tat ion,  rather than as p art  
of  a move toward legal i sm.  While September 1 1  i s  un likely to be the 
only incident that produces such conditions, we may hope s im ilar  i nci­
dents are few and far between. 
B eyond the pol i ti c s  of m i l i tary tribunals ,  normative consi derat ions 
mi l i tate agains t  their use . M i l i tary tribunal s ,  depending on the ir  structure 
and rules, may well  violate core princ ip les of international l aw, such as 
There. they were put on trial before mi l itary courts and sentenced to pri son terms, ranging 
from eighteen months to ten years.") .  
I 00.  For this debate see, e .g . ,  Koh, supra note 64;  Jordan J.  Paust, Antiterrorism Mili-
run· Commissions: Courting lffegofity, 23 MICH.  J. INT' L L. I (200 1 ): Slaughter, .l'llpm note 
54: Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WAL L  ST. J ., Dec .  3, 200 L at A 1 8 . 
I 0 I .  See, e.g. , Charles Lane, Terrorism Tribunal Rights Are Expanded, WASH. PosT, Dec. 
28. 200 l ,  at A I ;  Katherine Q. Seelye, Pemagon Savs Acquittctls Mar Not Free Dewinees, N.Y. 
Tifi.IES, Mar. 22, 2002, at A 1 3 ;  Editorial, How to Try a Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 200 I ,  at 
A32 (noting that the Bush administration was "about to release procedural rules for i ts pro­
posed mil i tary tribunals that are much fairer than 01iginally feared") .  
1 02 .  See generafh· Jordan Paust, Ami-Terrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc 
DOD Rules of Procedure, 23 MICH.  J. INT ' L  L. 677 (2002).  
I 03. GARY BASS, STAY THE  HAND OF  VENGEANCE:  THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRI-
BUNALS 7 (2000).  
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the right-enshri ned i n  n umerous i nternational conventions-to a fair 
trial before an independent arbiter. 1 04 I n  fact ,  prior to September 1 1 , the 
U . S .  State Department was a vocal critic of the use of mi l i tary tribuna ls  
in  B urma, China, Col umbia, Egypt, M alaysia. Nigeri a, Peru , Russia , and 
the Sudan . 105 Pres ident Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfe ld  have sub­
sequently argued that m i l itary tribunals  are necessary to a l low swift trials 
that do not jeopardize witnesses,  j udges,  and the publ ic at l arge . 1 1)6 How­
ever, the successful  trials of the first Worl d  Trade Center bombers i n  
federal court and o f  high-ranking Serb army commanders b y  the ICTY 
suggest that domestic courts and special i zed i nternational tribunals  are at 
l east as wel l  equipped to handle such cases .  The most s ignificant argu­
ment against  m i l i tary courts i s  that , no matter how fair  they may be i n  
practice, they l ack the perceived legit imacy crucial  to reconstructing so­
c ieties and judic ia l  systems in the wake of serious i nternational  crime s . 1 07 
The need for transparency, procedural regu larity, and conformity with 
in ternational obligations advi ses agains t  the use of mi l i tary tribunals .  
E .  Internationalized Domestic Courts 
The most recent  enforcement mechanisms to emerge are i n ternation­
a l ized domestic courts (semi- in ternational i zed courts ) ,  which are part 
of the domestic j ustice systems of their  host countries ,  but i nc lude 
a mix  of l ocal and i nternational  j udges who app l y  both i nternational 
and domestic l aw. S uc h  courts are current ly  in operation  in East 
Timor 1 08 and Kosovo. 1 09 They w i l l  soon come i nto effect i n  S ierra 
1 04. See, e.g. , Paust, supra note 1 00, at 2 (noting that "the Mi l i tary Order wi l l  create 
mi l i tary commissions that involve unavoidable violations of international law and raise serious 
constitutional challenges' ' ) .  The rights to a free and fair trial are recognized by all maj or po­
l i tical ,  social, rel igious, and cultural systems. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that everyone "is entitled in ful l  equali ty to a fair and public hearing by an i ndependent 
and impartial tribunal." Even in times of war, common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
requires that anyone accused of a crime be afforded "all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civil ized peoples." The International Covenant on Civi l  and 
Political Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the European 
Convention all contain similar guarantees of fair j udicial process. 
1 05 .  See Human Rights Watch ,  Fact Sheet: Past U.S. Criticism of Military Tribunals 
(Nov. 28, 200 1 ) ,  at http ://www.hrw.org/press/200 1 / l l /tribunals 1 1 28 .htm ( las t  visi ted Dec. 23,  
2002) .  
1 06 .  See, e.g. , Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for MilitarY Tribunals, WASH .  PosT, 
Nov. 20, 2002, at A 1 4 . 
1 07 .  Mi l i tary courts, which, through the mil i tary chain of command are directly ac-
countable to the executive, are widely viewed as susceptible to executive pressure. 
I 08. See On the Organiz.mion of Courts in East Timor, UNTAET Reg. 2000/ 1 1 ,  § s  I 0. 1 ,  
1 0.3 ,  U.N.  Doc. UNTAET/REG/20001 1 1 (Mar. 6, 2000). 
1 09 .  See On Assignment of lntemationul Judges/Prosecutors 011(/ or Change of Venue, 
UNMIK Reg. 2000/64, U.N. Doc. UNMIKJREG/2000/64 ( Dec. 1 5 , 2000). 
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Leone, 1 1 1 1  and may eventual ly beg in  operation in Cambodia.  1 1 1  These 
courts tend to be i ndiv idual ized to meet the needs of the domestic S tate 
as wel l  as the demands of the i nternational community, whic h  often con­
tributes finances,  resources ,  and judges .  Given the i mportance of these 
new judicia\  forums,  Part II argues that i nternational ized domest ic courts 
wi l l  become a very s ign ificant component of the in ternational crim inal 
j ustice system. Part HI rev iews the ir  operation.  
From a normative perspective,  i nternational ized domest ic courts 
offer a unique combination of the benefits  of  the mode l s  d iscussed 
above . First ,  they can provide some of the legi t imacy of an i nterna­
t ional tribunal ,  as foreign j udges are more l ikel y  to be i mpart ial and 
v iewed as such both by domestic audiences and by the g lobal commu­
n ity. Likewise,  international ized domestic courts can demons trate the 
general  g lobal consensus that i nternational crimes w i l l  not be tolerated. � � 
These semi- i nternational i zed courts are al so far easier to estab l i sh and 
much less expensive to operate than their ful l y  in ternat iona l ized coun­
terparts .  1 1 ' They do not require chapter VII authority and, as part of a 
S tate 's  preexist ing domestic jud ic iary, they can draw on resour c: s al­
ready in place w ithout the need to create an entirely new j udici a l  ent i ty. 
Like pure ly  domestic courts,  semi- internat ional i zed comts are proxi ­
mate to  the events i n  questi on ,  h ave the  best  access to  relevant 
evidence, and m ay be able  to p l ay a pos itive role  in the local  processes 
of reconci l iation .  Semi- internat ional i zed domestic courts ,  when prop­
erly implemented, might then offer a powerful new mechanis m  for the 
enforcement of i nternational criminal l aw. 
I I . THE PO LI TICS OF DOMESTIC EN FO RCEMENT O F  
INTE RNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
The overview i n  Part I argued that the ICC and other ful l y  i nterna­
tionali zed courts wi l l  p lay a role ,  but a l im i ted one, i n  the e mergent 
system of i nternational criminal l aw enforcement .  The bul k  of enforce­
ment work wi l l  have to be done by national courts-either operating 
locally or universall y  and possibly borrowing judicial e lements from 
1 1 0 .  Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002) ,  Ol'({i/able at http://sieml-
leone . org/speci alcourtstatu te.htm 1 .  
1 1 1 . Law o n  the Establishment o f  Extraordinary Chambers i n  the Courts of  Cambodia 
for the Prosecution of Cri mes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 
(200 1 )  (on fi le with author). 
1 1 2 .  Of course, the quality of j ustice rendered wi l l  be directly proportional to the fund-
i ng provided to the intemationalized court. Savings may be avai l able in terms of i nfrastructure 
as the court may draw on the preexistent domestic legal system.  However, a clear lesson from 
East Timor is that where funding is l imi ted or nonexistent, the court may not be able to func­
tion and certainly will not be able to meet the standards of well-funded, fully intemationalizecl 
courts. 
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other States .  Th i s  Part draws on comparative polit ics and international 
relations inqu iry to understand the creation of enforcement mechanisms 
for in ternational criminal lavv. It begins with a consideration of  the pol i ­
tics of creating international tribunal s-such as  the ad hoc tribunals for 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Then it presents three case studies of countries 
where domestic and semi- international ized adj udicatory bodies with j u­
risdiction over international crimes have been or are being establ i shed: 
Cambodia, East Timor, and Rwanda. 
The polit ics of the enforcement of international cri minal law is of 
s ignificance for three reasons .  First ,  polit ical considerations may i ndicate 
when one can expect S tates or groups of States to establ i sh  mechani sms 
of  enforcement.  Second, comparative pol i t ical analys is  can suggest 
where third States and international institutions may have the most lev­
erage in fac i l itat ing the creati on of such mechanisms .  Third ,  the pol itics 
of establ ishing tribunal s may highl ight potential dangers and difficulties 
i nherent in particu lar approaches to i nternational criminal j ustice.  
On the surface ,  i nternational relations inquiry provides the necessary 
context for understanding State deci sions to enforce i nternational crimi­
nal l aw. As Kenneth Abbott has argued, "international relat ions helps us 
. . .  incorporat[e] the pol it ical factors that shape the law." 1 1 3 But ,  at a 
deeper level , these interactions at the i nternational level are dependent on 
domestic pol it ics .  As Andrew Moravcsik notes,  the "basi c  l iberal ins ight 
[ i s ]  about the central ity of State-society relations to world pol it ics ." 1 1 .j  
Understanding the deci s ions of sovereign States to establ i sh  e nforcement 
mechanisms for international criminal law must begin wi th an under­
standing of State-society relations and domestic pol it ics .  To that end, thi s 
Part engages i n  an inquiry of  how and why some States have created 
semi-international ized courts . 
A The Politics of International Tribunals 
A body of recent scholarship addresses the question of when States 
create international war crimes tribunal s .  Gary B ass argues that S tates 
establ i sh such international enforcement mechanisms when they seek to 
export legal norms .  B ass ' s  comprehensive h istorical analysis o f  the pol i ­
tics behind Nuremberg and the I CTY provides a useful starting point.  H e  
argues that war crimes tribunal s are only estab lished by  l iberal States ;  
they "spring from a particular k ind of l iberal domestic poli ty." 1 i )  He 
1 1 3 . Kenneth Abbott, Jntemmionul Relations TheOI)', International Law, and the Regime 
Governing A trocities in lnremational Conflicts, 93 AM. J. lNT'L  L. 36 1 , 362 ( 1 999) .  
1 1 4 .  Andrew Moravcsik, Toking Preferences Seriously: A Liheral Theory: of Interna-
tional Politics, 5 1  I NT' L 0RG. 5 1 3 ,  5 1 3  ( 1 997) .  
1 1 5 .  BAss. supra note 1 03 .  at 7 .  Bass's  claim depends on the proposi tion that l iberal 
States do, in fact, behave d i fferent ly. S!!e Anne-Marie Sbughter, lntenwrional Law in a World 
of Liberal Swtes, 6 E u R .  J. i N T . L  L. 503 ( 1 995);  cj: Jose E. Alvarez, Do Liherol Swtes Behave 
26 Mich igon Jounw! of ln temotionol Lo� t ·  I Vo l .  2-!-: 1 
observes that when ' ' i l l iberal states have fought each other. they have 
n e ver establ i shed a bona fide war crimes tribunal ." 1 [ (, The creat ion of war 
crimes tribunal s i s  a consequence of the fact that " l iberal states tend to 
operate abroad by some of the same rules they observe at home.' ' 1 1 7 The 
particular norm of the domestic pol ity which l iberal States  export in the 
creation of war crimes tribunals ,  according to B ass ,  i s  legal i s m .  For h im ,  
legal i sm consists of  a "fixation on process,  a sense that international tri­
als must be conducted roughly according to wel l-establ ished domestic 
practice ." 1 1 s Only l iberal States ,  he claims, are committed to legal i sm.  
B ass further suggests that the  creation of  i nternational war  crimes 
tr ibunals wi l l  be l imi ted to c ircumstances in  which the risk of exposure 
of the State 's  soldiers i s  extremely low. 1 1 � Such ri sk could come e i ther 
from the actual enforcement of in ternational c1iminal law through, for 
example, the apprehension of suspects, or from possible trial b y  a tribu­
nal itself. Recent examples demonstrate the accuracy of B ass ' s  findings .  
NATO has been extremely hesitant to locate and anest  Yugoslav war 
crimes suspects such as Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb mi l itary 
leader, as "there i s  much fear that it wi l l  cost l ives to apprehend" such 
individuals .  1 20 Likewise ,  the B ush administration has ren ounced the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, feari ng i t  may "open American offi c i a l s  and 
mi litary personnel  in operations abroad to unjust ified, frivolous  or pol iti­
cally motivated suits ." 1 2 1 
B ass also observes that war crimes tribunal s wi l l  only be created 
when States are outraged "by wars waged against them." 1 22 The publ ic  
outrage in the United States 1 23 and B ri tain 1 ='4 after World War II, for ex-
Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 1 2  EuR. J .  INT' L L. 1 83 .  1 94 ( 200 I )  ( noting 
that "( w ]e do not know for sure [whether l iberal States behave better] but there is plenty of 
reason to be skeptical" ) .  
1 1 6. BASS, supra note 1 03 ,  at 1 9 . 
1 1 7 .  !d. at  1 8 . In his  War Message to  Congress ( 1 9 1 7) ,  Woodrow Wi l son noted, "We are 
at the beginning of an age in  which i t  wi l l  be i nsisted that the same standards of  conduct and 
of  responsibi l i ty for wrong shall be observed among nations and their governments that are 
observed among the individual citizens of civi l i zed states.'' !d. at 1 8- 1 9. 
1 1 8 .  !d. a t  20. 
1 1 9 .  !d. at 29. 
1 20. Ian Fisher, Ex-Commander in Yugoslavia Will Surrender to U. N.  Tribunol, N .Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1 5, 2002, at A3.  
1 2 1 .  Crossette, supra note 5 ,  at A3.  
1 22 .  BASS, supra note 1 03,  at 30. 
1 23 .  In Ju ly  1 942, for example, 39  percent of  Americans desired Hitler to  be shot, whi le 
23 percent demanded i mprisonment.  !d. at 1 60. It is important to note, however, that public 
opinion and mass outrage can undermine legalism i f  pushed too far. A May 1 945 pol l ,  for 
example, showed that the majority of the American Publi c  wanted German leaders p laced i n  
forced l abor camps, rather than tried. !d. a t  1 6 1 .  
1 24. After World War II,  97 percent of Britons thought top Nazis should be punished ancl 
53 percent demanded executions. !d. at 1 83 .  
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ample ,  p layed a significant role in  the domestic polit ics beh ind the Nur­
emberg Tribunal .  As B ass notes, "legalism without outrage [both mass 
and e l i te] could result  in a dreary series of fut i le legal briefs ." l eo 
These observations significantly narrow the range of c ircumstances 
in which i nternati ona l  war crimes tribunal s are l ikely to emerge .  Under 
the constraints, B ass observes ,  for war crimes tribunals to ari se ,  l iberal 
S tates must be the outraged v ict ims of war crimes and be able to export 
domestic norms of l egal ism wi thout further jeopardizing their own c it i­
zens and soldiers. This appears a high ly  unl ikely proposrt10n . 
Democratic peace theorists asser1 that " [ ! ]  iberal states have created a 
separate peace" and are un l ikely to go to war against one another, 1 26 
thereby decreas ing the number of confl ict-dyads that could give ri se to 
war crimes enforcement mechanisms.  If B ass ' s  argument holds ,  only 
when l iberal S tates go to war with nonliberal S tates and those nonl iberal 
S tates commit s ignificant crimes against the c i ti zens of l iberal States are 
we l ikel y  to see war crimes tribunals .  However, even when al l  of these 
conditions are met-such as the United States '  war on terrorism­
international war crimes tribunals do not necessaril y  emerge. 
A second strand of emerging scholarship i n  the area of w ar crimes 
enforcement stresses the real is t  power politics behind war cri mes en­
forcement regimes. In  an analys is  of the creation and implementat ion of 
the ICTY, Christopher Rudolph argues "the I CTY i l lustrates how the 
s trategic interests of powerful S tates . . .  shape the process of i nstitution­
al ization and i ts use." 1 27 Though powerfu l  l iberal S tates had not been the 
d irect victims of war crimes in the B alkans, their domestic l iberal poli ­
t ies were nonetheless outraged as "vivid i mages from B alkan prison 
camps recal l ed memories of the Holocaust." 1 28 The creat ion of the ICTY 
was seen by S tates as a "means to respond to such cal ls  i n  a po l it ical ly 
1 25 .  BAss, supra note I 03, a t  3 1 .  
1 26 .  Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 A M .  PoL. Set. REv. 1 1 5 1 ,  
I 1 52 ( 1 986) .  The l iterature on the democratic peace i s  extensive and suggests that due both to 
belief systems and domestic structures, l iberal S tates rarely go to war with other l iberal States, 
although l iberal States may wel l  have particular "l iberal reasons for aggression" against 
nonliberal States. !d. John Owen has argued that "l iberal ideas [as mediated through l iberal 
i nstitutions] cause liberal democracies to tend away from war with one another, and that the 
same ideas prod these states into war with i l l iberal states." John M. Owen, How Liberalism 
Produces the Democratic Peace, I NT' L SEc. , Fall 1 994, at 87 ,  88 .  For further reading on the 
democratic peace see, Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 1 2  PHIL .  & 
PuB. AFF. 205 ( 1 983 ) ;  David A. Lake, Powe1jitl Pacifists: Democratic States and War, 86 AM. 
PoL. SCI. REv. 24 ( 1 992) (presenting an i nstitutionalist explanation for the democratic peace 
based on rent seeking) ;  T. Clifton Morgan & Sal ly  Howard Campbel l ,  Dornestic Structure, 
Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?, 35 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
1 87 ( 1 99 1 )  (explain ing the democratic peace based on decisional rules in democracies) .  
1 27 .  Christopher Rudolph ,  Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War 
Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT' L 0RG. 655 ,  660 (200 1 ) .  
1 28 .  !d. a t  665. 
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inexpens ive way." l c'J Realist concerns dictated the creation of a court, but 
one with l i ttle power and influence .  According to Kenneth Abbott, the 
ICTY was created precisely because realist  power interests were l imited : 
" ' [T] he threat of prosecution was material ly l ess costl y  than economic 
sanctions or mi l i tary intervention ." 1 10 Powerful States were not the direct 
victi ms as they were at Nuremberg , 1 3 1  and they provided " 'strong rhetori­
cal support, but l ittle aid in enforcement." 1 1� 
Rudolph ' s  conclusions l ikewise suggest international war crimes tri­
bunals wi l l  be created only rarely.  While he notes that "expanding l i beral 
norms of state conduct and protecting human rights" may help "explain 
the exi stence of tribunals in l ocales with l i tt le strategic or material im­
portance,' '  he claims that effective i nternational tribunals w i l l  only exist 
where real ist  pol itics so dictate . 1 3 1 H e  argues "real ist variables of power 
and interest best explain why tribunals may be estab l is hed" and, even 
once establ ished, the same variables can l ead States away from conduct­
ing "investigations in pol itical ly sensitive areas" and prevent them from 
"al locating adequate resources . . .  i n  areas perceived to h ave l ittle strate-
. . , ,  1 34 g1c tmportance. 
Great powers will rarely  identify such reali st interests in the creation 
of an international criminal enforcement mechanism . 1 05 U . S .  i nact ion and 
fai lure to i ntervene mil i taril y  i n  Rwanda, for example, is h ighly i ndica­
tive of this lack of great-power strategi c  interest where atrocities seem 
most l ikel y  to occur. 1 36 Other than i n  extremely rare cases where such 
direct strategic i nterests exist, l iberal States are only l ikel y  to create 
i nternation al criminal enforcement mechanisms where domestic in terest 
groups can "raise the domestic costs i n  a l iberal coun try for ignoring 
foreign atrocit ies ." 1 37 Even in those cases, however, Rudolph argues that 
the mechanisms created may l ack the polit ical wi l l  and mi l i tary muscle 
to be effective. 
The observations presented by  B ass and Rudolph paint  a relatively 
b leak picture for the creation of v iable enforcement mechanisms of in-
1 29 .  !d. 
1 30 .  Abbott, supra note 1 1 3 , at  373-74. 
1 3 1 .  See BASS, supra note I 03, at 1 47-205 . 
1 32 .  Rudolph, supra note 1 27 , at 665. 
1 33 .  !d. a t  68 1 -82. 
1 34. !d. at 682-83 .  
1 35 .  See Abbott, supra note 1 1 3, at 374. 
1 36. See, e.g. , Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the 
Rwandan Tragedy Happen, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Sept. 200 1 ,  at 84; see also SAMANTHA 
POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL" :  AMERICA A N D  T H E  AGE OF GENOCIDE ( 2002) .  
1 37 .  BASS, supra note 1 03 ,  a t  33 ;  see also KECK & S I K K!NK,  supra note 82,  a t  1 2- 1 3  
(describing the boomerang effect, whereby NGOs can raise domestic in terests i n  l iberal States 
and thereby force such States to act in relation to human rights violations in fore ign States ) .  
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ternational crim inal law. The ir c laims,  taken col lectivel y, indicate that 
international criminal tribunals w i l l  emerge in  two situations : fi rst,  where 
l iberal States are vict imized and outraged and can create an enforcement 
mechanism wi th l ittle ri sk to their own cit i zens;  and, second, where 
States tind significant power-pol itics strategic interests . Yet ,  both B ass 
and Rudolph focus on international war crimes tribunals w i thout recog­
mzmg the broad array of domestic and semi - international i zed 
enforcement mechani sms rev iewed i n  Part I. 
B .  The Politics of Domestic International  Criminal Enforcement 
The future enforcement of international criminal law may not be as 
dire as the observations of Bass and Rudolph suggest . B y  shift ing the 
focus from why powerful States create international war crimes tribunals 
to when and why victim States enforce in ternational criminal law at 
home, significant opportun ities emerge for i nternational criminal law 
enforcement. 
Three case studies-the creation of tribunal s in Cambodia, East 
Timor, and Rwanda-il l ustrate additional pol i tical al ignments , beyond 
those identified by B ass and R udolph, that may give ri se to viable en­
forcement mechanisms in  the vict im State i tself. The case of Cambodia 
shows how pol i ti cal divisions within a powerful el i te may l ead to at­
tempts at domestic enforcement. The East Timor case demonstrates the 
role of U .N .  administration and suggests the circumstances in which 
States may seek semi-internationalized enforcement mechanisms to ex­
ternal ize the political costs of prosecutions vis-a-vis a powerful 
neighbor. The example of the Rwandan Gacaca shows how domestic 
demands for j ustice along with severe resource constraints can encour­
age innovation i n  the enforcement of international criminal law. 
Each of the fol lowing case studies combines i nternational law, inter­
n ational rel ations ,  and comparative political analysis ,  drawing 
particularly on liberal theories of international relations . 1 38 N one of these 
case studies is intended to be exhaustive-further analys is  particularly 
through comparative politics methodologies would be required to ascer­
tain the exact political dynamics within each country. Nonetheless, the 
following discussions do highlight important opportunities and align­
ments allowing for the exercise of international criminal justice by 
domestic courts .  
1 3 8. According to  positive l iberal international rel ations theory, individual s-the basic 
actors in international society---organize to promote their own interests; States represent some 
subset of those domestic interests; and international outcomes depend on the configuration of 
national interests. See generally Moravcsik, supra note 1 1 4. 
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The ongoing process of establ ishing courts to try the leadersh ip of 
the Khmer Rouge i n  C ambodia demonstrates that even i l l i beral States 
w i l l  attempt to design mechanisms to enforce internat ional cr i m i na l  l aw 
when policy externalit ies of international criminal l aw enforcement yie ld 
net benefits for members of pol it ical e l ites and governing coal it ions .  The 
argument here proceeds in four steps :  First, it wi l l  be demonstrated that 
div isions within the Cambodian pol i tical e l i te account for the stop-and­
go approach to the creat ion  of a tribunal in Cambodia. Second, it wi l l  be 
shown that this  s low process has p layed d irectly i nto the bands of the 
C ambodian governing el i te ,  strengthen ing its position v i s-�t-v i s  pol i t ical 
rivals .  Third ,  the way the U . N .  and other i nternational actors have guided 
the process to date has further enhanced the Cambodian e l i te ' s  pol i tical 
power. F inally, conclusions wi l l  be drawn from the Cambodian case for 
the creation of semi-in ternational ized tribunals more general ly. 
Before proceeding, i t  i s  necessary to s ituate this pol iti cal process in 
the larger context of the recent hi story of the creatio n  of a tribunal in 
Cambodia . 1 39 The process  of bringing the Khmer Rouge l eadership to 
justice has its roots i n  1 979 when Vietnam and i ts puppet government in 
C ambodia tried and convicted Pol Pot and Ieng Saray-two of the senior 
leaders of the Cambodian genocide-in a trial l acking any claim to fair­
ness or due process . 140 I n  1 997,  toward the end of the c iv i l  war i n  
1 39 .  Unfortunately, a history o f  the negotiations t o  establ ish the Khmer Rouge Tribunal 
has not yet been written. Much of the negotiation process has remained secret and many key 
documents from i nside the Cambodian government, as well as most of the correspondence 
between the Cambodian govemment and the U.N.,  have not been made public .  See, e.g. , 
Anette Marcher, UN Accepts Flawed Tribunal for KR, PHNOM PEN H  PosT, Oct. 1 3 , 2000, at I .  
The analysis that fol lows does not attempt a comprehensive hi story, but rather seeks to analyze 
the political alignments behind the ongoing attempts to create a Khmer Rouge tribunal, based 
on interviews and the l imited documentary evidence avai lable. 
1 40. See STEPH E N  HEDER & B RI A N  D. TITT EMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECU-
TION : AcCOUNTABILITY FOR T H E  CRIMES OF THE KHM E R  ROUGE 1 3  ( 200 1 ) ; see also DAV I D  
CHAN DLER, B ROTHER N u M B E R  O N E  1 60-62 ( 1 999). The Ju ly  1 979 l aw under which Pol  Pot 
was tiied for genocide deviates significantly from in ternational defini tions of the crime. Under 
article I of the l aw, genocide is defined as "the pre-planned mass k i l l ing of many i nnocent 
people, expulsion of the people from the towns and their v i llages in order to concentrate and 
compel them to work to the point where their strength was broken in cond i tions that destroyed 
them both physically and mentally, smashing rel igion, wrecking the cultural i n frastructure and 
other relations with family and society." July 1 979 Law, art. I ,  reproduced in Somnonzreuang 
Robah Tolakar Kat-toh Ban Pro lay Puch-sah Pol Pot-leg Sary [Dossier of the Courr Judging 
the Pol Pot-leng Saray Genocidal Clique], quoted in HEDER & TtTTEMORE,  supra, at 1 3  n. l 7 . 
This definit ion deviates significantly from that provided in article 2 of the Genocide Conven­
tion: 
[G]enocide means any of the following acts commi tted with an intent to destroy, in 
whole or in  part, a national, ethnic, racial or rel igious group, as such: 
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Cambodi a that raged unt i l  the death of Pol Pot and the surrender of the 
Khmer Rouge leadership in 1 99 8 ,  First Prime Min ister Noroc!om 
Ranariddh and then Second Prime M in ister Hun Sen wrote to the U . N .  
Secretary-General seeking i nternational assistance t o  try "the persons 
respons ib le  for the genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule  
of  the  Khmer Rouge from 1 975 to 1 979 ." 1 � 1  In  response, a U . N .  Group of 
Experts issued a report i n  M arch 1 999 on the prospects for j ustice in 
Cambodia, recommendi ng the establ ishment of  a U . N .  Tribunal for 
Cambodia along the l ines of the I CTY. 1�2 
In the in terven ing period, Hun Sen,  the former Second Prime Min i s­
ter, staged a coup which led to the formation of a coal i t ion government 
in November ! 99 8  between Hun Sen 's  Cambodian People 's  Party and 
the Uni ted N ational Front  for an I ndependent, Neutral , Peaceful and Co­
operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC),  the second most i mportant party i n  
Cambodia, thereby ousting First Prime M i ni ster Norodom Ranaricldh. 1�3 
Over the next four years, Hun Sen's  government engaged i n  negotiations 
with the U .N .  to establ ish a tribunal for the Khmer Rouge. Throughout 
1 999 and 2000, the Cambodian government, led in thi s  effort by Senior 
Min i ster Sok An, 1 �� met wi th U . N .  counterparts,  Ralph Zakl in  and Hans 
Corel l . 1�5 
( a l  Ki l l ing members o f  the group; 
( b ) Causing serious bodi ly or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c ) Deliberately intl icting on the group conditions of l i fe calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction, in whole or in part; 
( d )  Imposing measures intended t o  prevent births withi n the group; 
( e )  Forcibly transferring chi ldren of the group to  another group. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1 948, a11 . 2, 
78 U.N.T.S .  277,  280 [hereinafter Genocide Convention] . 
1 4 1 .  Letter from the First and Second Prime Ministers of Cambodia to the Secretary-
General (June 2 1  1 997),  annexed to U.N.  GAOR, 52d Sess. ,  U .N .  Doc. A/1 997/488 ( 1 997).  
1 42 .  Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General As-
sembly Resolution 52/ 1 35,  Identical letters from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (Mar. 1 5 , 1 999) (on ti le with 
author) [hereinafter Report of the Group of Experts] . 
1 43 .  Michael Hayes, Another Chapter Opens as Hun Sen Gives Prince Ranariddh the 
Deed, PHNOM PENH PosT, Nov. 27, 1 998,  at 1 .  
1 44. Sok An serves as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and President of the Task 
Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Preparation of the Proceedings for the 
Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders. 
1 45 .  See. e.g. , 011e Hurdle Left on KR Trial, PHNOM PENH PosT, Sept. 3, 1 999, at 1 
(noting that agreement between the U.N. and Cambodia had been reached on most points, 
with the exception of the number of judges) ; Anette Marcher, National KR Tribunal Takes 
Shape, PHNOM PENH PosT, Nov. 26, 1 999, at 1 ("Key aspects of the Government's l atest pro­
posal on the Khmer Rouge tribunal include Cambodian juri sdiction for the trial and the 
appointment of judges by the Supreme Council of Magistracy.") ;  Anette Marcher & Yin 
Soeum, KR Trial Sails Through Council, PHNOM PENH PosT, Jan. 7, 2000, at 1 (noting that 
i'vliclz igan Journal  of ln remo!ionoi L(l \ \ '  [ Vo l .  2-+: I 
The result of these negotiat ions i s  the proposed tribunal rooted in the 
Cambodian domestic j udiciary, with a mix  o f  i n ternational and local 
prosecutors and judges app lying international l aw. In  m id- 1 999, differ­
e nces of opin ion between the C ambodian government and the U . N .  
emerged on several key i ssues,  namely the  n ::uional i ty of  the  maj ority of  
j udges and the prosecutor, the status of amnesties grante d  Ieng S aray, 
and the wi l l i ngness of the government to arrest i ndictees . 146 In ternat ional 
diploinacy eventua1 1y led to a breakthrough in  the negotiations  and the 
nove l  proposal for a tribuna l  with a maj ority Cambodian bench,  but re­
qu ir ing a supermaj ority, inc ludi ng at least one i ntern ational  j udge, to 
convict . 1.n 
On December 29, 200 I ,  Sok An presented the Cambodian govern­
ment 's  draft law for a semi- international ized tribuna l  as p art of the 
domestic judiciary to the Nat ional Assembly, �-�� which unan imously 
1 -19 • passed the law three days l ater. Further delay ensued as the ConstJtu-
t ional Council ,  Cambodia's  h ighest j udic ial authority, :�ha l lenged the 
law's  constitutional ity on grounds that artic le  3 of the draft l aw i ncorpo­
rates aspects of the Cambodi an Penal Code of 1 956  that provide for the 
death penalty, in violat ion of artic le 32  of the Cambodian Consti tution . 150 
Whi le finding that the general semi-internationalized format of the pro­
posed court was constitutional ly  permiss ible , 1 5 1 the Counci l sent the l aw 
the "Counci l  of Mini sters yesterday approved the draft l a\v for future tJiais  against former 
Khmer Rouge leaders"). 
1 46 .  Anette Marcher, KR Tribunal Talks Inch Forword. PH NOtvl P E N H  PosT, Mar. 3 1 ,  
1 999, at I .  From July 4 to July 7 ,  2000, Hans Corel l  engaged in negotiations with the Cambo­
dian government in  an attempt to resolve these d ifferences. After these meetings observers 
were upbeat noting that " i ts beginning to look l ike the real thing." Anette Marcher, Agreement 
Close on KR Trial, PH NOM PEN H  PosT, Ju l .  7, 2000, at I .  
1 47 .  See, e.g. , Anette Marcher & Vong Sokheng, Kerrr Visit Raises KR Tribunal Hopes, 
PHNOM PEN H  PosT, Nov. 24, 2000, at I .  
1 48 .  See Sok An, Presentation and Comments to the National  Assembly on the Draft 
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chwnbers (i the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Dec. 29, 
2000 & Jan. 2,  200 1 (on file with author) (outlin ing the detai ls  of the law and describing it as 
"embody[ing] new formulas, new concepts, and new and significant principles") .  
1 49. See Vong Sokheng & Pheli m  Kyne, Trial Lo w Sails Through Assembly, PH NOM 
PENH PosT, Jan. 5 ,  200 1 ,  at I ( noting that "legislators unanimously passed 47 of 48 articles of 
the Khmer Rouge tribunal law without a whisper of debate") .  
I 50.  Paragraph 2,  article 32  of the Cambodian Constitution i s  unambiguous: "there shal l  
be no capital punishment." CAMB. CoNST. art. 32(2) ;  see Constitutional Counci l ,  Case No. 
038/00 1 /200 1 (Jan .  1 7 , 200 1 ) , Decision No. 040/002/200 1 ( Feb. 1 2, 200 1 )  (on file with au­
thor) . Paragraph 1 ,  article 3 of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal Law incorporates ten artic les of the 
Penal Code of 1 956 which allow "th i rd degree criminal penalty." Artic le 2 1  of  the Penal Code 
states that ' 'third degree criminal penalty i s  the death sentence." 
I 5 I .  Among other i ssues considered, the Counci l  found "that prohibi ting the Royal Gov-
ernment of Cambodia to request amnesty . . .  does not infringe the Constitution." Case No. 
038/00 1 /200 1 .  lt approved "Articles 9 to 32,  which define the composition o f  the Extraordi­
nary Chambers,·· noting that there "is no article in the Constitulion found to prohibi t  a national 
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back to the N at ional Assembly to "remove any mention" of the death 
1 .:; "'� sentence . · -
Even after the revi s ion of the law to conform to the Constitutional 
Counci l ' s  order, 153 s ignificant delays in  implementation continued. 1 54 The 
standoff between the U . N .  and the Cambodian government on the issues 
of the independence of the prosecutor and the status of amnesties previ­
ous ly granted to Khmer Rouge leaders was exacerbated by statements 
from Prime Min i ster Hun Sen  l oudly cri tical of the U .N . "' In J anuary 
2002, Sok An and Hans C orel l  yet again exchanged letters i n  an attempt 
to reconcile these differences ,  but were unable to do so. 1 56 On February 8 .  
2002 , the U .N .  withdrew from negotiations,  concluding that "as cur­
rently envisaged, the Cambodian court wou ld not guarantee 
independence, impartial i ty, and obj ectivity." 1 57 After a seven month delay, 
in  early September 2002, the U . N . indicated a wi l l i ngness to reenter into 
discussions if the Security Counc i l  or General Assembly gave "a man­
elate to do so." "� At  the ti me of publ ication ,  this process is ongoing and 
its outcome remains uncertain .  
i nstitution, i n  part icu l ar the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, from appoin t ing people from 
the Uni ted Nations .'" [t found that the exte n s ion of the statute of l i mitations on certain crimes 
was appropriate as "Cambod i a  has not ru led that [statutes of l imitations] are a fundamenta l 
principle or equa l value with its Constitution ... !d. 
I 5 2 .  /d.; see olso Phel im Kyne & Vong Sokheng , KR Low M01·es, But Fine Print Th reot-
ens, PH NOM PENH PosT, Feb. I 6. 200 I ,  at l .  
I 53 .  See Vong Sokheng, Senme Apprm·es KR Trihunal Law Change, PHNOI'vl PENH PosT, 
Aug. 3, 200 l .  Subsequent ly, King Noroclom Sihanouk signed the draft l aw in mid-August 
200 1 .  See Vong Sokheng & B i l l  Ba i nbridge, King Signs KR Law, But Obstacles Loom, PH NOtvl 
PENH PosT. Aug. 1 7, 200 l .  
I 54.  Vong Sokheng, UN Role in Tribuna l  Decisions Under Fire, PHNOM PENH PosT, 
July 6, 200 1 (asking why a "matter that Look the Counci l of Ministers about [ fi fteen] minutes 
to approve has taken six months to get clone" ) .  
I 55 .  Hun Sen i s  on record as say ing that  " [ i ] f  you are not  taking part, we will proceed 
without the United Nations, because when we toppled Pol Pot's genocidal regime we did not 
have Un i ted Nations help at al l ." Seth Myclans, UN Ends Cambodia Talks on Trials for 
Kluner Rouge, N.Y. TI M ES, Feb. 9, 2002, at A4 (quoting Hun Sen) ;  see a lso Vong Sokheng, 
7/·iol Delay UN's Fault-PM, PH NOM PENH PosT, Nov. 23, 200 1 (noting the P1ime M inister's 
comment that "the tribunal law to try the former Khmer Rouge was approved and they (the 
UN) vetoed it") . 
1 56. Interview with Sok An, Chairman, Cambodian Council of Ministers, in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia (Jan. l l ,  2002 ) .  
1 57 .  My dans, supra note I 5 5 ,  at A4. 
I 58 .  Seth Mydans, Cwnbodio and U N  Break an icy Silence on  Khmer Rouge Trials, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. l ,  2002, at A I I . In mid-November, the U.N .  Sixth Committee provided that 
mandate through a resolution requesting the continuation of negotiations. El izabeth Becker, 
U N  Revives Pion to Try Remnants r�t' Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, N.Y. TI MES,  Nov. 2 l .  2002, 
at A8. The resolution of the S ix th Committee, however, has been much crit icized by interna­
tional observers for relaxing standards of clue process and granting too much power to 
Cambodia to structure and admin ister the court. See id. 
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The first pr incipal c la im of this  Section i s  that the preced i ng saga of 
repeat ing cycles  of smal l steps toward the creation of a semi­
i nternational court, fol lovved by delay and backpedal ing  can be 
expla ined by d iv is ions with in  the C ambodian pol i t ical e l i te .  Steps for ­
ward have occurred when the pol icy external i ties of enforcement of 
international criminal l aw have benefi ted rul ing members of the pol i ti cal 
e l ite; steps back h ave occurred when proposed enforcement has threat­
ened control l i ng members of th i s  e l i te . 1 09 
Cambodia remains a rel atively i l l iberal democracy with a narrow 
and extremely powerful pol i t ical  el i te .  The Cambodian gove rn ment i s  
not the kind o f  democratic polyarchy Robe11 Dah l  describes a s  being 
"completely or almost complete ly  responsive to al l i ts  c iti zens ." 1 61' M ore­
over, Cambodian c iv i l  society-sti l l  i n  its infancy-lacks what D ah l  
refers to as "organizat ional p lural i sm." 1 r' 1 Exemplary o f  th i s  lack o f  plu­
ral i sm are reports by elect ion monitors that in the February 2002 
commune elect ions,  the government's " lands l ide would not h ave been 
possible but for a pre-pol l s  campaign of vote buy i ng, in t imidation ,  and 
v iolence, including the k i l l ing  of more than twenty candidates and party 
• • ,, I h2 act iVIStS .  
fn  circumstances such as these, government pol icy rests not  w ith the 
broad spectrum of the Cambodian people,  but i nstead wi th a n arrow po­
l it ical el i te .  Li beral i nternat ional rel ations theory i ndicates that the 
government 's  actions on the i n ternational stage represent some subset of 
the domestic pol i ty. 1 6-' In  Cambodia, then, that subset is a pol i t ic al power 
e l ite .  Government by e l i tes occurs when, to quote C. Wright M i l l s ,  "the 
I 59 .  That j ustice in Cambodia should tum on politics i s  not surpri sing in  a country in 
which history. culture, death, and memory have all been purposefu l ly pol i ticized by the gov­
ernment to entrench power and undermine enemies. See Mary K.  Magistad, Pol Pot's Shadow: 
The Politics of Memory in Cambodia, Remarks to the Radcl i ffe Institute Colloquium, Apr. 29, 
2002. 
1 60. ROBERT A. DA H L , POLYARCHY :  PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 2 ( 1 97 1 ) ;  see also 
Freedom House S urvey Team, Freedom in the World 2002: The Democrocy Gap, available at 
http://www. freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/essay2002.pdf ( last v is i ted Nov. 24, 
2002) (describing Cambodia as "not free") .  
1 6 1 .  Robert A .  Dahl, Pluralism Revisited, in  THREE FACES OF PLURALISM 1 9 1 ,  1 92 ,  1 87 
(S .  Ehrlich & G. Wootton eds. ,  1 980) (defining organizational pluralism as "the number and 
autonomy of organizations that must be taken into account in order to characte1ize confl ic ts 
among a given col lective of persons" and observ ing that "organizational plura l i sm is ordinar­
i ly  a concomitant, both as a cause and effect, of the l iberalization and democratization of 
hegemonic regimes" ) .  
1 62 .  Leo Dobbs, Spotlight: Cambodia Votes, 1 65 FAR E .  EcoN. REV. 6 (2002) .  Likewise 
Cambodia's own election-monitoring organizations have found hundreds of c ases of irregu­
huities during the campaign. See Lon Nara, Election Monitors List Irregularities, P HNOM 
PENH PosT, Feb. 1 5 , 2002, at 6 ( noting 1 28 cases of i l legal activities by the CCP and I 05 
cases of intimidation). 
1 63 .  Moravcsik, supru note 1 1 4, at 5 1 3 . 
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men of the c ircles  compos ing thi s  el ite,  several ly and co l lectively . . .  
k d 
. 
. , ! (,.) make . . . ey ects tons .  
When a government i s  control l ed by a pol i tical e l i te ,  p rivate con­
t1icts are often acted out on a very publ ic  stage . Accordin g  to Robert 
Putnam ' s semi n al work i n  the area,  pol i tical e l i tes cons i st of "networks 
of personal communication,  friendship and i n fiuence" which,  at times 
" 'act out private drives and contl icts ,  c loaking thi s  fact in publicly ac­
ceptable rhetoric ." 1 (,, Whi le  such e l i tes are often "homogeneous i n  terms 
of party affi l i ation' '  and pol i t ical goal s ,  cleavages within eli tes are fre­
quent . t i'6 Putnam expiains :  "In some societies intrael i te competition and 
fragmentation  reaches extrem e  levels" directly affecting pol i ti cal out-
1 67 comes.  
U n derstanding the outcomes of the negotiations between the U .N .  
and the  Cambodian govemment requires characterizing the dynamics of 
this polit ical e l i te .  Competit ion with in  the pol i t ical elite i n  Cambodia has 
at times driven the creation of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal and, at other 
times, delayed the process .  A pri nc iple division with in  the Cambodian 
government fall s  precisely along the line of the establishment of a tribu­
nal for the Khmer Rouge . The side of this  issue on which a member of 
the Cambodian elite falls depends largely on the individual 's position 
during the time of Khmer Rouge rul e .  As the U .N .  Group of Experts ex­
plains :  " [B ]oth of the principal poli tical parties have over the y ears had 
strong connections with the Khmer Rouge and include former Khmer 
Rouge among their members, including some who might be targets of 
any i nvestigation i nto atrocities of the 1 970s." 1 "8 Obviously, l ikely targets 
of i nvestigation and their supporters are strongly against the creat ion of a 
tribunal .  Further, while Prime Minister Hun Sen suggests that the pro­
posed tribunal be l imited to ten suspects at most, 1 69 others fear that they 
may be implicated in the proceedings by damaging infonnatio n  revealed 
in the course of j udicial inquiry. For example, former Khmer Rouge 
commanders, such as Sou Met and Yim Phana, who currently hold 
1 64. C. WRIGHT MILLS,  THE POWER ELITE 28 ( 1 956);  see also ROBERT D.  PUTNAM,  
T H E  COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES  9 ( 1 976) (describi ng how "a t iny proportion 
of the ci tizens of any of these countties has more than an infinitesimal chance of directly in­
fluencing national policy"). 
1 65 .  !d. a t  72. 
1 66 .  !d. at  1 1 3 . 
1 67 .  !d. at 1 1 9 (noting that " [a] l most inevitably such cleavages rend the national poli t ical 
el i te and raise the specter of civil  war, as in  America in  the 1 860s, Germany in the 1 930s, and 
Nigeria and Northern Ireland in the 1 960s"). 
1 68 .  Report o f  the Group o f  Experts, supra note 1 42, 9[ 96. 
1 69 .  Justice Not Vengeance; Prime Minister Hun Sen Supports a Wur-Crimes Tribunal­
So Long As It Focuses Only on Top Khmer Rouge Leaders, NEWSWEEK (Atlant ic Edition), 
Aug. 1 3 , 200 1 ,  at 1 7 . 
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high-ranking army posts, have publ icly expressed concern that "the trial 
might be connected to us ." 1 70 Yim Phana admits that these personal tribu­
lations have direct effects on "other politic ians and other pol i tical 
. , 1 7 1  parttes .  
Whi le fear o f  prosecution leads some members o f  the Cambodian 
e l ite to argue against the creation of a tribunal , others see the tribunal as 
an opportun ity to expose and implicate pol itical enemies .  To use an 
analogy from a mi l i tary officer: " [T]he trial should end up l ike a meal of 
shrimp soup : [W]hen diners pick up one shrimp three or four others 
c l ing on." 1 7c As one Cambodian official explained on condition of ano­
nymity :  "There are many powetful people in government who fear this 
trial wil l reveal something about them, but there are a l so many even 
more powerful who woul d  be happy to have facts about others revealed. 
It is a political game and the stakes are very high." 1 73 
The second principal argument of this Section is that both the efforts 
toward and del ays  in creating a Khmer Rouge tribunal p lay direct ly into 
the hands of the Cambodian government. At the center of  the ongoing 
political game in Cambodia  sits Prime Minister Hun Sen,  h imself a for­
mer member of the K hmer Rouge before defecting to Vietnam i n  the 
l 970s . 1 7.j While he and h is  closest adv isors would not be subject to l egal 
proceedings by any proposed tribunal, many of his pol it ical r ivals ,  such 
as those in the FUNCIN PEC Party, which was "closely all ied with the 
Khmer Rouge i n  the struggle against Viet Nam" could be damaged by 
information which might surface in  the course of trial . 1 75 I nformation that 
could potentially emerge i n  a trial has been described by  some as "a 
powerful weapon to hold over [some of] his FUNCINPEC coalition 
partners . " ! 76 
Yet, Hun Sen' s  own allies are n ot immune from the thre at of possible 
trials .  Revelations about some s itting government officials from one po­
tential defendant, Ta Mok, have been described as "career wrecking at 
best, and at worst could result i n  criminal charges being brought ." 1 77 
More recently, Cambodian political commentators have suggested a spli t  
within Hun Sen's own Cambodian People 's  Party between Chea S im and 
Hun Sen over the tribunal i ssue, reflecting this private p ol i tical game 
1 70. Yong Sokheng, Senior KR Nervous as Trial Looms, PH NOM PENH PosT, Aug. 3 1 ,  
200 1 .  
1 7 1 .  /d. 
1 72 .  !d. 
1 73 .  Interview with Cambodian Official, Office of the Council of Minis ters, in  Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia (Jan. I I ,  2002) .  
1 74. Report of the Group of Experts, supra note 1 42. <J[ 96. 
1 75 .  /d. 
1 76. Trials j(Jr Khmer Rouge Ever More Remote, PHNOM PENH POST, Aug. 6, 1 999, at 1. 
1 77.  /d. 
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being played out o n  a national policy-making stage. 1 78 By contro l l ing this 
process ,  Hun Sen is  able to threaten his rivals while simultaneously rest­
ing secure that h is  allies w i l l  not in fact be subject to prosecution. 
In 1 997,  when Hun Sen and his co-Prime Minister wrote to the U . N. 
seeking assistance in the establi shment of the tri bunal, the threat of a 
court may wel l have seemed a potent tool to use against po lit ical ene­
mies,  particularly those with extremely close Khmer Rouge t ies .  Given 
the seemingly remote l i kel ihood of an ac tual trial , it was presumably a 
weapon that Hun Sen could brandish at wil l  to scare, coerce, and control 
other factions within the government.  After al l ,  no one could be sure 
what files might turn up at tri al . A comment by Om Yen Tieng,  Senior 
Advisor to Hun Sen on the creation of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal i s  sug­
gestive of the power this i s sue may have given to the Prime M i nister: 
"There were lots of different views about this within the government. 
Before we could start to draft the law we had to resolve these internal 
differences . The Prime Mini ster was abl e  to look at the problems and 
neutralize the different factions." 1 79 
However, as the tribunal came closer to reality over the past few 
years and it appeared that the U .N .  would h ave greater authority than the 
Cambodian government, Hun Sen may wel l h ave realized that a trial-at 
least one outside of his  direct control-could be dangerous.  According to 
one European diplomat in Phnom Penh "there is stil l  the l in gering doubt 
that if [Hun Sen] cannot control the trial, it  could produce some evidence 
that would be embanass ing either for people close to h i m  or for h im­
self." 1 80 Another pol itical commentator has observed: " [T]he trials  might 
both implicate his party all ies  and foster subversi ve ideas about legal 
accountabi li ty i n  the m i nds of h is  restive citizens ." 1 8 1  This fear of loss of 
control may well have driven the demands by Hun Sen ' s  government to 
ei ther end negotiations or to leave final authority over the proceedings to 
C ambodia, including the appoi ntment of a maj ority of Cambodian 
j udges. This sentiment was reflected by Senior Minister Sok An: "[W]e 
must conduct the process with ful l  respect for national sovereignty." 1 82 
B y  asserting sovereignty and delaying a final deal with the U . N . ,  Hun 
Sen may h ave been seeking to protect h imself from embarrassment, 
1 78 .  Robert Carmichael & Lon Nara, Sar Kheng: On the Job, The Trial, Crime and 
Politics, PHNOM PEN H  PosT, Aug. 3 1 ,  200 1 ( interviewing Sar Kheng, Deputy Pri me Minister 
and co-Minister for the Ministry of  the Interior). 
I 79. Interview with Om Yen Tieng, Advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen, in  Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia (Jan. I 2, 2002).  
1 80. Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Trials Won 't Be Fai1; Critics Say, N.Y. TIM ES,  Feb. 1 0, 
2002, at A 1 2. 
I 8 1 .  Chung Kuo Jih Pao, Cambodia, UN Agree on Trial, CHINA DAILY,  May 25, 2000, 
http:/ /www.chi naclail y.com.cn. 
1 82. Interview with Sok An, supra note 1 56. 
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while max imizing the effectiveness of the use of the "tribunal weapon" 
against rival members of the Cambodian el i te .  
As Hun Sen further cements his  hold on power, the need for the tri­
bunal as a hypothetical weapon against  rival s may decl ine .  Such a 
dec line could have two different effects on the negotiations .  I f  Hun Sen's  
own calculations suggest that trials would actually  be more dangerous to 
h im and h i s  friends, the tribunal i ssue could s l ip  off the agenda. If, on the 
other hand, he deems his enemies to be the more l ikely losers of actual 
rather than hypothetical tria ls ,  the govemment's commitment to j ustice 
may i ncrease. 
The l oomi ng omnipresence of a hypothetical tribunal may also have 
p layed into Hun Sen 's  pol i t ical hand, affording h im a bargain ing tool in  
the negotiation of a peace deal with the Khmer Rouge. 1 udith Goldstein 
observes in the context of NAFTA that the creation of l egal mechanisms 
"may be directed as much at domestic concerns as by cons iderations of 
the more aggregate national i nterest ." 1 x' B ecause the poss ib i li ty of trial 
existed, Hun Sen was able to offer surrendering Khmer Rouge protection 
from eventual prosecution .  In fact,  in 1996, when Ieng S ara/8-�-a top 
Khmer Rouge commander and a l ikel y  defendant-led the defection of 
s ignificant Khmer Rouge forces to the government, Hun Sen "recom­
mended that King S ihanouk grant Saray an amnesty and a pardon ." 1 R5 
Thus, Hun Sen was able to win favor with st i l l  influential Khmer Rouge 
cadres by offerin g  them protection from the very threat of prosecution he 
had hypothetically created .  
Moving away from granting such amnesties may further serve Hun 
Sen' s  i nterests . By  clai ming that the U .N .  has  forced h im not to  recog­
n ize these grants of amnesty, he may be able to use the process of 
1 83 .  Judith Goldstein ,  International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North 
American " Unfair " Trade Laws, SO I NT ' L  0RG. 54 1 ,  562 ( 1 996). 
1 84 .  See HEDER & T!TTEMORE, supra note 1 40, at 63-75 (noting that "there i s  suft!cient 
evidence of Ieng Saray 's individual responsibi l i ty for CPK crimes, for repeated ly  and publicly 
encouraging arrests and executions with in  h i s  Foreign Mini stry and throughout Democratic 
Kampuchea"). 
1 85 .  See Tom Fawthrop, No Reason for Standoff on KR Law, PH NOM P E N H  PosT, Mar. 
2, 200 1 , at I .  Note that according to article 27 of the Cambodian Constitution, "the King shall 
have the right to grant partial or complete amnesty." Constitutional Council ,  Case No. 
038/00 1 /200 1 (Jan. 1 7 , 200 1 ) . However, the King only considers amnesty grants when so 
requested by the government. Interview wi th Sok An, supra note 1 56. Om Yen Tieng has sug­
gested that the amnesties granted to Saray are not binding: "Ieng Saray was granted amnesty 
when the government requested it. But because we are using a special chamber we don't be­
l ieve that past amnesty i s  a bar to prosecution in any way." Interview with Om Yen Tieng, 
supra note 1 79 .  For a further discussion of the binding nature and enforceab i l i ty of  amnesty 
grants, see general ly, Wi l l iam B urke-White, Reframing Impunit}·: Applying Liberal Interna­
tional Law Theory to an Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. J .  I N T '  L L.  647 (200 1 )  
(arguing that amnesties should not be given val idity unless the enacting govemment was le­
gitimate and the amnesty i tself i s  of l imi ted scope) .  
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l egal ization to continue to threaten those same individuals he  orig inal ly 
pardoned. In  the words of a European diplomat, Hun Sen "has no love 
for any of these people [the sen ior Khmer Rouge leaders]" 1 �0 and would 
qu ite probabl y  be happy to have them removed from the pol it ical land­
scape . As Om Yen Tieng, Hun Sen 's  senior advisor, expla ins :  "We have 
been working to 'prepare the land' for the trial l ike a gardener would . . .  
The government i s  working hard to neutralize these people ." 1 87 
In many ways ,  the threat of the possibi l i ty of prosecution-rather 
than prosecution itself-is the most effective means of neutraliz ing these 
former Khmer Rouge bosses. Fear of the unknown is often worse than 
the event itself. Moreover, Hun Sen may not want to actua l ly  break the 
"secret deals he made with key K hmer Rouge l eaders to get them to de­
fect in the l ast few years." 1 88 Some of these Khmer Rouge commanders, 
such as leng Saray, are rumored to have evidence and information about 
Hun Sen 's  activities durin g  the Khmer R ouge time, which would be ex-
1 d 
. 
'f l d 1 89 treme y amagmg 1 re ease . 
The Cambodian pol it ical landscape is a murky world of mystery and 
i ntrigue. Rumors, threats , and uncertainty abound. What is clear is that 
the slow negotiation process has been caused by splits wi th in  the polit i­
cal el i te and Hun Sen has been able to use the threat of prosecution as a 
pol itical tool against his  enemies . In  so doing he has externalized the 
polit ical costs onto the U . N .  He created a poli tical situation i n  which it 
was left to the U . N .'s top negotiator to declare that "no amnesty shal l be 
a bar to prosecution" 1 90 and demand that the prosecutor must be able  to 
m ake independent indictments. 1 9 1  Thereby, Hun Sen can appear to be 
respecting h i s  promises to the Khmer R ouge leadership ,  while sti l l  
threatening them with the specter of prosecution.  I n  
The third principal claim of this Section is  that the way the U . N .  and 
i nternational actors have structured the Cambodian tribunal creation 
process has enhanced Hun Sen ' s  power. As shown above, the stops ,  
starts, and delays in  the process have given Hun Sen an i mportant politi­
cal tool to use against his enemies.  By allowing negotiat ions to drag out 
over a period of years, the U . N .  has tacitly  condoned, or, at least, al­
lowed the continuation and use of j ustice as a poli ti cal weapon.  
1 86. M ydans, supra note 1 80, at A 1 2 .  
1 87 .  Interview with Om Yen Tieng, supra note 1 79. 
1 88 .  Chung Kuo J ih Pao, supra note 1 8  I .  
1 89. Magistad, s1tpm note 1 59. 
I 90. Fawthrop, supra note 1 85 , at I (quoting Hans Core l l ) .  
I 9 1 .  Interview wi th Sok An, supra note 1 56. 
1 92 .  In a simi lar context, Vojislav Kostunica's decision to allow Slobodon Milosevic's 
extradition to The Hague, represents a similar kind of cost externalization onto the U.N.  
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More directly, Hun Sen has been able to use the negotiation process 
w i th the U .N .  to enhance his own legitimacy. Andrew Moravcs ik has 
argued that "international cooperation" such as between Hun  Sen's  gov­
ernment and the U . N .  " redistributes control over four i mportant polit ical 
resources :  ini t iat ive,  institutions, information , and ideology . . .  such 
sh ifts tend to benefit . . .  national executives." 1 �3 The negot iations over 
the creation of the tribunal may have "created informational asymme­
tries" in  the government's favor and al lowed Hun Sen ' s  government to 
"manipulate the [perceived] credib i li ty of government pol icy" as he ap­
peared to commit h imself to an international proces s ,  which l ent 
" ideological legit imation" to his regi me . 1 ,14 The process of negotiation­
even w ithout results-may have thus bolstered Hun Sen ' s  pol itical 
power at home. 
Final l y, the proceeding discussion of  the creation of the Khmer 
Rouge tribunal has important impl ications for understand ing the pol i tics 
of international c1iminal law enforcement. I t  i s  apparent that semi- l iberal 
or i l l iberal S tates do negotiate for the creation of i nternational cri minal 
l aw enforcement mechanisms when such negotiation furthers the polit i­
cal goals of the contro l l ing el i te .  Where polit ical  e li te divide along pro­
enforcement and anti-enforcement l ines or where the government in 
power is l argel y  i mmune from prosecution, an i l l iberal S tate m ay wel l  
favor the creation of a j udicial enforcement mechanism.  Such c ircum­
s tances should be identified as real opportunities for domestic or semi­
i nternational ized criminal l aw enforcement. 
There is,  of course, risk i n  the creation of international crim inal l aw 
enforcement mechanisms when they are used as a poli t ical tool by par­
ticular elements of a domestic government. First, the Cambodian 
example highlights the possibility that polit ical infightin g  can undermine 
the creation  of a tribunal , where the threat of prosecution is a more valu­
able political commodity than prosecution itself. Second ,  pol i t ics may 
subj ugate the rule of l aw to the point where it no longer h as the charac­
teristics of obligation, precis ion,  and delegation associated with legal ized 
regimes in in ternational relations . 1 95 Comments by the U.N. upon with­
drawal from negotiations in February 2002 were i ndicative of  this failure 
to achieve impartial j ustice. 1 96 The Cambodian example thus draws atten-
1 93 .  ANDREW MORAVCSIK, W H Y  T H E  EUROPEA N  UNION STRENGTH E N S  THE STATE: 
Dotv!ESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 63 (Ctr. for European Studies, Work­
ing Paper Series No. 52,  1 994). 
1 94. /d. at 1 0, 1 2, 1 4. 
1 95 .  See generall_v Kenneth W. Abbott e t  a l . ,  The Concept of Legalization, 54  lNT' L 0RG. 
40 1  (2000) (defining legalized regimes as those "characterized by three components: obliga­
t ion, precision , and delegation") . 
1 96 .  See Mydans, supra note 1 55 ,  at A4. 
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t ion to the crucial  role i n ternational organi zat ions and third States wi l l  
have to  play in  achieving fai r  and just outcomes when i nternational 
cri m inal law becomes overly pol i ti c ized . 
Pol itical fissures along such fault  l i nes are l ikel y  to be a frequent oc­
currence in States recovering from massive ethnic v iolence and thus 
present numerous opportunities for the enforcement of i nternational 
crimi nal l aw. S ome elements of the s itti ng government are l ikely to have 
been involved in the atrocities, whi le others l ikely have c leaner hands.  
Political divisions can provide an opportunity for the creation of a do­
mestic enforcement mechan ism by generating strong domestic pol it ical 
interests in favor of prosecution . The intern ational community needs to 
be able to identify such opportun ities for the creation of enforcement 
mechanisms and to provide appropriate outside pressure and ass i stance 
to real ize them. 
I n  the process of deciding how and whether to support domestic at­
tempts at semi- internationalized criminal  justice, the U .N .  and 
international actors must understand that their negotiat in g  tactics may 
become part of a domestic pol itical game. Where a potential tri bunal has 
become a polit ical as well as j udicial weapon, international actors wi l l  
further the in terests of  some subset of domestic pol i tical  i nterests.  While 
external pressure may give the pro-enforcement forces the upper hand, 
international i nvolvement has a direct ef ect on domestic politi cal bar­
gaining . 1 97 This i s  not to say that the U . N .  should not support the creation 
of semi- internationalized courts,  but in  doing so, it must recognize and 
evaluate their impact on domestic pol it ic s .  The international community 
must be on guard against strengthening the hand of a regime or particu­
lar politician in the name of i nternational justice. Carefu l  analysis of 
domestic political interests, fractions, and dynamics wil l  be required for 
such international pressure to be successful .  
2.  East Timor: Nation B uilding and Cost  Externalization 
The ongoing prosecutions of crimes against human ity and war 
crimes in E ast  Timor present two additional situations in which S tates 
and international organizations may establish domestic enforcement 
mechanisms for international criminal l aw. First, when the U .N .  exer­
cises effective sovereignty over a territory i n  the wake of mass violence, 
it  may impose i nternational criminal j ustice. Second, S tates may use 
semi-internationalized courts in  order to externalize the political costs of 
prosecutions vis-a-vis a powerful neighbor onto an international organi­
zation. 
1 97 .  See. e.g. , Robert Putman, Diplomacy and Domesric Policy: The Logic of Two-Let·el 
Games, 43 !NT' L ORG. 427 ( 1 9R8J  
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The troubled hi story o f  East Timor, its Portuguese colonial era and 
Indonesian occupation, 1 ''' the violence of  its quest for independence i n  
1 999, 1 9') and the role of the U . N .  i n  reconstruction thereafter"uo have been 
wel l  documented. Prior to the December 1 975 Indones ian invasion,  East 
Timor was a Portuguese colony. Over the next quarter century, a 
Timorese independence movement fought a sometimes v i olent  struggle 
for independence .20 1 In January 1 999, the government of Indonesia of­
fered a "popular consultation" w ith the potential for independence.""�> ' 
Prior to, during, and after the August 1 999 consultat ion ,  " In dones ian 
security forces unleashed a wave of violence in which pro-independence 
supporters were terrorized and k i l led."203 Amidst increas ing violence,  the 
government of I ndonesi a  agreed to the presence of an in ternational force 
under Australian leadership ,  which was deployed on September 20, 
1 999.204 Through Resolution 1 272 of  October 25 , 1 999, the U . N .  Secu­
rity Counci l ,  acting under chapter VIr authority, establ i shed the U . N .  
Transitional  Administration  for East Timor ( UNTAET),  which exercised 
sovereign authority over the territory through May 2002.20' 
The first c laim of this  Section is that the U .N .  may effective ly  "im­
pose" i nternational crim inal j ustice on terri tories i t  admin i sters . Given 
1 98 .  See generally NATAL I E L. RE I D, PE B B LES A N D  SAND:  CASE S T U DIES I N  S ECOND-
HAND CoN FUCT 2 1  ( 1 999) (describ ing Indonesia's occupation of East Timor as "second hand 
colonialism" which i mpl ies "the imposition of poli tical control by mi l i tary force, and the oc­
cupation and exploitation of the recolonized territory by i ts new masters" ) .  
1 99 .  See, e.g. , Report of the International Commission of Inquiry o n  Eust Timor to the 
Secretarv-General, annexed to Identical Letters Dated 3 1  January 2000 from the Secretary­
General Addressed to the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Securi ty 
Council and the Chairperson of  the Commission on Human Rights, U.N.  GAOR, 54th Sess. , 
Agenda Item 96, 9[9[ 5- 1 3 ,  U .N .  Doc. A/541726 (2000) [hereinafter Commission of Inquiry 
Report] (summarizing the period from 1 99 1 - 1 999); id. 9[9[ 26-92 (docu me nting specifi c  ex­
amples of violence in 1 999); Situation of Human Rights in East Timor: Note hy the Secretary­
General, U.N. GAOR, 54th sess . ,  Agenda Item 1 1 6(c ) ,  9[9[ 1 0-22,  U .N .  Doc A/54/660 ( 1 999) 
[hereinafter Human Rights Report 1 999] (discussing the violence surrounding the 1 999 elec­
tion in considerable detail ) .  
200. See, e.g. , Hansji:irg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interven tions Work: The UN 
and the Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25  FLETCHER F. 
WoRLD AFF. 1 07 (200 1 )  (comparing U .N .  administration of Kosovo and East Timor); Boris 
Kondoch, The United Nations Administration of East Timor, 6 J. CON FLICT S ECURITY L. 245-
65 (200 1 )  (considering the rel ationship between East Timor and the U .N . ) ;  Suzannah Linton, 
Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 1 2  CR!M. L .F. 
1 85 ,  202-06 (200 1 ) ; Sarah Pritchard, United Nations Involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Efforts: New And Continuing Challenges in the Case of East Timor, 24 U.N .S .  
WALES L . J .  1 83 ,  1 83-90 (200 1 ) . 
20 1 .  See REID, supra note 1 98 ,  at 33 .  
202. Human Rights Report 1 999, supra note 1 99, 9[ 1 8 . 
203 . Jd. q[ 20. 
204. /d. 9[ 22. 
205. S.C. Res. 1 272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess . ,  4057th mtg. ,  U . N .  Doc. S/Res/ 1 272 
( 1 999) .  
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the U . N .  reputat ion as a foremost protector of human rights as well  as i ts 
obl igat ion to prosecute certai n  i nternational crimes such as crimes 
agai nst humanity and war crimes ,211'' the U .N .  Admin istration in East 
Timor faced signi ficant pressure both from within the organi zation  and 
from Member S tates to design an adequate enforcement mechanism for 
the prosecution of serious crimes committed i n  East Timor during 1 999. 
The Secur ity Council  Resolution establ i sh ing UNTAET granted the U .N .  
Transitional Admini stration the power to  "exercise a l l  leg i s lat ive and 
executive authority, i nc luding the admin i strat ion of j ustice ."207 Less than 
two month s la ter, on December 1 0, 1 999, the Special Rapporteur of the 
Commiss ion on Human Rights Report on East Timor affirmed that "the 
international community would exert every effort to ensure  that those 
responsible [for serious crimes in East Timor] would be brought to jus­
t ice"2'" and suggested that an i nternational criminal tribunal m i ght be 
appropriate to guarantee " individual responsibi l i ty for the crimes com-
. d 
. 
h ,,(><) m ttte .. In t e past year. -
The Secretary-General has noted the he ightened responsib i l i ty of the 
U .N .  to ensure accountabi li ty.  In a cover letter to the report of the Inter­
national Commi ss ion of Inquiry establ i shed to gather i nformation  on 
violations of human rights i n  East Timor,2 1 0 he noted: The "United Na­
tions . . .  has a particul ar respons ib i l i ty to the people of East Timor in 
connection with i nvestigating the v iol at ions,  establ i sh ing respons ib i l i ties ,  
206. Sec, e.g. , Diane Orentl icher, Settling Accounrs: The Duty to  Prosecute Human 
Rights Violutions of a Prior Reg ime , I 00 YALE L.J.  2537 ( 1 99 1 )  (arguing that " [a] state's 
complete fai lure to punish repeated or notorious i nstances" of certain i nternational crimes 
constitutes a v iolation of i nternational l aw ) ;  WELLER & B uRKE-W HITE, supra note 63 (noting 
that States may face an obligation to exerc ise universal jurisdiction over certain in ternational 
crimes); Kondoch,  supra note 200, at 26 1 (noting that "[a] l though the Uni ted  Nations is not a 
party to the above named conventions it is undisputed that the United Nations has legal per­
sonali ty, which i mpl ies that the United Nations can be bound mutatis mutandis by customary 
international law·· to prosecute certain crimes). Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick i n  Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 1 2, 1 949, art. 49 , 6 
U.S .T. 3 1 1 4, 3 1 46 ,  75 U.N.T.S .  3 1 ,  62 (observing that " [e]ach High Contracting Party shall be 
under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed . . .  such grave breaches, 
and shall bring such persons . . .  before its own courts") ;  Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judg­
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ,  ser. C,  no. 4, (JI 1 74 (July  29, 1 988) ( finding a duty under the 
Inter-American Convention to "carry out a serious i nvestigation of violations committed 
within its jurisdiction"). 
207 . S.C. Res. 1 272, supra note 205, 91 I .  
208. Human Rights Report 1 999, supra note 1 99 ,  1[ 3 . 
209. !d. 91 74(5 ) .  
2 1 0. The lntemational Commission of Inquiry was established by the U.N.  Economic 
and Social Counci l  in 1 999 pursuant to E .S .C.  Dec .  1 999/293, Resolutions and Decis ions 
Adopted by the Economic and Social Council at Its Resumed Substantive Session of 1 999, 
Agenda Item 1 4(h ) ,  at I 0. U .N .  Doc. E/ 1 999/INF/2/ Add.3 (2000). 
44 JV!ichigmz Joumol  oflntenzorionol  Lmv l Vo l .  2-l : l 
punishing those responsible and promoting reconci l iat ion ."� � �  The Com­
m ission of I nquiry 's  report found that "al l persons who committed or 
authorized violations of human rights or i nternational humanitarian law 
were individual ly  responsible and accountable for those v io lations and 
must be brought to justice.' ' � 1 2  Li kewise,  the Commission c al led on the 
U . N .  to "establ i sh an independent and international body" to "prosecute 
those gui l ty of serious human rights violations .' '2 1 3  
As the sovereign authority over East Timor, the U . N .  was committed 
to the enforcement of internati onal criminal law. The most obvious pos­
s ibi l i ty was to establ i sh  an ad hoc tribunal s imi lar to the I CTY and the 
I CTR. The H uman Rights Report, after a l l ,  had speci fi ca l ly  recom­
mended such an internat ional criminal tribunal . 2 1 4  Under a chapter VI I  
mandate, the tribunal would h ave the enormous benefit o f  obl igating In­
donesia to cooperate and turn over i ndictees for prosecut ion .  
Yet, for at  least three reasons, a ful l y  in ternational tr ibunal  was not 
created. First, the ad /zoe in ternational tribunal s are created through 
c hapter VII resolutions ,� 1 5 requiri ng a finding of a "threat to peace and 
security" and rais ing the possibi l i ty of veto by permanent Security 
Counci l  members.  Some have argued that the presence of UNTA ET in 
East Timor e l iminated the threat to peace and security,2 1 6  t hereby under­
m ining the legal bas i s  to create an international tribunal u nder chapter 
VI I .  With sufficient pol i t ical wi l l ,  the Security Counci l  probably could 
h ave found a continuing threat to peace and security in the region,  but 
such pol i t ical wi l l  was lacking .  Indonesi an President Wahi d  had specifi­
cally requested the use of national , rather than internati onal ,  means to 
bring the perpetrators of the 1999 cri mes to j ustice. 2 1 7  The Secretary­
General , noting Indonesia ' s  Foreign Min ister 's  assurances "of the 
Government' s determin at ion that there wi l l  be no i mpun i ty for those re­
sponsible," m agreed that "if the government  has the c apacity and 
w i l l ingness to  do it, you don ' t  want to create another tribunal ."2 1 9 M ore-
2 1 1 .  Identical Letters Dated 3 1  January 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to 
the President of the General Assembly, the President of the Security Counci l and the Chairper­
son of the Commission on Human Rights, U .N .  Doc N54!726, S/2000159 .  
2 1 2 . Commission of Inquiry Report, supra note 1 99 ,  <]! 3 .  
2 1 3 . Commission of InquiJy Report, supra note 1 99, (TI 1 52. 
2 1 4. Hunw11 Rights Report 1999, supra note 1 99, 9! 74(5). 
2 1 5 . See Mydans, supra note 1 55 ,  at A4. 
2 1 6 . Kondoch, supra note 200, at 263 . 
2 1 7 . See E. Timor Inst . for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analys is ,  Sites for Justice 
Reloted Ef orts, LA' o HAMUTUK B U L L . ,  Oct. 200 1 ,  at 2, 2, ami/able at http://www.etan .org/ 
lh/bu lletin .html [hereinafter Sites for Justice Related Efforts] .  
2 1 8 . Sires fur Justice Related Eforts, supra note 2 1 7  (quoting Secretary-General Annan). 
2 1 9 . Linton, supra note 200, at 2 1 3  n .95.  
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over, Indonesia's powerful a l l ies on the Securi ty Counci l  deferred to Ja­
karta's request that it  have the right to prosecute its own.""0 
The second reason the U . N .  rej ected call s  for another ad hoc tribunal 
was financial . As discussed above."" 1 the costs of an international tribunal 
can be exorbi tant. The total budget for governing East Timor, inc luding 
j udicial recon struction ,  for 200 1 was U . S . $65 mi l l ion . "22 Yet ,  that same 
year, the ICTY budget was U . S .$96.4 mi l l ion .223 Even assuming a far 
more modest ad hoc tribunal for East Timor, the budget of such an i nter­
national tribunal could have easi ly exceeded that of the entire 
government of East Timor. To create such a tribunal , e i ther additional 
funds would have to be con tri  bu ted by i nternational actors or other gov­
ernment services curtai led .  Permanent members of the Security Council  
were general l y  unwi l l ing to i ncrease assessed contributions to fund a 
third ad hoc tribunal and East Timor itself had few spare resources at its 
disposal . ""4 
The third justification  for rej ecting cal l s  for another ad hoc tribunal 
was the perceived need for l ocal justice and the reconstruction of the 
East Timorese j udiciary. An i ntegral part of UNTAET's m andate was to 
"support capacity building for self-government."225 By s i tuating the en­
forcement mechanisms of in ternational crim inal l aw with i n  the East 
Timorese system, rather than as an external internationa l  cou11 ,  
U NTAET could further th is  reco nstruction process often o verlooked by 
i nternational tribu nals such as  the ICTY and ICTR. Likewise,  the 1 999 
Human Rights Report and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry had 
both noted that "the primary responsibil ity for bringing perpetrators to 
j ustice rested with national j udicial systems.''226 Even call s  for an ad hoc 
i nternational tribunal by East Timorese NGOs noted that "trying crimes 
before domestic courts wi l l  in most cases be preferred due to a n umber 
of reasons,  not least from the perspective that the perpetrators of crimes 
should be brought to j ustice in the country in which the crimes were 
com m itted."217 
220. Sites for Justice Related £./forts, supra note 2 1 7. 
22 1 .  Supra Section I .B .  
222. This figure is separate from the UNTAET peacekeeping budget of approxi mately 
U.S.$560 mi l l ion. See AMNESTY I N T ' L ,  EAST TIMOR: J uSTICE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 6 
(July 200 1 ) , AI Index: ASA 57/00 1 /200 1 [hereinafter A M NESTY I N T ' L ,  EAST TIMOR] ; see also 
Pi·ess Release. UNTAET Press Oftice, UNTAET Basic Facts (Dec. 2, 200 1 )  (on fi l e  with au­
thor). 
223 .  See ICTY Key Figures, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e .htm ( l ast modified 
Nov. 8 , 2002) ;  Wald,  supra note 55 ,  at 536 n . 3 .  
224. Sites for Justice Related Efforts, supra note 2 1 7. 
225.  S .C .  Res .  1 272, supra note 205, 91 2(e) .  
226. Commission of lnquirr Report, supra note 1 99, 1J1 3 .  
227. Nelson Belo & Christian Ranheim, Prosecuting Serious Crimes in Eosr Ti1110r. in 
J USTICE A N D  ACCOUNTA B I L ITY I N  EAST TIMOR: I NTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS A N D  OTH E R  
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Given the l ack of po l i t ical  w i l l ,  the costs of an ad hoc tribunal , and 
the perceived benefits of loca l  prosecution ,  the Security Counc i l  p laced 
j udic ia l  authority in the h ands of U NTAET22� and demanded "that those 
responsible for [ violations  of i nternational l aw] be brought  to j us tice" 
e i ther by UNTAET or by the Government of I ndones ia . 229 With that 
authority, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General ( S RSG),  
S ergio Vieira de Mel lo ,  s igned Regulation 1 999/ 1 establ i sh ing  the l aw 
of East Timor''() and creating a Transi t ional  Judicial Service Commis­
s ion with the goal of creating a j udic i al system.  23 1  I n  early 2000, 
U NTAET estab l i shed a court system for East Timor, i n c l uding S pecial  
Pane l s ,  composed of "both East  Timorese and i nternati onal j udges," 
with universal jurisdict ion over genocide,  war crimes ,  cr imes against 
h umanity, and murder. 2'2  
Taken together with s imi lar actions by the U . N .  M i s sion in Kos­
ovo,2'' the creation of semi- intern ationalized comts appears to be the 
prefetTed method for accountabi l i ty i n  U . N .  administered terr itories .  I t  
seems l ikely this trend w i l l  continue.  Michae l  Matheson h as argued that 
"the role of the U . N .  has substantial ly expanded . . .  wi th  respect to the 
governance of societies affected by confl icts ."234 Such c ases of nation 
bui lding-though not necessari ly U . N .  admin istration per se-are more 
numerous than might at first be i magined; they include Hait i ,  Rwanda, 
Mozambique, Uganda, and Bosnia.235 Moreover, nation bui l ding or "gov­
ernment bui lding" is likely to become a more frequent phenomenon i n  
OPTIONS. REPORT O F  A ONE-DAY SEMINAR I N  DILl 5 ,  6 (Oct. 1 6, 200 1 ) , available at 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/justicereport.pdf. 
228.  S .C.  Res. 1 272, supra note 205 . However, note that UNTAET itself could not estab-
l i sh an international tribunal in the mold of the ICTY or ICTR with jurisdiction over 
individuals in Indonesia as "its mandate only extends to East Timor and not Indonesia." Kon­
doch, supra note 200, at 263. 
229. S .C.  Res. 1 264, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess . ,  4045th mtg. ,  U.N. Doc. S/Res/ 1 264 ( 1 999). 
230. On the Authority of" the Transitional Administrator in East  Timor, UNTAET Reg. 
1 999/ l § 3 . 1 ,  U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/ 1 999/1 (Nov. 27 ,  1 999). 
23 1 .  On the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service Commission , UNTAET 
Reg. 1 999/3 § l ,  U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1 999/3 (Dec.  3, 1 999) . 
232. UNTAET Reg . 2000/ 1 1 ,  supra note 1 08 ,  § §  I 0. 1 ,  I 0.3 .  
233.  S trohmeyer, supra note 200, at 1 1 1 - 1 3 ,  1 1 9 .  Security Counci l  Resol ution 1 244 
establ ished the U.N. Mission in Kosovo ( UNMIK) under a similar mandate to that of 
UNTAET. See S.C.  Res. 1 244, U.N.  SCOR, 54th Sess. ,  40 l l th mtg., U .N .  Doc. S/Res/ 1 264 
( 1 999). \Vhi le  plans for special pane ls  for international crimes were not i mplemented in Kos­
ovo, international judges do sit alongside Kosovar Judges in ordinary domestic courts and 
even on the Supreme Court. S trohmeyer, supra note 200, at 1 1 8 . 
234. Michael  J. Matheson , United Nations Governance of" Postconjlict Societies, 95 AM.  
J .  [ NT ' L  L .  76 (200 1 ). 
235 .  Fareed Zakaria, Don 't Abandon Afghanistan, NEWSWE E K, Dec . 1 7 , 200 l ,  at 28 .  
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the years ahead .2'" Though then-Presidential candidate George W. Bush 
was i nit ial ly skeptical of nation bui lding,217 the Bush admini stration 's  
actions in  Afghanistan and p lans  for a possible post-war Iraq speak to the 
growi ng importance of nation building ."'s This points to a more general 
opportuni ty to create enforcement mechan isms for international criminal 
law where the U . N .  administers a territory or reconstructs a government 
after war, revolution, or ethnic strife .  
The second claim of this Section i s  that the case of East  Timor dem­
onstrates how weak States may create semi-internationalized courts to 
externalize the political and diplomatic costs of prosecution onto i nterna­
t ional actors . Whi le the creation of the Special Panels  can be attributed 
to U . N .  adm i nis trat ion of the territory, the decis ion by the newly formed 
government of East Timor to continue those trial s after i ndependence on 
May 20, 2002 requires a separate explanation .  
Throughout the winter and spring o f  2002, the democratically  
e lected Constituent Assembly of East  Timor met  i n  Di l i  to draft a consti­
tution and design a new govern ment around the blueprin t  of  the 
U NTAET admini stration . 23y The new constitution specifical ly provides 
that "acts committed between the 25th of April 1 974 and the 3 1 st of De­
cember 1 999 that can be considered crimes against  humanity of 
genocide or of war [sic] shal l be l i ab le  to criminal proceedings w ith [ in] 
national or international courts ."2�0 However, the first draft of  the consti­
tution fai led to provide for the continued operation of Special Panels of 
national and international judges to hear cases of serious cri mes . 2� 1  Once 
236.  Richard Lowry, Two Cheers for Nation Building, NAT'L  REv. ON-LIN E ,  Oct. 22, 
200 I ,  at http://www.nationalreview.com/lowryllowrypri n t l  0220 l .html (noting the importance 
of nation building and arguing that the U.S .  "should general ly be pursuing i t" ) .  
237 .  See Jane Perlez, For Eight Years, a Strained Relationship >vith the Military, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at A l 7  (observing "[ i ]n the presidential campaign, Governor George W. 
Bush of Texas expressed an almost visceral distaste for assigning America's fighting forces to 
nation-building missions"). 
238 .  See, e.g. , The National Securi ty Strategy of the Uni ted States of America 2 (Sept. 
1 9, 2002), available ar http://www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html ( making i t  a national priority 
to "expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of 
democracy"). 
239 .  Seth Mydans, U.N. Certifies First Election in the Newly Born East Ti111or, N.Y. 
TIM ES, Sept. 1 1 , 200 1 ,  at A I S .  
240. E. TIMOR CaNST. § 1 60 (Serious Crimes). The text o f  this section demonstrates a 
misunderstanding of the drafters as to the meaning of crimes against humanity. According to one 
member of the Constituent Assembly, the in ternational legal adviser had told them that crimes 
against humanity included all international ctimes and therefore it  was not necessary to enumer­
ate the particular crimes, as are curTently enumerated in UNTAET Regulation 2000/ 1 1 .  E-mail 
from Caitlin Reiger, Judicial Systems Monitoring Program, East Timor Constituent Assembly 
(Apr. 26, 2002) (on file with author); see UNTAET Reg. 2000/ 1 1 , .wpm note l 08, § I 0. 1 .  
24 1 .  Press Release, Judicial Systems Moni toring Program, Constituent Assembly Adopts 
Serious Crimes Articles, Jan. 3 1 ,  2002. available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org. It appears 
that the draft constitution lacked the requisite provision due to a misunderstanding of the 
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l egi s lators were made aware that the new consti tution as written would 
extin guish the j urisdiction of Special Panels ,  they amended the section to 
al low continuation of the S pecial  Panels as long as "deemed strictly 
necessary."c lc According to one local court observer: Desp ite the restric­
tive wording of this provis ion,  "the i ntent of the drafters w as to continue 
with the current Serious Crimes I nvestigat ion Uni t  and Specia l  Panels  i n  
the Di l i  Dis trict Court."c43 Moreover, funding h as been secured for the 
continued operation of the S pecial Panels at l east through June 2003 .c.l l 
This dec is ion to continue internationalized trial s in  i ndependent East 
Timor raises the question of why a newly emergent State with extraordi ­
nary resource constraints would seek to  continue prosecuting crimes 
against humani ty, particul ar ly  when funds for the court are drawn from 
the overall  East Timor budget and not specifical ly earmarked by the U . N .  
for that purpose.c.J' One answer, o f  course, i s  momentum.c46 With such 
prosecutions already underway, continuing them mere ly  maintains  the 
status quo . While institutional momentum may h ave played a part,  after 
operating for just  over a year, the Special Panel s were h ardly wel l  en­
trenched by M ay 2002. A second possib i lity i s  that preferences of 
domestic i nterests i n  favor of accountab i lity have been art iculated in 
government pol icy. Various domestic i nteres t  groups have l obbied hard 
for j ustice and accountab i li ty with an international component to ensure 
fairness .247 The new President of East Timor h as acknowl edged the "peo-
drafters . Only when NGOs "lobbied the Constituent Assembly  about the orig inal  wording was 
some . . .  attention paid to the issue" leading to the new version of the text. E-mai l from Cait­
lin Reiger, supra note 240. 
242. E. TIMOR CoN ST. § 1 63 ( 1 )  (Transi tional Judicial Organization ) .  The section reads in 
ful l :  "The collective judicial instance exi sting in East Timor, integrated by n at ional and inter­
national judges wi th competencies to judge serious crimes committed between the l st of 
January and the 25th of October 1 999, shal l remain operational for the t ime deemed strictly 
necessary to conclude the cases under investigation." /d. This provision has been interpreted 
by the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit as "mean [ing] they can just continue, and there 
doesn ' t  seem to be any suggestion that investigations wi l l  be curtail ed after independence." E­
mail from Cait l in Reiger, supra note 240. 
243. E-mai l from Cait l in Reiger, supra note 240. 
244. Interview with Stuart Alford,  Prosecutor, UNTAET Special C rimes Unit ,  in  Di l i ,  
East Timor (Jan . 1 4, 2002). Presumably, th is  funding wi l l  again be renewed by the U.N.  in  
mid-2003. 
245. The l imi ted avail ab i l i ty of funding for the court must be contrasted with the rela-
tively generous funding for the office of the prosecutor drawn fro m  assessed U.N. 
contributions and specifical ly earmarked for the se1ious crimes unit .  
246. See, e.g. , Cheryl Shanks et a l . ,  Inertia and Change in the Constellution of Inter-
governmental Organizations, SO IN T ' L 0RG. 593 ( 1 996). 
247. Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, Yayasan HAK, in  Dili , East Timor (Jan . 1 7 , 
2002); see also Letter from East Timorese NGOs to the Members of the Security Council  
(Oct .  24, 200 I )  (on file with author) (call ing for the estab l ishment of an in temational tribunal 
for East Timor). 
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p le  ' s  profound understanding of  the need for reconc i l i ation."24' Addi­
tional research by comparative pol itical scientists is required to 
determine the sal ience of these possible explanations,  but i t  seems l ikely 
that interest groups within East Timor have led to the formu lation of a 
national preference i n  favor of holding the perpetrators of  the 1 999 
cri mes accountable. 
Once the underlying preference has been establ ished, the pursuit of 
accountabi l i ty through semi- international ized courts and their cont inued 
operation after i ndependence must be separate ly analyzed. The semi­
internationalized tribunal has al lowed the new government of East Timor 
to externalize the political and diplomatic costs of prosecution v i s-a-vis 
Indonesia onto the U .N .  To invoke a concept coined by Robert Keohane 
and J oseph Nye,  East Timor and Indonesia are in an i nterdependent rel a­
tionship. 249 More particularly, this  rel ationship can be characterized as 
one i n  which East Timor is  both extremely sensitive and highly vulner­
able .250 In  other words, pol icy changes in  Indonesia  are quickly fel t  i n  
East Timor and East Timor has few viable alternative options but t o  fol ­
l ow the policy preferences of  Indonesia for the t ime being . "' 1  As the 
former colonial master, the regional hegemon, and the only S tate to 
share a l and border with East Timor, Indonesia's  int1uence is beyond 
dispute . Given East Timor's  isolation and rel ative pover1y,252 i t  has few 
means at its disposal to al ter the pol i tical balance and decrease its sensi­
tivity vis-a-vis Indonesia .  East Timorese President Gusmao has been 
swayed by this comb ined sensitivity and vulnerabi l i ty, defin ing the East 
Timorese national interest  as one of "guaranteeing stab i li ty along the 
border and of s trengthening our cooperation with Indonesia ."253 
Through its actions and publ ic statements ,  I ndones ia  has m ade its 
preference to avoid prosecution of i nternational crimes i n  East Timor all 
248 . President Xanana Gusmao, Reconciliation-the Challenge for A ll, Address to the 
S tockholm International Forum, Conference on Truth, Justice and Reconci l iation (Apr. 23 ,  
2002) ,  available m http://www.stockholmforum.gov.se. 
249 . See ROBERT 0. KEOH A N E  & JOSEPH NYE,  POW E R  A N D  I NT ERDEPE NDENCE:  WORLD 
PoLITICS IN TRANSITION 8 ( 1 977) ("Interdependence in  world pol i t ics refers to situations 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in  d ifferent countries 
. . . . ") . 
250. Keohane and Nye describe sensitivity as i nvolving "degrees of responsiveness 
within a political framework-how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in  
another." /d. at  1 2 . The "vulnerabi lity dimension of interdependence rests on  the relative avail­
abi l ity and costliness of alternatives that various actors face." !d. at 1 3 . 
25 1 .  At least unti l oil and gas production in the Timor Gap between East Timor and 
Austral ia comes on l ine, East Timor has few resources to decrease i ts vulnerabi l i ty. See Becky 
Gaylord, Accord Is Set on Timor Gap Energy Revenue, N.Y. TIM ES,  July 4, 200 1 ,  at W 1  (not­
ing that "East Timor i s  expected to receive substantially more than $3.6 bi l l ion in revenue 
from existing and planned developments in the area the next 24 years"). 
252.  See AMNESTY INT'L,  EAST TI MOR, supra note 222, at 6. 
253. Gusmao, supra note 248. 
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too c lear. Though a l im i ted human rights tr ibunal i s  final ly  si tti ng i n  J a­
karta, the government of Indonesia has taken every poss ib le  opportunity 
to delay proceedings. 2".j The cases now being heard have been cri t ic ized 
for both l ack of fairness  and mild sentences . 2'" Even UNTAET Transi -­
t ional Administrator, Sergio Yieiera de Mel lo ,  expressed concern that the 
Indonesian tribunal might not "get down to work."256 Indonesia's  prefer­
ence for i mpunity has been further evidenced by its systematic fai l ure to 
cooperate with the U NTA ET j udiciary. ""' Despite a Memorandum of U n  
derstanding between Indonesia and UNTAET reaffirming the 
commitment to hold the perpetrators of the 1 999 crimes accountab le and 
prov iding for ex.tradition ,25x Indonesia has repeatedly refused to hand 
over suspects for prosecution.25� 
The continuation of prosecutions i n  East Timor, despite th i s  strong 
pressure for impunity from a powerful neighbor, can be explained by 
poli tical cost external i zation. Had East Timor initi ated prosecutions 
w ithout U . N .  mandate, pressure from Indonesia to cease might  h ave be­
come overbearing.  Instead, the East Timorese Consti tuent Assembly and 
President Gusmao have sh ifted the diplomatic costs of prosecution vi s-a­
vis Indonesia onto the international community. S ince the U . N .  created 
the Speci al Panels ,  East Timor can legitimatel y  claim t h at i t  h ad no 
choice but to allow prosecutions. While the decision to continue opera­
tions of the Special Panels is within East Ti mor's control , the East 
254. The Indonesi an law on Human Rights Tribunals was passed in 2000, yet numerous 
technical i ties were found to delay the initiation of proceedi ngs. See Rl Opem Historic Eo.\ / 
Timor Tribunal, JAKARTA PosT, Mar. 1 4, 2002; Trial Begins in Indonesia This Week for East 
Timor Crimes, AssociATED PRESS, Mar. l 0, 2002, available ot http://i iasnt . leidenuniv.nl (not­
ing the "long delayed trials" ) .  
255 .  Seth  Mydans, East Timor's Scourge Serves Time on His Patio, N . Y. TIMES ,  May 1 6, 
200 1 ,  at A4. 
256. Press Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mel lo ,  S pecial  Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General to East Timor, in Di l i ,  East Timor (Jan. 1 7, 2002). 
257. See Linton, supra note 200, at 223 (describ;ng an "atmosphere of hosti l i ty ancl 
unwil l ingness to cooperate"). 
258. Memorandum of Understanding Between The Republic  of Indonesia and the United 
Nations Trans itional Admini stration in East Timor Regarding Cooperation in Legal , Judicial 
and Human Rights Matters § 9 . 1  (entered into force Apr. 6, 2000), reprinted in Official  Ga­
zette of East Timor, vol . l ,  No. l ,  U.N. Doc. UNTAET/GAZ/2000/Add.2,  93 ( Feb. 1 6, 2000),  
available at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/MOU.htm ("Parties undertake to transfer to 
each other all persons whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are prosecuting 
for a Ciimi nal offence."). 
259. See, e.g. , Linton, supra note 200, at 223 (observing that Indonesia has "refused to 
transfer the milit ia leader Enrico Guterras to stand trial" in East Timor) ; Indonesia to File Firsr 
Timor Abuse Cases Thursday, REUTERS, Feb. 20, 2002, available at http://i i asnt . leidenuniv.nl 
( noting a comment by the spokesman for the Indonesian Attorney General that "Indonesia has 
no obligation to send suspects across the border") ;  Seth Mydans, Modest Beginnings for East 
Tinwr 's Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 200 1 ,  at A l O  (commenting on a unanimous view 
in  East Timor that "no Indonesian i s  likely ever to be sent to court in East Timor' ' ) .  
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Timorese govern ment can c i te strong U . N .  pressure , rather than i ts  own 
national ore ferences as the driving  force behind prosecut ion .  In so doing l .._ � 
i t  can avoid Indonesia 's  wrath . Moreover, by having two in ternational 
j udges on each pane l ,  East Timor can "blame" the internati onals and dis­
tance i tself from decisions implicating Indonesian suspects . Th is 
hypothes i s  of cost external ization was frequently confirmed by official s 
and observers in the j udic iary and policy community in East Timor. 200 
To cast this argument i n  the terms of l iberal i nternational rel ations 
theory, East Timor and I ndonesi a  have divergent national preferences 
with respect to prosecution . I f  East Timor were to prosecute crimes 
w ithout U . N .  mandate, the negative policy interdependence of these 
pre ferences might make the costs of prosecution too high for East Timor 
to bear. According to M oravcsik, policy interdependence "can be de­
scribed as the set of costs and benefi ts for dominant social groups in 
foreign societies . . .  that arise when domi nant social groups in a given 
society seek to realize thei r  own preferences i ntemational ly."Y' 1  In  this 
case, the costs of the East Timorese preference in favor of prosecution 
are extremely h igh on dominant I ndonesian social groups,  which might 
be i mplicated or prosecuted. Liberal i nternational relations theory "as­
sumes that this pattern of interdependence among state preferences . . .  
imposes a binding constrain t  on state behavior."2b2 With out U . N .  in­
volvement, I ndonesian preferences against  prosecution could i mpose 
such a b inding constraint on East Timor's  behavior. 
However, the involvement of an i nternati onal actor such as the U . N .  
can change the policy i nterdependence resu lt ing from divergent national 
preferences . The U .N .  has effectively shifted the cause, or, at l east the 
perceived cause, of the negative externalit ies i mposed on I ndonesia by 
East Timorese prosecutions, thereby expanding the set of possible out­
comes . What would have been a "zero-sum . . . b argaining game 
[between two governments] with . . .  a high potential for in terstate ten­
s ion and conflict" is transformed i nto a three-level game in which 
international preferences arti cu lated through U .N .  i nvol vement shift the 
pol icy interdependence between East Timor and Indonesia.263 
This concept of a three-level game buil ds on Robert Putnam's  two­
level game model . Two-level games operate first at the national l evel ,  at 
260. Interview with J im Coy, Human Rights Officer, UNTAET (Jan. 1 5 , 2002) (noting 
that i t  i s  ·'politically much easier to have the U.N. prosecute these crimes. East Timor needs 
good relations with Indonesia. The advantage of the in ternationalized tribunal i s  that the UN, 
not East Timor, i s  seen as pushing Indonesia.") .  
26 1 .  Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal International Relotions Theory: A Scientific Assess-
ment, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (Colin Elman & M iriam Fendius 
Elman eds . ,  forthcoming 2003) (manuscript ch. 5, at 7, on file with author). 
262. !d. 
263 . !d. at 8 .  
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which "domestic groups pursue their  i n terests by pressur ing the govern­
ment to adopt favorable pol icies and pol i tic ians seek power by 
constructing coal it ions among these groups ." '''·' Second , on the i n terna­
t ional game board, "national g:overnments seek to maxim i ze their own � 0 
abi l ity to satisfy domestic pressures _, , .,, , I n  East Timor, a third l evel  i s  
added, i n  which both the  East Timorese and  I ndonesian governments 
must al so negotiate with the U .N .  and U NTAET. Gusmao and the As­
sembly may have ''spot [ ted] a move on  one board that wil l  trigger 
real i gnments on other bomcls ,  enab l ing:  them to achieve otherwise unat-0 . � 
tainable obj ectives ."266 M ore specifical ly, Gusmao could cal l for amnesty 
for some perpetrators as a means of strengtheni ng cooperation with In­
donesia.'67 Yet ,  s imultaneously, prosecutions could continue  u nder the 
U .N . mandate, placatin g  domestic interests strongly in favor of account­
abi l ity '6� and satisfy ing the demands of UNTAET. 26,1 Th is  i s  a c lear 
example of ''complex patterns of i nterdepende nce . . .  creat [ ing] new 
possibil i ties for creative statecraft."270 To i nvert a c laim made by Peter 
Evans ,  domestic bargain s  are n ot s imply about the relat ions  between the 
S tate and its c itizens .  They are al so about the distribut ion  of costs and 
benefits between States and i nternational organizat io n s .27 1 Yet another 
way to frame this cost external ization i s  to see East Timor as  "borrowing  
government" from the U .N .  to  decrease i t s  accountab i l i ty v i s-a-vis  I ndo-
• �72 nesw. 
The possibi li ty of  i nternational institutions external iz ing polit ical  
costs was first suggested by Keohane and Nye as early as 1 974.273 Arthur 
264. Putman, supra note 1 97 ,  at 434. 
265 . !d. at 434. 
266. !d. 
267. See Gusmao, supra note 248 (defending the need for amnesty for those i ndicted) .  
268.  Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, .wpm note 247 (noting a "high demand for j us­
tice" among the East Timorese people) .  
269. Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, supra note 256. 
270. Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating Intenwtionol and Domestic Theory (if 
International Borgaining, in DOUBLE EDGED DtPLOI'v!ACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND 
DoMESTIC PoLITICS 3 ,  16  (Peter B.  Evans et a ! .  eds . ,  1 993) .  
27 1 .  This is the inverse of Peter Evans's  c la im that  "[ i ]nternational bargains are not sim-
ply about relations between nations. They are also about the distzibution of  costs and benefits 
among domestic groups and about domestic opinion divided on the best way of rel ating to the 
external environment." Peter B. Evans, Building an !ntegmtil'e Approach to International and 
Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections, in DoUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNA­
TIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLI T ICS, supra note 270, at 397. 
272.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER ( forthcoming Nov. 2003) (manu-
sCiipt ch. 5, at 1 3 , on fi le with author) (explaining that the phenomenon of borrowing 
government allows a foreign government to adjudicate a rule or di spute where the domestic 
State is unable or unwi l ling) .  
273 .  Robert Keohane & Joseph Nyc, Tmnsgovernmental Relmions wzd Intenwtionol 
Organization, 27 WoRLD PoL. 39, 6 1  ( 1 974) (suggesting the ' 'political signi ficance of in terna­
tional organizations") .  
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Rovine has s imilarly suggested that legal ization of di spute settlement 
through i nternational organizat ions gives "weaker states . . .  an obvious 
advantage . . .  in di sputes w ith more powerful opponents . . .  the strong 
give up much of their leverage in a contest of legal briefs and 
argument ation ."274 S imi l arly, one explanation for ratification of the Rome 
Statute was that the ICC might "effectuate a change in interstate power 
relations  by moving an important category of interstate di sputes out of 
the diplomatic realm and into that of compulsory jurisdiction ."ns While 
semi- international ized courts-such as the Spec ial Panels  in E ast 
Timor-do not prov ide the same k ind of compulsory j ur i sdiction ,  con­
tl icts between more vulnerabl e  States and their powerful neighbors are 
s t i l l  moved from the world of interstate diplomacy to that of i nterna­
tional legal settlement. Al though powerful States may see through this 
po l i tical cost externalizat ion,n6 legal ization and the involvement of inter­
national institutions i s  a pol it ical ly  savvy strategy to al ter policy 
interdependence and expand the range of possible outcomes in  favor of 
accountabil i ty. 
To general ize, the pol itical context of the Special Panel s  in East 
Timor yie lds two sign ificant propositions . First, where the U . N .  serves as 
the admini strating power in a nation-bu ilding context, it may i nterna­
tional ize ( both i n  terms of l aw and judges) local courts to e nsure the 
prosecution of  serious international crimes .  Second, where a vulnerable 
State faces pressure from a more powerful neighbor not to prosecute 
(presumably because the neighbor wi l l  be i mpl icated i n  the proceed­
ings) ,  the vulnerable State may bonow adj udicatory mechanisms or 
i ndividual j udges from other States and the i nternational community, 
thereby externalizing political costs, altering policy i nterdependence, and 
creating the possibi l i ty for otherwise unattainable j ustice . 
274. Arthur Rovine, The National interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CouRT OF J usTICE 3 1 3, 3 1 9  (Leo Gross ed . . 1 976) .  In addition to the weaker 
State gain ing political power through the use of institutions, Andrew Moravcsik has observed 
that such international negotiations "tend to benefit those domestic actors-general ly, but not 
always national executives-who control access to international negotiations." MoRAVCSI K, 
supm note 1 93 ,  at 63 . The newly  elected East Timorese government may wel l  have seen the 
possibilities of strengthening its hand domestical l y, as wel l  as internationall y, through contin­
ued involvement with the U.N. i n  judicial proceedings. 
275. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party 
Stmes .  in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 1 9, at 2 1 9, 233 .  
276. Rovine, supro note 274,  at  3 1 9  (noting that  "this i s  precisely why many leading 
nations are not particularly anxious to establish a Court regime of peaceful change") .  
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and Resource Constraints 
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The G acaca courts in  Rwanda suggest two additional  c ircumstances 
in which States may develop domestic enforcement mechanisms for in­
ternational criminal l aw. First, when domestic i nterests in a responsive 
( i f  not ful ly  l iberal )  State demand accountabi l ity and the in ternational 
external ities of prosecution are e i ther posit ive or only s l ightly negative , 
domestic courts may be u sed to enforce international l aw.  Second, where 
resource constraints l imi t  the effectiveness  of intemat ional tri bunal s and 
normal domestic court s ,  special ized domestic mechan isms of account­
ability may be created. 
A brief h is tory of the creation of the Rwandan Gac ac a  courts is a 
necessary starting point .  After serving as a "bystander to genocide" in 
Rwanda,c77 the U .N .  estab l i shed an international criminal tribunal for 
Rwanda, along the l i nes of the ICTY, with jurisdiction to prosecute seri ­
ous viol ations of i nternational l aw during 1 994.2n B y  December 2002, 
however, the International Crimi nal Tribunal for Rwanda h ad only com­
pleted eleven c ases,  2 7 9  a paltry figure given the more than 1 1 0,000 
Rwandans in detention for genocide related crimes at that t ime.2�0 Ac­
cording to a Report by the International Panel of Eminent Personali ties ,  
officials i n  the Rwandan government were "so fru strated . . .  by the 
ICTR' s  in it ial dysfunction . . .  that in early 1 996 they c reated special 
courts within the exi sting j udic ial system."2� 1 An August 1 996  l aw em­
powered these speci al courts to hear cases "of genocide ,  or crimes 
against humanity" and divided these crimes i nto four c ategories  b ased on 
the seriousness of the offense.2�2 Yet even these speci al ized courts were 
277. See Samantha Power, Bystanders To Genocide, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 200 I ,  at 
85 (documenting how the United States and the i nternational community "let the Rwandan 
tragedy happen") .  
278. See S.C.  Res. 9 5 5 ,  supra note 5 1 .  For a d iscussion of the reasons for creation o f  the 
ICTR, and, in particular, a contrast between the "internati onal legal paradigm" and "the more 
ethnocentric journalistic one," see Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons 
jimn Rwanda, 24 YAL E  J .  lNT'  L L. 365,  369 ( 1 999) .  See also Paulus, supra note 5 3 .  
279. TCTR Website ,  http://www. ictr.org/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2003 ) .  
280. Aloisea Inyumba, Chai rwoman, National Commission on Un i ty and Reconci l iation, 
Restoring Hunwn Dignity and Reconciling the People of Rwanda, Presentation at the Stock­
holm International Forum: Truth, Justice and Reconci l iation ( Apr. 23, 2002) .  
28 1 .  International Panel of  Eminent Personalit ies ( IPEP), Report on the  1 994 Genocide 
in  Rwanda and Sun·ounding Events '][ 1 8 .35  (July 7, 2000) , reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 1 4 1 ,  2 1 3  
( 200 1 ) [hereinafter IPEP Report ] .  
282 .  See Rwanda Organic Law No .  8/96 of August 30 ,  1 996 on the  Organization of  
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the  Crime of  Genocide or  Cri mes  Against Humanity 
Committed Since October I ,  1 990, m·ailable m http://www.preventgenocide .org/law/ 
domestic/rwanda.htm ( last v is i ted Jan. 23 , 2003). Article 2 of this l aw d iv ide s  cri mes i nto four 
categories .  Category I includes "person [s] whose criminal acts or whose acts of cri minal par­
ticipation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervi sors and leaders of  
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unable to address the overwhelming number of  outstanding cases .  Be­
tween 1 996 and 1 998 ,  only 1 ,5 00 to 2 ,5 00 trial s occurred, with one 
hundred times that many accused and still in detention .c� 1 A more dra­
matic solutio n  to the prob lem of accountab i l ity for the 1 994 genocide 
was therefore needed. 
S ince 1 999, the Rwandan government has been design i ng and pre­
paring to implement the Gacaca system. Those i ndividual s fall ing i nto 
Category !-namely the plan ners and organ izers of genocide and crimes 
against humanity-wi l l  appear before normal courts , a l l  other suspects 
wi 11 be handled through the Gacaca process .28� Gacaca i s  not a standard 
judicial forum . Rather, the idea derives from a traditional dispute resolu­
tion mechanism in the form of  a "meeting which is  convened whenever 
the need ari ses and i n  which . . .  inhabitants of one h i l l  [the basic com­
munity structure in  Rwanda] participate [and] supposedly wise old men 
. . .  seek to restore the social order."cs:i While the Gacaca as appl ied wil l  
have some resemblance to a j udicial proceeding, i t  w i l l  be l argel y  based 
on this tradit ional mode l .  Communities wi l l  meet under the leadersh ip  of 
elected "judges" or local elders . Suspects wi l l  be presented to them and 
members o f  the community wil l  have the chance to speak for or against 
the accused. 286 In a May 200 1 p i lot program, some communities met al­
most as if in an early version of  the common law grand jurl87 to review 
the c rime of genocide or a c1ime against humanity," persons who "acted in positions of author­
ity at the national, prefectoral ,  communal, sector or cel l level or in a pol i ti cal party who 
fostered such crimes," "notorious murderers,'' and "persons who committed acts of sexual 
torture." Category II includes "persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal partici­
pation place them among the perpetrators. conspirators or accompl ices of international 
homicide or of serious assaul t  against the person causing death." Category III includes "per­
sons whose criminal acts or whose acts of cri minal participation make them gui l ty of other 
se1ious assaults against the person." Category IV includes "persons who committed offenses 
against property." !d. 
283 .  IPEP Report, supra note 28 1 , 91 1 8 .36, at 2 1 4  ( cit ing the 1 ,500 trial figure) ;  cf AM-
NESTY INT' L, RWANDA: THE TROUBLED CouRSE OF J usTICE 2 ( Apr. 2000), AI Index: AFR 
47/ 1 0/00 (citing the 2,500 tria] figure) [hereinafter AMN ESTY INT 'L ,  RWANDA] .  
284 .  Interview with Isabel le Kalihangabo, Supreme Court of  Rwanda, Gacaca Division, 
in  Cambtidge, Mass. (Nov. 1 3 , 200 I ) .  
285 .  IPEP Report, supra note 28 1 ,  ell 1 8 .43, at 2 1 5 .  The term comes from the Kinyar-
wanda (the Rwandan l anguage) word for "the grass that vil lage elders once sat on as they 
mediated the disputes of mral l i fe." Ian Fisher, Massacres of ' 94: Rwanda Seeks Justice in 
Villages, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2 1 ,  1 999, at A3 ;  see also Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Restmc­
tive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 N.Y.U.  J. INT ' L  L. & POL . 355,  370-7 1 (2002 ) 
( "Gacaca courts have been used for hundreds of years for domestic disputes i nvolving prop­
erty settlement and the l ike."). 
286. Interview with Piene St .  Hi laire, Legal Advisor, USAID, in Kigal i ,  Rwanda ( Aug. 
28, 200 1 ) ; Gov'T  OF RWANDA,  ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF GACACA COURTS (on fi le with 
author). 
287 .  R.H.  Helmholz, The Earlv Historr of the Gmnd Jury and the Cannon Lmv, SO U. 
CHI .  L. REv. 6 1 3 , 6 1 3  ( 1 983)  (observ ing that "the modem grand jury traces its otigins to the 
Assize of Clarendon, an enactment of King Henry II in I 1 66.  The Assize cal led for inquiry to 
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cases against  certain detained individual s .  ""3 Fol lowing a mass ive 
publ ic ity campaign ,�s9 a nationwide election was held in October 2 00 l to 
select 260,000 local elders as j udges ( more than twice as many "j udges" 
as accused) for the 1 1 ,000 Gacaca courts eventual ly to be convened .2'1' ' In 
J une 2002,  Gacaca courts began operation in  twelve select communi ties 
with additional courts scheduled to open across the country over the 
. '9 1 commg months . -
The explanation for the  creation of  the  Gacaca presented here pro­
ceeds in two steps. Understanding these two steps requires separati ng 
national preferences-the set of fundamental preferences defined across 
States of the world-from nat ional strategies-the part icul ar trans ient 
pol icy goals that constitute the everyday cunency of i nternational pol i -­
t ics .  29� First, domestic i nterest groups w ithin Rwandan society are 
strongly in favor of accountabi li ty and have generated a nat ional prefer­
ence in favor of prosecution.  Second, resource constra ints drove the 
government to choose the Gacaca system as the particular strategy to 
achieve accountabi l i ty. 
It appears that there i s  a widely held preference for accountab i l ity 
and a widely held perception that j ustice i s  a prerequis i te for reconci l ia­
tion .  A recent survey of over 1 ,5 00 Rwandans  conducted by Johns 
Hopkins University found that nearly half the populat io n  fears a "re­
peated occunence" of genocidecY' and is "overwhelmingly i n  favor" of 
reconcil iation through accountab il i ty. 294 Thi s  fear of repeated cycles of 
v io lence coul d  well be a root cause of the preference for accountab i l i ty. 
be made, by the oath of twelve men from every hundred and four men from every vi l lage, as 
to what persons were publicly suspected of robbery, murder, or theft or of  receiving men 
gui l ty of those crimes." ) .  
288 .  See Mary Kiman i ,  Community Frees Four Genocide Suspects During Pilot Gacoca 
Justice Process, lNTERNEWS, May 30, 200 l ,  at http://www.internews .org/activit ies/ 
ICTR_reports!ICTR_reports_may200 l .htm. 
289.  See Ju les Marius Bishogoro, The Fina l  Stretch, Judicial Diplomacy : 
Chronicles and Reports on International Criminal  Justice (Oct. 2, 200 l ), m 
http : //www.diplomatiej udiciaire .com/UK/RwandaUK3.htm (noting that the j ud ic ial e lection 
and preceding publicity campaign had cost the government of Rwanda U.S .$2 .5  mi l l ion) .  
290. Jules Marius B ishogoro, Massive Participation in Elections for Gacaca Judges, 
JUDICIAL DIPLOMACY: CHRONICLES AND REPORTS ON INTERNATIONAL CR IM INAL  J USTICE 
(Oct. 5 ,  200 1 ) , at  http ://www.diplomatiej udiciaire .com/UK/RwandaUK5.htm. 
29 1 .  Marc Lacey, Kanombe Journal; After the Honm; Truth and Some Healing, Mm·be, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at A4. 
292 . Moravcsik, supra note 26 1 ,  (manuscript ch. 5, at 6 n .4) (observing:  "States '  prefer-
ences . . .  are by defini tion causally independent of and prior to speci fic in terstate strategic 
interactions.") .  
293 .  S.  GASIBIREGE & S .  BABALOA, PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE GACACA LAW IN 
RWANDA: EVIDENCE FROM A MuLTI-METHOD STUDY 9 (Johns Hopkin�; Ctr. for Communica­
tion Programs Pub l ' n  No. 1 9, 200 1 )  (reporting that 43 .5 percent of respondents expressed a 
· 'fear of repeated occurrences") .  
:?.94. !d. a t  1 3 . 
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According t o  one "op inion leader," justi ce "wi l l  bri ng Rwandans closer 
together. It w i l l  br ing about unity and reconc i l i ation ."c45 Overal l ,  87 per­
cent of the survey respondents were fai rl y  or highly confident that the 
Gacaca program would "succeed i n  resolv ing the problems of tri al s" for 
the perpetrators of the 1 994 genocide and 5 3  percent expressed h igh 
confidence that Gacaca would "promote sustainable peace i n  the coun­
try."296 Addit ional reports suggest upwards of 80 percent of the Rwandan 
population supports the Gacaca process, "at least in pri nc i ple ."297 
Demands for j ustice i n  Rwanda are particularly strong as they come 
from both v ict ims and accused. Victims, as one part icipant in the draft­
ing of Rwanda's new constitution put i t ,  find speedy j ustice "very 
i mportant to reconci l iat ion .  Once the trials are carried out, we hope that 
there wi l l  be no further problems,  because the truth wi l l  have been un­
earthecl . ' '29s Some victims l ink their personal demands for j ustice to the 
overal l pol it ical process .  As one young man who lost h i s  parents in 1 994 
commented:  " [W]e need to see j ustice, to see justice clone ,  so we can live 
together again .  This i s  a major pol i t ical priori ty for me."299 L ikewise,  the 
accused and their fami l ies demand access to justice, part icular ly those 
with legitimate c laims of innocence.'00 As one accused woman impris­
oned (with her chi ldren) for k i l l ing a neighbor put it : "Seven years later I 
am sti l l  innocent. I f  the Gacaca wil l  show [the authorit ies]  my inno­
cence, then let it come fast."'0 1 
These sentiments suggest that the numerous interest groups within 
Rwanda are strongly in favor of accountabi l i ty. For such preferences to 
be represented i n  State pol icy, however, the i nstitutions of government 
must serve as a "transmission belt" between preferences and pol icy.'02 
Contrast, however, Cambodia, where, despite strong domestic 
295 . !d. 
296. !d. 
297. Daly . . wpro note 285. at 374; Foundation Hirondelle, Rwandans Express Mixed 
Feel ings on New Cour1 System, May 4, 200 l ,  at http://www.hirondelle .org. 
298. Aloys Hakizimana, Comments at the Conference on Constitutional Deve lopment, in 
Kibuye, Rwanda (Aug.  22. 200 1 ) . in PROCEEDINGS OF THE  CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1 04 (Wil l iam Burke-White et al. eds . ,  2002) (on file with author). The author 
served as the Special Rapporteur to the Legal and Constitutional Commission of the Govern­
ment of Rwanda. 
299. Interview with Anonymous Rwandan Genocide Surv ivor, in Kigali ,  Rwanda ( Aug. 
28 , 200 1 ) .  
300. Elizabeth Neuffer, Kigali Dispatch: It Takes a Village, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. I 0, 
2000. at 1 8  (noting that the fami lies of the accused are "push[ ing] for . . .  trial date [ s ]  . . .  [as] 
at least under gacoca the truth will come out" ) .  
30 I .  Interview with Anonymous Accused. in  Ruhungeri, Rwanda (Aug. 29, 200 l J .  
302 . Moravcsik. SIIJIW note 2 6 1 ,  (manuscript ch. 5 ,  at 5) .  
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preferences for justice a tribunal has yet to be established . 'o' As i n  C am­
bodia, a small  subset of the poli t ical e li te ,  rather than a broad national 
pol i ty, control s  government pol icy. While Rwanda is by n o  means a per­
fect polyarchy, ").) nor even an ideal l iberal State, 305 the Rwandan 
Government has made s ignificant advances both in terms of representa­
t ive government generally,'0" and the issue of j ustice more spec i fical ly. 
Massive education campaigns on j ustice and reconc i l i ation helped 
e nsure that 82 percent of the respondents in the Johns Hopkins s urvey 
were fami l iar with Ga.caca.307 Such efforts have included a travel ing play 
about Gacaca, weekly radio spots, radio talk shows, and Gacaca soccer 
m atches. 31 )� L inked to this education campaign have been numerous con­
sultations with the Rwandan people to ensure the govern ment i s  fami li ar 
w ith their  views. 309 The feedback between the people and the government 
on this issue has manifested itself most strongly in  the broad-based elec­
tion of Gacaca j udges .  N inety percent of the population p artic ipated3 1 0  by 
spending a day "in groups made up of ten neighboring households . . .  to 
designate those persons in the g::.-oup believed to be honest or wise" to 
serve as j udges .3 1 1 These j udges act as i ntermediaries between the people 
and the governmental authori ties, both i n  the p rosecution of offenses and 
i n  the communication of ideas , views, and interests. 
Efforts to make the government responsive to the people have 
largely succeeded; the R wandan government has heard and internal i zed 
popular demands for justice. For example, the Chairman of the Legal 
and Constitutional Commission has recognized that the Gacaca  was im­
plemented because: 
[T]he  Rwandan people did not  accept amnesty. Throughout the 
history of Rwanda, the government of the day has granted am-
303. See Will iam W. Burke-White, Preferences Matter: Conversations with the Camho-
dian People on the Prosecution of the Khmer Rouge Leadership, in J USTICE IN CAMBODIA:  
AccouNTABILITY AND THE KHMER RouGE ( Beth van Sc!laack et a! . eels . ,  forthcoming 2003) .  
304. See DAHL, supra note 1 60, at 3 .  
305 . See Slaughter, supra note 1 1 5 .  
306. The Rwandan government is in the process of drafting and consulting the popula­
tion on a new constitution, guaranteeing broad representation and free elections. 
307. GASIB IR EGE & BABALOA, supra note 293, at I I . 
308. Johns Hopkins Univ. ,  Ctr. for Communication Programs, Rwanda: Gacaca, at 
http://www.j huccp.org/africa!rwanda!gacacalhtm [hereinafter Rwanda: Gacaca] .  
309. For example, the author, as  Rapporteur for the Legal and Constitutional Commis-
sion, is personal ly famil iar with the efforts of the Commission. whose members have traveled 
across the country meeting wi th groups and communities to discuss the new constitution and 
its provisions relating to justice mechanisms. Likewise, the National Unity and Reconci l iation 
Commission undertook "national exercises of consulting Rwandans on their uni ty and recon­
ci l iation, by engaging them in grassroots participatory discussions." Inyum ba, supra note 280. 
3 1 0. Rwanda:  Gacaca. supra note 308.  
3 1 1 .  Bishogoro, supra note 290. 
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nesty, and throughout h is tory, the government has been involved 
i n  the massacres and then granted amnesty . . .  Amnesty encour­
aged impun ity. For these reasons ,  [the people] wanted to try 
something else in R wanda. 1 1 2  
5 9  
Likewise, the government's c hief prosecutor, Gerald Gahima ex­
plains the deci s ion to hold perpetrators accountable through Gacaca 
based on domestic preferences: 
We are asked why we didn ' t  take the South African approach of 
amnesty . . .  you can only do what i s  po l it ical ly  possible in your 
own soc iety . . . .  In the aftermath of genocide there was an over­
whelming feel ing that there must be accountabil i ty, people must 
be punished so it wi l l  not happen again . 3 1 3  
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has noted the i mportance of  do­
mestic pol i t ics' 1 �  i n  the deci s ion to "bring the thousands of genoc ide 
suspects to justice."m Thus, a national preference in Rwanda in favor of 
accountabi l i ty developed as a result  of the i nterests wi thin Rwandan so­
c iety and the abil ity of those i nterests to i nfluence national pol icy 
through the representative institutions of the State. 
The second step in thi s  devel opment was the deci s ion to use the 
Gacaca system as the particu lar s trategy to realize the nat ional prefer­
ence in favor of accountabi l ity. I t  i s  argued here that this  strategic  choice 
was largel y  driven by resource constraints .  In  the wake of the 1 994 
genocide , nearly one i n  fifty Rwandans was in prison. 3 1 6 With a s ignifi­
cant portion of the able-bodied population dead, the addit ional burden 
i mposed by such a h igh i ncarceration rate was s imply not sustainable .  
Fami lies of the detained often h ad to provide food and m oney for their 
incarcerated relatives and the S tate had to support the prisons on an al­
ready insufficient budget .  The desperate need for l abor in agriculture and 
reconstruction required many prisoners to work in group s  in the commu­
nities around the prisons .  Moreover, the government was subjected to 
3 1 2. Tito Rutaremara, Chairman, Legal and Constitutional Commission of Rwanda, 
Comments at the Conference on Constitutional Development, Kibuye, Rwanda (Aug. 22, 
200 1 ) ,  reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
supm note 298, at 99. 
3 1 3 . Victoria Brittain ,  Time for Tntth as Rwanda Strives for Reconciliation, GUARDIAN, 
Apr. 6. 200 l , at 1 4. 
3 1 4. Interview with President Kagame, President, in Kigali , Rwanda (June 25 ,  2000). 
3 1 5 . Interview with President Kagame by Marc Hoogsteyns (Apr. 1 3 ,  2002) (on file with 
author), ovailob/e at http://www.rwanda l .com/government/president/interviews/200 1 /  
drcserious.html. 
3 1 6. Esti mates suggested that upwards of  1 25,000 genocide suspects were incarcerated 
in the late 1 990s, out of a total post-genocide population of approximatel y  s ix mil l ion. Neuf­
fer, .wpm note 300, at 1 8 .  
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significant NGO critic ism for horrific prison condit ionsm and the l ack of 
adeq uate documentation for more than 40,000 detainees . ' 1 �  Wi th vocal 
cal l s  from i nternational c iv i l  society and w i t h  the financial strain of h igh 
i ncarceration rates, the Rwandan government had no choice  but to in­
crease the effectiveness and speed of the domestic j udic iary in 
prosecuting international crimes .  
Ex isting j udicial resources i n  Rwanda proved unable to  meet  thi s  
daunting task, despite a p lan to create special i zed domest ic  court s  to hear 
only genocide and crimes against  humanity cases 3 1 9  At one point  "it  was 
est imated it would take between two and fo ur centuries to try all those in 
detention."'c< l At first, the government bel ieved the ICTR m i ght offer a 
solution, yet i t  quickly became apparent to President Kagame and h is  
advisors that the ICTR cou ld  not  provide large- scale j ustice .'" 1 l n  Ka­
game's  words,  the government needed "a better solution to this  problem 
of bringing the thousands of genocide suspects to j ustice ."':>:> A s  ne ither 
the domestic j udiciary nor the i nternational community h ad offered a 
workable solution, the Rwandan government had to consider more radi­
cal alternatives .  Turning to the traditional model of Gacaca c ircu mvents 
these resource constraints . The Gacaca system i s  rel ativel y  i nexpensive ,  
easy to operational ize on a l arge scale, and c losely tied to the communi­
ties in which crimes occurred. Gacaca thus o ffered a s trategy derived 
from national preferences and able to accommodate the l i mited m eans 
avai l able to the Rwandan government.  
The central premise of this Part is that pol i t ics ,  and part icu l ar ly  the 
pol icy interdependence between the preferences of nat ional actors in a 
variety of States ,  i s  essential to the enforcement of i nternational crimi nal 
3 1 7 .  The author has vis ited prisons i n  Ngozi, Burunc!i ( June 2000) and i n  Kibuye and 
Ruhungeri. Rwanda (Aug. 200 1 )  and can personal l y  attest to the overcrowding, unsanitary 
condit ions, and hunger that mark many prisons. 
3 1 8 . See Report on the S i tuation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submi tted by the Special 
Representative, Mr. Michae l  Moussall i ,  Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1 999, Feb. 20, 
2000, �[ 1 35, U.N.  Doc E/CNA/2000/4 1 25 ;  see. e.g. , AMNESTY INT ' L, RwA NDA, supra note 
283, at 1 2  (noting "extremely poor prison conditions and inadequate access to medical care") ; 
IPEP Report, supra note 28 1 , <j[ 18.36,  at 2 1 4  (describing "deplorable conditions" and ac­
knowledging that "several thousand detainees died [ in 1 998 alone] from AIDS, malnutrition, 
dysentery or typhus") .  
3 1 9. IPEP Report, supra note 28 1 ,  9[ 1 8 .35 ,  at 2 1 3 . 
320. !d. 9[ 1 8 .37, at 2 1 4 .  
32 1 .  Press Conference, President Paul Kagame, Kagwne Urges Rwandans to Build a 
Better Future Learning from the Mistakes of the Posr (Apr. 6, 2002), ot h ttp:!/ 
www.rwanda l .com/government/president/intervicws/200 1 /genocideweek.html .  
322. Interview with President Kagame by Marc Hoogsteyns, supru note 3 1 5 . 
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l aw. While  the pol i tical prospects for the creation of new in ternational 
mechanisms of enforcement-such as the ad hoc tribunal s-are l im i ted, 
the opportunit ies for the creation of domestic and semi-international ized 
enforcement bodies are promis ing .  Certain pol i t ical al ignments are l ikely 
to give rise to the creation of semi- internationalized tribunal s ,  as i l l us­
trated by the three case studies di scussed here . F irst ,  domestic tri bunals 
may emerge where polit ical divides within an i l l iberal S tate ' s  e l i te gen­
erate pol it ical benefits for powerful members of that el ite who support 
i nternational criminal justice.  Second, w·here the U . N .  serves as adminis­
trator of a territory in  the wake of in ternational crimes,  the U.N. may 
estab l i sh  such a mechan ism .  Third, semi-i nternational ized tribunals may 
be created where they shi ft pol icy interdependence and a l low a vulner­
able State to external ize the costs of prosecution v is-a-v is a more 
powerful  neighbor onto the international community. Fourth ,  in  l i beral 
S tates strong preferences of domestic interests may resul t  in a govern­
ment pol icy of accountabi l i ty. Final ly, resource constrai nts may lead 
governments to p ursue creat ive strategies for the enforcement of interna­
tional cri minal law. 
None o f  these conditions may be necessary or sufficient for new 
domestic and semi-international ized enforcement bodies to be created. 
But .  where these conditions exist ,  the prospects for domestic enforce­
ment of international cri minal J aw appear high.  Paying attention to the 
pol i t ical contexts discussed here i s  essential ,  both to identify opportuni­
ties for the creation of new enforcement mechanisms and to spot 
potential ly dangerous c ircumstances in  which courts become so pol i ti ­
cized they no  longer serve as  independent arbiters of the l aw. 
III. THE OPERATION OF INTERNATIONALIZED COURTS 
IN EAST TIMOR 
If, as argued above, domestic courts-and more particularly, semi­
i nternationalized domestic courts-are to become a significant 
enforcement mechanism of in ternational criminal law, then a close 
analysis of the effectiveness and operation of such tribunals i s  necessary 
to determi ne how their usefulness can be enhanced i n  the future . I n  Part 
I I  the situation in East Timor was presented to i l lustrate the pol itical cir­
cumstances i n  which countries establish domestic courts to enforce 
i nternational criminal law. This Part builds on that presentation,  provid­
ing a focused study, based on i n-depth field research and on-site 
observation, of the operational successes and challenges faced by the 
Special Panel s of the District Court i n  Di l i ,  East Timor. 
62 lv!ic!z igon Jowncil of' ln remationo! Lmv I Vol .  2� I 
The form and structure of the S pecial  Panels of the Dis trict Court of 
Di l i  have been described el sewhere ,-':' but a few background facts s hould 
be recounted. Security Counc i l  Resolution 1 272 estab l i shed the U . N .  
Transit ional Admin i stration for East Timor (UNTAET) _ _  ,:.J Among the 
early acts of the SRSG was Regulation 2000/ 1 1 ,  estab l i sh i ng the d istrict 
courts of D i l i  and vest ing them with "exclusive j urisdict ion over serious 
cr iminal offenses,  part icularly Genocide, War Crimes. Crimes against 
humanity, and murder." 'co I n  June 2000, the S RSG establ i shed Special 
Panels  in  the District Courts of D i l i  wi th "universal jurisd ict ion" over the 
::;e rious of enses l isted above . The Special Panels were to cons is t  of one 
East Timorese judge and two i nternational j udges,  'c(• w i th the East 
Timorese j udge named by the S RSG after consul tation with an East 
Ti morese Trans it ional Judici al Services Commiss ion . ':' The first Special 
Panel  began operat ion i n  January 200 1 and a second Panel  convened in  
November 200 1 .  
With the foregoing general background, thi s  Part engages i n  a the­
matic consideration of the principal successes and chal lenges fac i ng the 
Special Panel s  in East Timor. The analys is  is not intended to be exhaus­
tive, but rather to focus on one country and highl ight some of the areas 
in which semi- internat ional ized courts have been part icul arly effective 
and where they have fal len short. 
A A reas of Success 
I .  Physical & Judic ial Reconstruction 
Possib ly the most obvious success of the Special Pane l s  i n  East 
Timor i s  the reconstruct ion of the i ntegrity and physical premises of the 
j udicial system, l i terall y  from the ground up.  When the U .N .  adm i n istra­
t ion arrived i n  D i l i  i n  1 999, most of the city had been burned. There 
were neither j udicial institutions nor buildings from which to work .328 I n  
l ate 200 1 ,  a new courthouse opened i n  the center o f  Di l i ,  wi th office 
space ( including l imi ted space for court-appointed defense counsel) ,  di­
rect-to-CD recording technologies (provided by a USAID grant) , and 
323. See, e.g. , Suzannah L inton, Prosecuting Attrocities ut the District Court of Dili, 2 
MELBOURNE J. INT ' L L. 4 1 4  CWO 1 )  [hereinafter Linton, Prosecuti11g Atrocities] ; Linton, supra 
note 200; Daryl Mundis ,  Current Developments: New Mechanisms for the Enforcemellt of 
Internotionol Hunwnitarimz Law, 95 AM.  J .  INT' L L. 934, 942-45 (200 1 ) .  
324. S .C.  Res. 1 272, supra note 205 . 
325 .  UNTAET Reg . 2000/ 1 1 ,  supra note 1 08 ,  en 1 0 . 1 .  
326. !d. <Jl 22. 1 .  
327. For a discussion of the process of locating and selecting East Timorese j udges, 
including ae1i al dropping of adverti sements across East Timor, see Strohmeyer, supra note 
200, at 1 75-77. 
328 .  Interview with Caitlin Reiger, Judicial System Monitoring Program, in  Di l i ,  East 
Ti mor (Jan. I 8, 2002) .  
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holding cel l s .  'c<l At the very least, the physical reconstruc tion stands as a 
powerfu l symbol of the renewed commitment to the rule of law. 
B eyond the physical premi ses ,  the i ntegrity of the j udicia l  process 
has begun to be restored, with the Special Panels operating and hearing 
cases .  In  less than two years, s ixteen j udgments have been rendered''o-a 
number that far exceeds the equivalent period for the ICTY and I CTR 
combined. A number of other cr imes against  humanity cases are now 
pending before the court. -'3 1 At least some of the crim inals from the 1 999 
atrocities have faced justice and a few vict ims have found catharsis in 
thi s  process. ''c Justice i s  being done and, notwithstanding i ts  many faul ts ,  
the j udicial system i n  East Timor "has come a long way.' '"' 
2. Judicial Cross-Fert i l ization 
One of the most s ignificant contributions of the East Timorese Spe­
c ial Panels ,  both for East Timor and for the development of i nternational 
criminal law more general ly, i s  the cross-fert i l ization of law, precedent, 
and thought,  faci li tated by foreign j udges sitting with their East 
Timorese counterparts on the bench . This international ization exempli ­
fies what Anne-Marie S laughter has described as "judicial 
global ization," whereby j udges look, talk ,  and sometimes act "beyond 
the confines of national legal systems . . .  [shar ing] a deep sense of par­
ticipation i n  a common g lobal enterprise of j udging." 33-l Judicial 
globalization i n  East Timor serves a dual function :  first to ensure fai r, 
unbi ased, and informed j udgments i n  cases before the court and, second, 
to develop capacity and expert ise within the local j udiciary. This  coop­
eration, sharing, and teaching has been remarkab ly  effective. 
International ized panels have served an important purpose in ensur­
ing impartial deci s ions based in i n ternational legal principles ,  while 
respecting and understanding local custom. D uring the period of I ndone­
sian rule, East Timorese were excluded from government, leav in g  a void  
of  local j udicial expe1ience upon Indonesian withdrawal i n  1999 .  Even  if  
329. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, Judge, D i l i  Special Panels, i n  Di l i ,  East Timor 
( Jan .  1 9, 2002) .  
330. See Judicial System Monitoring Program, http://www.j smp.minihub.org/ 
Trialsnew.htm. The principal crimes against humanity case is Prosecutor v. M arques ( Los 
Palos Case) ,  Case No. 9/2000, Judgment (Di l i  Special Panel ,  Dec .  I I , 200 I ), ami/able at 
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/trials .h tm.  
33 1 .  See, e.g. , Prosecutor v .  Sarmento (SAME Case), Case No. 1 8/200 1 ,  Indictment (Di l i  
Special Panel, Aug.  7, 200 1 ) ; Prosecutor v .  da S i lva (Lolotoe Case) ,  Case No. 4/200 1 , Indict­
ment (Dili Special Panel, Feb. 6, 200 1 ) . 
332 .  Interview with Joaquim Fonseca, supra note 247. 
333 .  J UDICIAL SYSTEM MONITORING PROGRAM, JUSTICE I N  PRACTICE : H U M A N  RIGHTS 
IN CouRT ADMINISTRATION § 4. 1 (JSMP Thematic Report No.  I ,  200 1 ) [hereinafter J usTICE 
IN PRACTICE], availah/e at http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/JSMP ! .pdf. 
334.  Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1 1 04. 
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local judges had been avai lable, the polit ically charged s ituation after 
1 999 raised legitimate concerns about bias.  The presence of in ternational 
judges and parti cul arly the ratio of two i nternational to one East 
Timorese judge has avoided many potential c laims  of bias and provided 
a degree of expert ise on the panels . ''' 
Partnership with l ocal judges (even wi th their l i mited experience ) 
has fac i l itated the i nternational j udges '  understanding of the East 
Ti morese context and local traditions . M aria Natercia Gusmao Pere i ra, 
the East Timorese j udge , was educated i n  B al i ,  I ndonesia and is there­
fore famil iar wi th the Indonesian Penal Code in effect in East Timor. 
Likewise, she is famil iar with local customs .  Judge Gusmao Pereira re­
lates a story from the Carlos Suarez murder case, in  which a c la im of 
m itigating ci rcumstances was based on an East Timorese bel ief in  ' 'black 
magic"-that the victim h ad placed a curse on the accused ' s  two chi l ­
dren .  Judge Gusmao Pereira "assisted the Italian j udge in  understanding 
how this belief could exist in  East Timor" and they collectively identified 
provisions of the app l icable Indonesian Penal Code allowing them to 
take such bel ief structures into cons ideration . 136 
While i nternational train i ng sessions for l ocal j udges, primari ly  or­
ganized by the government of Portugal, have not proved particularly 
successfu l ,m sitting on the bench with international col leagues h as been 
a powerful educational too l .  Judge Gusmao Pereira observes :  "I have 
learned a great deal fro m  the two i nternational judges .  I was never a 
judge before this and they have helped me think about p art icular argu­
ments and principles ." m From the i nternational perspective, the 
B urundian Judge, Sylver Ntukamazia, comments : "Judge M aria and I 
d iscuss things together. I am helping  her to understand and i nterpret i n­
ternational l aw. This was the first t ime she had heard of crimes against  
humanity so we talked about that a l ot together."339 Education has been 
reciprocal . Judge Ntukamazina observes :  "Judge Maria knows I ndone­
s ian law and I have l earned about that. And I have learned about 
transitional s i tuations ,  something that wi l l  make my job at home in Bu­
rundi easier as some s imi lar crimes were committed there and now I 
335 .  I nterview with Cait l in Reiger, supra note 328 .  
336. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, Judge, Dist1ict Court of  Dil i ,  in 
Dil i ,  East Timor ( Michael  Anderson trans . ,  Jan .  1 8 , 2002) .  
337 .  The fai lure of  these training classes is largely due to  their being conducted only in  
Portuguese, a language the  East Timorese judicial officers do not  speak. Likewise, many of  the 
training sessions have been scheduled while cases were in session, requiring j udges and de­
fense counsel to either miss court or to skip the training sessions. 
338 .  Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira. supra note 336. 
339 .  Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. 
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thi nk they could qualify as crimes against huma nity and genocide ." ;Ju A 
possibly un intended e ffect of the use of international j udges then i s  
cross-fert i l ization of  j udicial  thought and precedent both to  and from the 
host State . S imi lar partnering of i nternational and local personnel has 
also been a feature of the offices of the prosecutorw and publ ic  de­
fender.3�2 
.3 .  The Office of the Prosecutor 
Another success story of the East Ti morese model i s  the Serious 
Crimes Unit-the office of  the prosecutor under UNTAET rule and now 
in independent East Timor. Despi te in itial concerns about the effecti ve­
ness of the Serious Crimes Unit , after a reorganization in 200 l ,  it has 
emerged as an effective and efficient body.'-�' Responsibi l i t ies  are gradu­
ally bei ng shifted to the East Timorese General Prosecutor, Longunhos 
Montiero, who has indicated a desire to press ahead with priority crimes 
against  humanity cases, rather than the simple murder cases that charac­
terized most early indictments . '11 The Serious Crimes Un i t  consists of a 
number of international personnel ,  i ncluding British barristers , U .S .  
prosecutors, and civi l  l aw investigating j udges,  many o f  w h o m  have ex­
perience at the ICTY or ICTR. Whi le  the East Timorese officers in the 
Serious Crimes U nit  have significantly less experience, training from 
their international col leagues i s  now becoming part of the Serious 
Crimes Unit 's  miss ion. ' :' 
I n  addit ion to a strong human resource base, the Serious Crimes Unit 
has significant fin ances at i ts  disposal .  I t  i s  funded from the UNTA ET 
budget by assessed (mandatory) U . N .  contributions and i s ,  therefore, 
comparatively "blessed by resources ."316 It has put those resources to use, 
h iring numerous translators and i nvestigators as well as ensuring ade­
quate access to road and helicopter transportation for i nvestigation and 
transport of witnesses . This budget has been confirmed through at l east 
May 2003 and effective operation is therefore expected to continue.  With 
340.  /d.; see also Interview with Sy lvia de Bertodano, Dil i  Public  Defender, i n  Amster-
dam, Netherlands (Jan. 26, 2002 ) (De Bertoclano is an Engl ish Barrister). 
34 1 .  Interview with Stuan Alford, supra note 244. 
342. In terview with Siphosami Malunga, Zimbabwe Public Defender, in Di l i ,  East Timor 
(Jan. 1 7 , 2002) .  
343.  The Serious Crimes Unit was completely reviewed and restmcturecl fol lowing the 
arrival of Dennis MacNamara, the new Deputy Special Representative. who was tasked with 
reforming the Serious Crimes Unit .  
344. Interview with Longunhos Montiero, General Prosecutor, East Timor, i n  Di l i .  East 
Timor (Jan. 1 6, 2002) .  Montiero notes that most indictments to date had been for s imple mur­
der due to the difficulty of proving the crimes against humani ty elements. 
345. Interview with Stuart A l ford. supra note 244. 
346. !d. 
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both experienced personnel  and sufficient resources,  by M arc h 2002 the 
Serious Cri mes Uni t  had is sued more than th irty-three indictments 
against eighty-two accused, including ten charges of crimes against 
humanity.'�7 M oreover, in  every case brought before the D i l i  Di strict 
Court . the accused have been convicted on at least some counts . '�·� 
B .  Challenges and D(fficulties 
1 .  Judges and Judicial Resources 
Despite the success of j udicial  cross-ferti l i zation,  locating and re­
crui t ing qualified j udges (both East Timorese and i nternational)  has 
proved a s ignificant chal lenge. While the international j udges are clearly 
committed to their work in East Timor, none of them h ave s i gn ificant 
experience in  i nternational l aw and many have no experience in criminal 
trials .  Judge Ntukamazina, for example, was a j unior magistrate j udge in 
B urundi before apply ing to the U . N .  for a j udicial affairs officer position 
and then subsequently being appointed a S pecial Panel s  j udge .'.JY Whi le 
he holds a Masters degree i n  l aw from the U niversi ty of B uj umbura, he 
openly admits to having no experience in i nternational cr iminal  l aw prior 
to his arrival in East Timor.350 Other judges and senior j udic ial appointees 
have come from Mozambique, Cape Verde, Italy, and B razi l ,  but, l i ke 
Judge Ntukamazina, many l ack s ignificant expe1ience i n  international 
criminal law despite UNTA ET requirements for judicial  appointees .1=' 1 
Two factors have contributed to this problem.  First, salaries for j udicial 
officers ( low by Western standards) provide l i tt le motivat ion for highly 
qualified j udges to leave stable careers for work in D i l i .  S econd, the se­
lection of j udges may wel l  h ave been motivated more by the U N TAET 
347. Mohammad Othman, Former Prosecutor General for East Timor, Remarks at the 
Amsterdam Centre for International Law Conference on Internationalized Cri minal Courts 
and Tribunals (Jan . 25, 2002) .  
348. See Judicial System Monitoring Program, http://www.j smp.minihub.org/ 
Trialsnew.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) .  
349. See Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. 
350. See id. 
35 1 .  See Interview with Caitlin Reiger, supra note 328 .  UNTAET Regulation 20001 1 5  
requires that "account shall  b e  taken of the experience of the judges i n  criminal l aw, interna­
tional law, including in ternational humanitarian law and human rights." On the Establishment 
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offenses, UNTAET Reg. 20001 1 5  
§ 23.2, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/ 1 5  (June 6, 2000) ;  see also J usTICE I N  PRACTICE,  
supra note 333, § 3 . 1 . 1  n .32 (noting that pursuant to UNTAET Regulation 1 999/3 al l interna­
tional judges are supposed to be vetted by the Transit ional Judicial Services Commission, but 
to date none have been) ;  Linton, supra note 200, at 228. 
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goal of ensuring geographic diversity of staff, rather than a direct con­
siderat ion of the appropriate qual i fications for the posit ion.1'c 
The l imi ted judicial experience in  international and crim inal  l aw i s  
s igniticantly exacerbated by the l ack of avai lable support resources. 
There are no j udicial  c lerks or assistants as is common in  most j ur i sdic­
tions .1'1 There i s  l ikewise no judicia l  l ibrary ( though a few l egal books 
have been collected) . "".j Unt i l  December 200 1 ,  judges did not have per­
sonal Internet access ,  making any research almost i mpossib le ."" Judicial 
training �;essions  are often conducted in  Portuguese, a language most of 
the j udges do not speak."" 
The lack of judicial resources has been manifest in  the qual ity of j u­
ri sprudence. J udge Ntukamazina admi ts :  " I  don ' t  have time or resources 
to do independent research .  I go through the prosecution's  submissions 
and what they say was done by the ICTY and ICTR. I try to check them, 
but don ' t  have t ime to make my own research ."m Not surpris ingly, until 
the Los Palos crimes against humanity decis ion in early 2002, "no deci ­
s ion contained any reference to  in ternational j urisprudence ."353 Even in 
that case, according to the prosecutor, the j udges "adopted arguments put 
forward by the prosecution and defense without their own legal  in-
. , ,J)l) quny 
Jurisprudence on key legal i s sues i s  often questionable .  For example ,  
in determining the context of a systematic attack against a c iv i l ian popu­
lation, the court in one case merely noted that the I ndonesian plan to 
dep011 hundreds of thousands of East Timorese "do[es] not call  for any 
formal evidence in l ight of what even the humblest and most candid man 
in the world can access.".160 While fro m  a l ocal perspective thi s  may be 
352. See Press Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mel lo ,  supra note 256 
( referring to the importance of diversity in UNTAET and noting the I 07 nationalit ies repre­
sented in the mission). 
353 .  See Interview with Sy lve r  Ntukamazina, supra note 329. While a n umber of Austra-
l ian law graduates offered their services as legal assistants, the East Timorese Ministry of 
Justice refused to al low them to serve, apparently on grounds of bureaucratic difficulties and 
insurance risks. 
354. See J usTICE IN  PRACTICE, supra note 333, § 3 . 1 .2 .  
355 .  Interview wi th Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. 
356. Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336. 
357.  Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.  
358 .  JUSTICE IN  PRACTICE, supra note 333,  § 3 . 1 . 1 .  
359.  Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244. 
360 .  Prosecutor v .  Leki,  Case No .  5/2000, Judgement (Di l i  Special Pane l , June  I I ,  
200 I ), al'([i/able m http://www.j smp.minihub.org; see JUD ICI AL SYSTEM MONITORING PRo­
GRAMME,  PROSECUTOR V. JON! MARQUES AND 9 OTHERS, TRIAL REPORT § 3 .2 . 1 .2 (2002) 
[hereinafter MARQU ES TRIAL REPORT], available at http://www.j smp.minihub.org/ 
Resources .htm ( noting that in the Los Palos Case the Publ i c  Defenders did not contest that 
there was a "widespread and systematic attack . . .  but merely disputed their  c l ients knowledge 
of it" ) ;  see u!so Prosecutor v. Marques ( Los Palos Case) ,  Case No. 9/2000, Judgment (Di l i  
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self-evident, the role of a court i s  to apply law to facts ,  something the 
Special Panels have not been able to do with any regularity. In  determin­
i ng whether the nexus to an armed contl ict is a requirement for crimes 
against humanity, the court appears to have s imply misunderstood exist­
ing law.361 While commentators are correct to describe the Los Palos 
j udgment  as "a maj or achievement and an important contribution to ju­
risprudence internationally and within East Timor,"v'" the lack of judicial 
resomces and expertise were clearly manifest i n  the qual i ty of the judg­
ment itself. 
2. Applicable Law 
A second area in which the Special Panels experie nced difficulties 
relates to the applicable l aw i n  East Timor. UNTAET Regulation 1 9991 1 
provided the appl icable law s  would be the laws of Indonesia as applied 
i n  East Timor "prior to 25 October 1 999 . . . in so far as they do not con­
flict with the [ international] standards referred to i n  section 2, the 
fulfi l lment of the [ UNTAET] m andate, or the present or any other regu­
lation . . .  issued by the transitional administrator."'6' Thus,  Indonesian 
law appl ies as long as i t  conforms to international standards and is not 
superceded by UNTAET Regul ations .  While this convoluted specifica­
tion of applicable l aw m ay have been necessary (as there was no other 
law to apply and i nternational standards had to be observed),  commenta­
tors have noted that i t  "proved rather difficult to app ly  as it did not 
actual ly  spell  out the l aws or specifical ly identify the e lements that were 
Special Panel, Dec. I I , 200 1 ) The court's findings were based largely on the U.N. Interna­
tional Commission of Inquiry Report, which was quoted at length in the judgment. 
36 1 .  Significant attention is paid to finding that there was an armed conflict in East 
Timor as a necessary element for proving a crime against humanity. See Marques, Case No. 
9/2000, Judgment CJ[<Jl 680-85 . However, while the armed conflict nexus i s  included in the 
ICTY Statute, it i s  not incl uded in UNTAET Regulation 2000/ 1 5, which i s  taken from the 
Rome S tatute of the ICC. MARQUES TRI A L  REPORT, supra note 360, § 3 .2 . 1 .2 .  Moreover, the 
Tac!ic case, a leading ICTY decision that relaxes the required nexus between crimes against 
humanity and international armed conflict, has not yet been cited b y  the court. MARQUES 
TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 3 .2 . 1 .2 .  See Prosecutor v. Tactic, ICTY Case No. IT-94- l A, 
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber (Jul .  1 5, 1 999);  see also Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against 
Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the lntemational Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugo­
slavia and for Rwanda, 43 H ARV. INT' L L.J .  237 (2002) (defining the elements of crimes 
against humanity in ICTY jurisprudence). 
362. M ARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, § 4.7 .  
363. UNTAET Reg. 1 999/ 1 ,  supra note 230, § 3 . 1 .  Section 2 refers to the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, 
Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. !d. § 2.  
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inconsistent  wi th international l y  recognized human ri g:hts standards.""'� 
As J udge Gusmao Pereira candidly comments : "The hardest part for me 
was to interpret the l aw . . .  the I ndonesian , UNTAET, and i nternational 
l aws didn ' t  always fit ."16c One public defender noted that these overl ap-
p ing  laws were a "cause of g:reat confusion."166 � � 
The chal l enge of determining the appl icable l aw was exacerbated by 
often incorrect or unavai l able trans lations.  Again Judge Gusmao Pereira 
comments : "There is  a l anguage problem here. The Indonesian version 
[of many U NTAET documents] i s  often wrong, basicall y  useless ."167 
Moreover, in  many cases rel evant Indonesian l aws were s imply unavai l ­
abl e  or, in some cases, were rej ected by the East Timorese as  a remnant 
of Indonesian occupation.168 In  addition to applying l aw to extraordinar­
i ly  difficult facts,  under-resourced judges face the added burden of 
attempting to dist i l l  the l aw from numerous, often contradictory and 
sometimes unavai l able sources .  
The direct use of much of the Rome Statute i n  U NTAET Regulation 
20001 1 5  provided a further chall enge for j udges in  East Timor. While the 
Rome Statute i s  a useful starting point and represents an international 
consensus on  the laws and structures of an i nternational criminal court, i t  
i s ,  by i ts  nature, a compromise designed for a wel l -funded, ful ly  interna­
tional court, operating where n ational courts are unable or unwil l ing to 
prosecute . Prosecutors in East Timor h ave found the Rome Statute useful 
as the elements of the crimes could be borrowed from the Preparatory 
Commi ssion materia ls . 369 H owever, the wholesale adoption of the Statute 
may not have been appropriate for the East Timorese context, where 
physical constraints significantly l imit  the j udiciary. Tai loring provisions 
of the Rome Statute to East Timorese circumstances ,  p articular ly  the 
unavoidable l imits on j udicia l  capacity, might h ave been more appropri­
ate .:no For example ,  the lengthy and potential ly confusing definition of 
364. Strohmeyer, supra note 200, at 1 74; see also Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and 
Recomtruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo nnd East Timor, 
95 AM. J. INT' L L. 46, 59 (200 1 )  (noting that this system of laws led to "considerable  legal 
and political difficulties"). 
365. See Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336.  
366. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. 
367. See Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336 .  
368 .  See Strohmeyer, supra note 200, a t  1 74 .  
369. See Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244; see a lso S.C.  Res. 1 272, supra 
note 205 . 
370. See Phakiso Mochochoko, Government of Lesotho, Address to the Amsterdam 
Centre for Intemational Law Conference on Internationalized Crimi nal Courts and Tribunals 
( Jan . 26, 2002 ) ;  see n/so Interview with S iphosami Malunga, supra note 342 (noting that the 
ICC "statute was created for different purposes and the provi sions of the Rome Statute should 
have been adapted for local use" ) . 
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vvar critnes i n  the Ro111e Statute and i n  Regt1lation 2000/ J 5 rnight n ot 
have been needed i n  East Timor. 
3 .  Equality of Arms 
The lack of equal i ty of arms between prosecution and defense i s  a 
third area i n  which the Special Panels have failed to meet their mandate. 
The comparative lack of defense resources large ly  ari ses from 
fundamental differences i n  the way the prosecution (Setious Crimes 
Unit) and the public defense service are funded. Due to the mandate i n  
Security Council Resolution 1 272 t o  prosecute in ternational crimes,  the 
Serious Crimes Uni t  is funded directly from assessed U . N .  contribu­
tions. 1 7 1  The trial chambers as well as the otlice of the public defender, 
however, is funded from the general budget of East Timor and must 
compete for funds with other government entities .'7� This has led to, and 
wi l l  presumably continue to cause, m s ignificant di sparities between 
prosecution and defense budgets. 
At trial , these di sparities have manifested themselves in s ignificant 
ways.  For most of 200 1 ,  s ix  public defenders had to cover al l  cases i n  
East Timor-both regul ar cases and those before the S pecial Panels .374 
I nadequate resources and personnel l imitations in the office of the p ublic 
defender have meant that one defender i s  often assigned to multiple de­
fendants in the same trial . 375 I n  the Los Palos case, for example, three 
East Timorese public  defenders h ad to represent five c l ients,  while an 
additional three i nternational public defenders represented the remaining 
three accused.376 This problem is exacerbated when public defenders ' 
contracts expire or when they are away for training sess ions .  
The resource disparit ies between prosecution and defense has re­
stricted the abi l i ty of defendants to call witnesses. Prior to January 2002 
no defense witnesses h ad been called in any cases .377 This  i s ,  i n  p art, due 
to the l ack of UNTAET funds to pay witnesses '  expenses up front  and 
the fact that many potential witnesses remain in West Timor, beyond the 
court 's  subpoena power.m U . N .  vehicles frequently h ave not  been avail-
37 1 .  See Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244. 
372. See id. 
373 .  For a t  least fiscal year 2002-03 the Serious Crimes Uni t  w i l l  continue to receive 
funding directly from the U.N.  assessed budget. !d. 
374. See Interview with S iphosami Malunga, supra note 342. 
375.  See MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 3 60, § 3 . 1 .2.  
376. See id. 
377 .  See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342 ; In terview with J im Coy, 
supra note 260. 
378.  JusTICE IN  PRACTICE,  supra note 333, § 3 .4 ( noting that whi le UNTAET Regulation 
2000/30 provides for reimbursement, the "administration of such reimbursement has been a 
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able for the pub l ic  defenders to i nvestigate cases and locate wnnesses .  
The lack of  defense resources has been so severe that one publ ic de­
fender is  considering appea l s  based on a claim of unfair trial s . '7') 
4. Court Administration 
The easiest problems to rectify relate to the adminis tration of the 
East Timorese courts . Most of these problems are directly attributab le to 
a lack of financial resources, not surpris ing considering that the total 
bud£et for the East Ti morese Q:overnment i s  about two-thirds of the � � 
ICTY' s  funding and the budget allocation for Special Panel s i s  equiva-
lent to that of the Dil i  Fire Brigade ."'0 These resource l imi tations directl y 
affect the proceedings of the court . For example,  translation services are 
wholly inadequate . Judges have commented on the press ing need for 
interpretation-both i n  court and of documentary evidence .1:; 1 Translation 
difficulties are exacerbated by the use of numerous languages.  In the Los 
Palos trial ,  for example, six languages were spoken,  often requ iring the 
use of three separate translators for one conversation . 3o: Even for rela­
tively simple English-Indonesian translation, the number of available 
translators was simply i nadequate ; translators often had to work straight 
for e ight-hour shifts, and defense counsel had to rely  on the prosecu­
t ion 's  interpreters to communicate with their own cl ients as no 
independent translators were avail able . 3x3 Likewise,  no transcripts are 
available, a fact that s ignificantly interferes with the right to  an appeal .'�� 
While USAID funding allowed for the i nstallation of a d irect-to-CD re­
cording system in the Special Panel courtroom, the lack of a trained 
technic ian caused sporadic  operat ion.  Moreover, j udges were unable to 
access relevant portions of the CD recordings and so rel i ed i nstead on 
recurring problem"). The Serious Crimes Unit has taken to reimbursing witness expenses out 
of pocket, a solution not avai lable to most public defenders. /d. 
379. See Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. The basis of h is  clai m may 
l ie  in article 1 4(3 ) (e)  of the lntemational Covenant on Civi l  and Pol i tical Righ ts , binding law 
in East Timor, pursuant to UNTAET Regulation 1 999/ l ,  which provides a right to examine 
witnesses .  See UNTAET Reg. 1 999/ I ,  supra note 230, § 2 .  Despite his in tent to appeal, the 
UNTAET Human Rights Officer contends that trials are fair, though defense concems are 
valid. See Interview with Jim Coy, supra note 260. 
380. Othman, supra note 347. 
38 1 .  Interview with Maria Natercia Gusmao Pereira, supra note 336. 
3 82 .  These languages include Bahasa Indonesian, English, Tetun, Portuguese, Makasa, 
and Fataluku. For a discussion of the chal lenges of interpretation in the Los Palos trial ,  see 
MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, * 3 .2 .4. 
383 .  !d. 
384. UNTAET Regulation 2000/ 1 1 requires written or recorded notes of proceedings. 
UNTAET Reg . 20001 1 1 ,  supra note I 08, § 26. 1 .  The need for adequate transcripts has been 
found integral to the right of appeal in the United States and the United Kingdom, among 
others. 
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notes taken by the presiding j udge on a laptop computer.'"" Most  o f  these 
problems coul d  presumably be so lved with adequate fund ing .  In the 
ICTY, for example,  LiveNote software al lows simultaneous translation in 
both written and audio form for Engl ish ,  French,  and B os­
nian/Serbian/Croatian. 
An additional chal lenge of  court administration is  that trial s rarely 
fol low a prescribed schedule .  Duri ng the author 's  vis i t  to East  Timor, 
j udges went on an unantic ipated week long strike.106 Such disruption and 
unpredictab i li ty make it extremely difficult for the local population to 
observe the j udicial process .  Even when judicial proceedings are an­
nounced, they are often poorly pub l i c ized and, on occas ion,  East 
Timorese are excluded from the courthouse by guards.''7 W h i l e  the prob­
lems of schedul ing and access were rectified by j udicial order during the 
Los Palos case, they have h indered the restorative and reconc i l iatory 
functions of the Special Panels ."" 
A third problem i n  court admi n i stration is a general l ack of in ternal 
management and oversight .  The Special Panels  have no registry or c lerk 
of court to coordin ate schedules, tri al s ,  and witnesses.  This  l ack of inter­
nal  admin istration led to u nl awfu l  detention by U NTAET durin g  the run­
up to the Los Palos case, when several of the accused 's detention orders 
l apsed. When this came to l i ght  i n  m id-January 200 1 ,  the S pecial Panel  
i ssued new arrest warrants for accused already i n  custody.389 The issu­
ance of new atTest warrants was subsequently overruled by  the Court of 
Appeals .390 The net effect, that "several of the accused were un lawful ly  
detained at  least from 30 August to  1 9  October 2000," cou ld  h ave been 
avoi ded with better management, organization,  and oversi gh t. 39 1 
385 .  MARQUES TRIAL REPORT, supra note 360, * 3 .2 .5 .  
3 86 .  The East Timorese judges were striking because they sought l i fe t ime appointments 
after their two year provisional appointment. See In terview with Maria Naterc ia  Gusmao 
Pereira, supra note 336. Yet, the SRSG refused, commenting that this was a decision that 
should be made by the East Timorese govemment after i ndependence on M ay 20, 2002 . Press 
Conference and Interview with Sergio Vieira de Mello, supra note 256. 
387 .  See JusncE IN PRACTICE ,  supra note 333 ,  § 4 . 1 .  
3 88 .  See MARQUES TRIAL R EPORT, supra note 360, § 3 .2 .3  (noting that "several East 
Timorese people were not allowed in to the court building by the security personnel as they did 
not have U.N. identity cards") .  When the presiding judge became aware of this s ituation, he 
ordered the guards to allow the observers to enter the building. Based on the author's observa­
tions of the new courthouse i n  Di l i ,  the problems of public exclusion have been largely 
rectified. 
389 .  
390. 
39 1 .  
See id. § 3 . 1 . 1 .  
See Prosecutor v. Bosco, Case of Appeal No. 2/2000 (Dil i  Special Pane l ) .  
MARQUES TRIAL REPORT , supra note 360, § 3 . 1 . 1 .  
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5 .  Cooperation with Indonesia 
The final chal lenge that h as l imited the effectiveness of the Special 
Panels is  the need to secure cooperation from I ndonesia. Despite a Secu­
rity Council resolution "stress [ ing] the need for cooperat ion between 
I ndonesia . . .  and UNTAET," the I ndonesian government has been 
l argely unsupportive of the S pecial Panel ' s  work . Defendants, witnesses , 
and key evidence are often in  Indonesian West Timor, beyond the sub­
poena power of the Dil i  courts .192 While U NTA ET and Indonesia h ave 
entered into a Memorandum of Understandi ng, '9' cal l ing for mutual j udi­
cial cooperation, and while negoti ations between UNTAET and 
I ndonesia h ave been frequent, cooperation remains l i mited. UNTAET 
has l ittle authority or abi l i ty to enforce the Memorandum of U nderstand­
ing or to secure the transfer of individuals and evidence from I ndonesia. 
This l ac k  of international cooperation has frustrated both prosecution 
and defense efforts . 394 As one public defender notes ,  "without subpoena 
power, the courts will only ever get the small fish .''395 
* * * 
B efore concluding this Part, a few brief observations are appropriate 
about the s imilarly situated internationalized courts in Kosovo, which 
have faced equivalent chal lenges and to which much of the above analy­
sis applies .  396 Securi ty Council Resolution 1 244 provided the U . N .  
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with the authority o f  "performing basic 
civil ian admin istrative functions," including the operation of the j udicial 
system.397 Under U .N .  supervision,  a new j udiciary has been constructed, 
consisting of one supreme court in Pri stina as well as five district courts 
i n  Pri stina, M itrovicia, Gji lan, Prizen, and Pee, with fifty-five local 
j udges and prosecutors in itially appointed.398 Due, however, to perceived 
392. See Interview with Longunhos Montiero, supra note 344. 
393 .  See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Republ ic of Indonesia and the 
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Regarding Cooperation in Legal, 
Judicial and Human Rights Related Matters, supm note 258 (providing for mutual assistance 
in taking evidence, serving documents, executing arrests, and transferring persons) .  
394 .  See Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities, supra note 323,  a t  456 (noting that "Indonesia 
has not transferred any of the suspects for whom the Special Panel has issued arrest war­
rants") .  
395.  Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. 
396. See Christopher Karphammar, Former Judge of the District Court of Mi trovica, 
Address to the Amsterdam Centre for International Law Conference on Internationalized 
Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Jan . 25, 2002) .  
397.  S.C. Res.  1 244, supra note 233, § l l (b ) .  
398 .  See AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR lNT' L LAW, INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS: PRACTISE AND PROSPECTS, COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS A N D  M ATER IALS 9-
] 0  (2002) .  
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and real ethnic bias, UNMIK Regulation 2 000/6 provided for the ap­
pointment of i nternational j udges with the authority to choose 
particul arly sensitive cases . '<)') A lthough p lans  for a special court to hear 
crimes against humanity cases have been abandoned,�00 as of J anuary 
2002, eight internati onal j udges and six i nternational prosecutors were 
actively working i n  regular Kosovar domestic courts and e fforts were 
underway to recru i t  twice that number.-w 1 Whi le  the i nternational i zed 
courts in Kosovo have reported general ly successful  operat ion ,  m any of 
the chal lenges facing East Timor di scussed above are equal ly  appl icable 
in Kosovo. 
Certain ly  in East Timor and presumably in  Kosovo as w e l l ,  i nterna­
tional ized courts present a m i xed record . Cases are being i nvestigated ; 
decis ions are being rendered ; j ustice i s  being done. However, personnel 
sho r1ages, resource l imits ,  m anagerial fai lures, and power constraints 
have restricted the work of the Special Panel s and have rai sed real ques­
tions about the qual ity of j ustice.  Judges and defense counse l  a l ike note 
the fundamental paradox of the Special Panel s  in East Timor: " [T ]he 
world has expectations for us  of an i nternational tribunal , with none of 
the resources and support ."�02 
The l arger point is that most of the problems and chal lenges dis­
cussed above are easily solved. They are caused by capacity constrai nts 
and misunderstandings,  not by wi l lful violations.  Addit ional  resources, 
careful staff recrui tment, and good management would a l leviate most, if 
not a l l , of the difficult ies the East Ti morese Special Panels h ave experi ­
enced. As an East Timorese publ ic  defe nder put it :  "[T]h i s  i s  an 
ambitious experiment, which, wi th a l ittle effort and support, would suc­
ceed."�03 The overriding l esson from the case study of the East Timorese 
Special Panel s ,  then ,  is that in ternational i zed courts can work if, and 
only i f, they are given the sufficient resources and suppm1. Semi-
399 .  See On the Appoilltment and Removal jimn Office of' International Judges and In-
ternational Prosecwors, UNMIK Reg. 2000/6, U .N.  Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/6 ( 200 I ) . 
400. E-mail from Brigitte Rath, Judicial A ffairs Officer, OSCE Mission i n  Kosovo ( Dec. 
1 4, 200 I )  (on tile with author) . 
40 1 .  AMSTERDAM CTR. FOR lNT' L LAW, supra note 398,  at 9. For more detai l s  on the 
internationalized courts in Kosovo, see Report of" the Secretary-General on the Ullited Nations 
Interim Mission in Kosovo 9191 48-52,  U.N .  Doc . S/200 1 /926 (200 1 ) . See a/sa RuLE OF LAw 
DIVISION, OSCE MISSION IN Kosovo, R EP. 2, THE DEVELOPMENT OF T H E  Kosovo JuDICIAL 
SYSTEM (Dec. 1 7 , 1 999), m'ailable at  http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice 
(covering the period) ;  DEP'T OF HuMAN RIGHTS AND RuLE OF LAW, OSCE MISSION IN Kos­
ovo, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN KOSOVO, avai/ahfe at 
http ://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice ( reports covering Feb. 200 ! -Feb. 
2002).  
402. Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. A simi lar theme was a i red by 
Judge Ntukamazina. Interview with Sy lver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. 
403 . Interview with Siphosami Malunga, supra note 342. 
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internationalzied courts are far less expensive than intern ational tribu­
nals ,  but they are not free .  If the U . N .  has l earned these lessons ,  there i s  
reason t o  hope that the internationalized courts now being establ i shed in  
S ierra Leone404 wi l l  overcome many of these difficul ties and function 
more effectively. To be successfu l ,  however, these semi-internationalized 
courts wi l l  need to be part of a cooperative global syste m  of j ustice from 
which they may draw the necessary resources, funds, and personne l .  The 
fol lowing Part considers such a system i n  detai l .  
I V. A COI\H>I U N ITY O F  COU RTS 
The decade of the 1 990s was a period of significant advancement for 
international criminal law: individuals were held accountab le ;  i mportant 
decisions were rendered; l aw was c larified and codified.  The challenge 
that l ies ahead i s  the deve lopment of an extensive,  effective, and effic ient 
means for enforcement of international criminal l aw. 
If the argument and observations in the preceding Parts of this Arti­
cle are correct, a particular v is ion of a system of in ternational criminal  
law i s  forming .  In  th is  system,  the bulk  of i nternational cri m inal  l aw en­
forcement wi l l  occur at a quasi-national, rather than supranational level .  
As the Introduction to the Princeton Principles on U niversal Jurisdiction 
sets forth ,  "the primary burden of prosecuting . . .  perpetrators of [ inter­
national] crimes wi l l  . . .  res ide with national legal systems .".Jos Whi le  the 
ICC wi l l  undoubtedly h ave a p lace in this system, the principle of com­
p lementarity e nsures that national courts wi l l  form the front  l i ne for 
prosecution of i nternational crimes.-�06 Moreover, the real it ies of glob al 
polit ics suggest that, whi le  the prospects for the creation of new suprana­
t ional tribunals are poor, there are numerous polit ical openings for the 
creation of n at ional and semi-in ternationalized e nforcement mecha­
nisms .  Although these mechan isms  are far from perfect, w i th appropriate 
suppot1 and assistance they have great potential . 
The best way to conceptual ize the emerging system of i n ternat ional 
criminal law enforcement i s  as a communi ty of courts.407 The courts 
comprising this system are i nteractive, i nterdependent ,  and i ntercon­
nected . .JoB They are not, in Wil l iam Aceves 's  words, merel y  "a serie s  of 
404. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of  Sierra Leone 
on the Establ ishment of a Special Court for S ierra Leone, Jan .  1 6, 2002 (on file with author) . 
405 . PRINCETON PRINCI PLES, supra note 74, at 24. 
406. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 1 6 . 
407. Abram Chayes, Remarks at the Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compli­
ance and Effectiveness, in 9 1  AM. Soc ' y I N T ' L  L. PRoc. 50, 56 ( 1 997) (describing this 
phenomenon as a "dense network of organizations and relationships") .  
408 . See supm Part I .  
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paral ic !  systems . . .  separately  appl icable within the various  nations of 
the world."-109 Rather, these enforcement mechan isms are overlapping,  
mutually supportive and mutual ly dependent. Their  juri sdict ions in ter­
sect.  They apply a s im i l ar body of law. They draw on each other's 
j misprudence . . .  1 0  As Anne-Marie S laughter describes i t ,  the new s ystem 
cons ists of "horizontal and vert ical government networks . . . [in] a 
three-dimensional web" of in teract ion.-lll These networks inc lude courts 
engaged in the common enterpri se of ensur i ng accountab i l i ty through 
the rule of law. They are a "communi ty of courts ."m 
Thi s  Part explores thi s  community of courts and the rel at ionship s  be­
tween them that bring order to the system.  It first cons iders how 
enforcement of i nternational crim i nal law differs from the standard i n­
ternational l aw or in ternational relations enforcement models . The 
vert ical and horizontal relat ion ship s  within thi s  dispersed e nforcement 
system are then analyzed . From them, basic  principles which regulate 
d i spersed enforcement of international law can be disti l led .  Final l y, th is  
Part turns to the primary actors within the system-an ep istemic com­
munity of internati onal crim inal law j udges .  
A Enforcement: A Two Level Analysis 
Unl ike most fields of in ternational law, the primary obligat ions i m­
posed by i nternational cr iminal law are on i ndividuals ,  not  on S tates . 4 1 3 
I n  many ways ,  the central p urpose of international criminal law i s  to de­
ter and punish individuals who commit i nternational crimes .  To that end, 
international cri m inal law d irectly regulates individual behavior, in ways 
far more s imi lar to domestic criminal law than to tradit ional international 
l aw. Only the secondary obligations of international cri m in al law are on 
S tates .  Through a variety of legal i nstruments, States are require d  to 
suppress primary v iolations by individuals and to exerc ise  j urisdiction 
over i ndividual perpetrators of international crimes. B ecause obligations 
409. Wil l iam J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet 
Case and the Move Tmt•ord o Universol System of Transnationol Law Litigation, 4 1  HARV. 
INT' L L.J. 1 29,  1 38 (2000) .  
4 1 0. In East Timor, for example, the submissions of  the Prosecution i n  the Los Palos 
case relied heavily on ICTY juri sprudence, which was also consulted by the judges .  See 
Prosecutor v. Marques (Los Palos Case), Case No 9/2000, Judgment (Di l i  S pecial Panel ,  Dec. 
1 1 , 2002). Likewise in  the Kunarac Case , the ICTY drew on national criminal l aw to 
determine the elements of rape in in ternational Jaw. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case 
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/ 1 -T, Judgement ( Feb. 22, 200 1 ) 
4 1 1 .  SLAUGHTER, supra note 272, ( manuscript ch. 4, at 2) .  
4 1 2 . See Helfer & Slaughter, supro note 2, at 372; S laughter, supra note 2, at 1 87 .  
4 1 3 .  See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 70 ,  a t  1 3- 1 6  (arguing that 
"[ i ]nternational law now protects ci t izens against abuses of power by their governments. It 
imposes i ndividual l iabi l i ty on government officials who commit grave . . .  crimes. It  must 
now impose direct obligations on individuals . . . .  ") . 
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i n  international crim inal law are directed at two different subj ects-both 
individuals and States-traditional compliance models fal l  s hort. Under­
standing compl iance with international criminal law requires analysis  at 
both the individual and State levels .  Such dual-level analysis  h as impor­
tant i mplications both for international criminal law and for other areas 
i n  which international legal rules regulate both i ndividuals and States ,  
such as  international economic law and international environmental l aw. 
Analyzing compliance on both the individual and State level requires 
reframing the l iterature on the enforcement of international law. Most of 
this  l i terature focuses only on why States comply with i ntern ational law 
and how States can be forced to do so. To date, l i ttle attention has been 
paid to the dynamics of enforcement and compliance where primary obli­
gations regulate individuals and only secondary obligations regulate 
States .  
I n  1 968 ,  Louis  Henkin wrote : " [A] lmost all nations observe almost 
all the principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all  of the time."4 1 4 For Henkin,  i t  i s  nations which "generally ob­
serve law."m I n  their theory of compliance, Abram and Antonia  Chayes 
offer a managerial model of why States comply with "formal" treaties .4 1 A  
Likewise, Downs,  Rocke, and B arsoom counter the managerial model by  
proposing a carrot-and-s tick approach to  generating compliance. They 
too operate with in  the tradit ional paradigm of State compliance with ob­
l igations targeted at States themselves .4 1 7  
B oth Chayes and Chayes and Downs, Rocke, and B arsoom define 
compliance as fulfillment of obligations vis-a-vis other States and think 
of enforcement as ways S tates can generate compliance by  other 
S tates . 4 1 8  I n  i nternational criminal law, however, the primary obligations 
of i ndividuals to refrain from committing i nternational crimes must be 
separated from the secondary obligations of States to suppress  and pun­
ish crimes .  As the nature of obligations on the individual and State levels 
is distinct, different theories of compliance may be needed at each level . 
4 1 4. LOUIS HENKIN,  How NATIONS B EHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1 979) .  
4 1 5 . See id. at 48. 
4 1 6. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONI A  CHAY ES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY ] ( ! 993  ) .  
4 1 7 . George W. Downs et a! . ,  Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation ?, SO I NT' L 0RG. 379, 383  ( 1 996). 
4 1 8 . See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4 1 6. at 1 7- 1 8 ; Downs et a! . ,  supra note 4 1 7, at 
386 (arguing that "the punishment must hurt the transgressor state . . .  the specific mechanism 
by which states punish violations is l ess relevant to the relationship between the depth of  co­
operation and enforcement than is the magnitude of enforcement") .  
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1 .  The I ndi vidual Level 
The primary obl i gations of i n ternational criminal law are at the indi­
v idual level . I n ternational legal instruments require i ndiv iduals  to refrain  
from international crimes such as  genocide, war crimes ,  and crimes 
against human i ty. I ndividual s comply with these primary obl igations 
when they do in  fact refrai n from such acts .  Enforcement of i nternational 
criminal l aw at the i ndiv idual level occurs when courts ( domestic or in­
ternational ) punish violations of  such primary obl igations .  
The primary obl igations for individuals to refrain from i nternational 
crimes are extremely specific .  The Statutes of the ICC, ICTY and ICTR, 
and the UNTAET Regul ation defi n i ng international  crimes i n  East Timor 
a l l  provide unambi guous descriptions of criminal behavi or.4 1 9 Such pre­
c ise obligations leave l i tt le room for deviation . Whi le there wi l l  be 
debate as to whether the bombing of television stations i n  Belgrade, con­
voys in  A fghanistan ,  guer i l las i n  Chechnya, or indivi dual s i n  Yemen 
v io late international law, i t  is c lear that i ndividual s must n ot cross into a 
n arrow and careful ly demarcated zone of international l y  prohibited con­
duct. Moreover, the primary obligations of international crim inal  l aw do 
not allow any derogation.  Those who do cross the l ine into the zone of 
proscribed behavior are clearly and absolutely i n  violation of their i nter­
national legal duties .  Given that these obligations on the i ndiv idual level 
are primary and aimed directly at preventing prohibited conduct, any 
violations of international cr iminal  law may "unravel"  the regi me i t­
self. 420 The deliberate commission of i nternational crimes  cannot be 
reconciled with a regime of in ternational crim inal law. 
The framework of legalization put forward by Ken neth Abbott and 
coauthors provi des a useful means of characterizing the n ature of in ter­
national crim inal law obligations at the i ndividual level . Abbott and 
coauthors evaluate legalizat ion of a set of rules based on the degree of 
obligation, preci sion, and delegation .  Applying these criteria first to i n­
dividual obligations i n  in ternational crim in al l aw, there i s  a high degree 
of what Abbott and coauthors deem "obl igation ." I ndividuals are bound 
by specific sets of rules .  Second, these obligations are extremely precise. 
To accord wi th the principle of nullwn crimen sine lege, the various in­
struments of in ternational crim inal l aw must "unambiguously define the 
conduct they require ,  authorize, or proscribe .""2 1 Third, at the level of 
4 1 9 . Genocide, for example, i s  defined i n  the Rome Statute as "any of  the fol lowing acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in pm1, a national, e thnic ,  racial or rel igious 
group, as such: (a) Kill ing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group." Rome Statute art. 6 .  
420. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4 1 6, at 20. 
42 1 .  Abbott et al . ,  supra note 1 95 ,  at 40 1 ;  see also Rome Statute art. 22  ("The definition 
of a crime shall be strictly constmed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambigu-
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i ndividual obl igations,  courts-both domestic and supranational-have 
been delegated the authority to enforce the rules of international law. To 
use Abbott ' s  terms, with respect to the primary individual obl igations of 
international criminal law, "parties [have] agree[d] to b indi ng third-party 
decisions on the basis of clear and generally applicable rules ."e 
The obl igations imposed by i nternational crim inal law on indiv iduals 
can thus be characterized as "hard legal ization," with h igh levels of  obl i­
gation, prec is ion ,  and delegation . At the individual level , strict 
compliance is requ ired .  The leaders of the Khmer Rouge cannot recon­
cile the extermination of three m illion people with the obl igation to 
refrain  from international crimes nor can the Hutu perpetrators of crimes 
in Rwanda reconcile the slaughter of the Tutsi with such obligations. At 
the individual level , i nternational criminal law does not and cannot toler­
ate even the s l ightest defection . These hard obligations and an 
extraordinari ly narrow zone of acceptable compl iance s uggest a conver­
gence around a precise set of rules that various judicial mechanisms wil l  
uniformly enforce against individual transgressors . 
I n  the context of hard, primary obligations on individuals, Chayes 
and Chayes's  managerial approach to compliance may be neither v iable 
nor appropriate . The basic principle of managerial compl iance is  that 
most v iolations are not w i llful . .m The commission of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, however is a "premeditated and 
deliberate violation."-12-1 Chayes and Chayes admit that their managerial 
compliance model may not extend to s ituations in which violations are 
del iberate. Because managerial  compliance i s  inadequate to ensure the 
primary obligations of international law are met, effective mechanisms 
to enforce i nternational criminal law against individual violators are 
needed. While the preferences and i dentities that drive i ndividuals to 
commit i nternational crimes may be shifted over t ime,  Downs and coau­
thors are correct to note the crucial role of enforcement mechanisms in  
ensuring immediate compliance.425 The most  effective means of prevent­
ing i ndividuals from committing international crimes is the sure 
knowledge that they wi l l  face j ustice, either before domestic or suprana­
tional courts, if they transgress the law. National courts are the most 
effective mechanisms to enforce i ndividual compliance with i nterna­
tional criminal obligations .  As Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests: " [T]he 
i ty, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.") . 
422. Abbott et al., supra note 1 95 ,  at 4 1 5 . 
423. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4 1 6, at 1 0  (noting that "on ly infrequently does a 
treaty violation fall into the category of a wi l lful flouting of legal obligation" ) .  
424. /d. at 9. 
425. See Downs et al . ,  supra note 4 1 7, at 39 1 .  
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global rule of  l aw depends on the domestic rule of law."42" L ikewise,  Wil­
l iam Aceves notes the "benefits fro m  the inst itutional framework that 
a lready exists at the national level to enforce the rule of l aw." '27 The exi s­
tence and effectiveness of national courts depends on the secondary 
obl igations of States to exerc ise j urisdiction over individual v io lators . 
2 .  The Interstate Level 
While the primary obl igations of i nternational crimina l  l aw require 
i ndiv iduals to refrain  fro m  committ ing international crimes , S tates face 
secondary obl i gations to cr iminal i ze such behavior, to h ave the neces­
sary domestic mechanisms to exercise  j urisdiction over v io lators , and, 
in many cases,  to affirmatively exercise that j urisdict ion . 42' S tates can 
and do comply with these secondary obl igations in  a variety of ways ,  
inc luding:  pass ing appropriate domestic l egi s l at ion,  grant ing  ordinary 
courts  j ur isdiction over i nternational  crimes,  estab l i sh ing  spec ia l ized 
courts , and vesting jurisdict ion in an i nternational tribunal . The various 
treaties and customary ru les from which these secondary ob ligations 
ari se do not i mpose on States a specific  set of required behav ior. At the 
S tate leve l ,  un li ke at the i ndividual  leve l ,  there i s  a broad "zone wi th in  
which behavior i s  accepted as adequatel y  conformi ng ."42y S tates are 
given a great deal of leeway to determi ne how they seek to comply. 
Whi le  some treaties require domestic criminal i zat ion of p arti c ul ar con­
duct,  most leave the choice of forum to the discretion of the S tate . 
H owever S tates do so, compli ance with their obligations y ie lds  mecha­
n i sms  through which S tates can enforce i nternational crim inal  l aw 
against  i ndividual perpetrators .  Unfortunately, there i s  a l so  s ign ificant  
426. Anne-Marie S laughter, A Liberal Theorv of International Law, 9 4  A M .  Soc ' y  INT 'L  
L .  PROC. 240, 246 (2000) . 
427 . Aceves, supra note 74, at 1 73 .  
428 .  The obligation t o  criminalize individual violations can b e  found. for example, in  the 
Genocide Convention, according to which States must enact "the necessary legi s lation to give 
effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, i n  particular, to provide effective pen­
alties for persons gui l ty of genocide." Genocide Convention, supra note 1 40,  art. 5. The State 
obligation to exercise jmisdiction over individual perpetrators of international crimes can be 
found, for example, in the "extradite or prosecute" requirement of the Torture Convention and 
the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which obligate S tates to "undertake 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions" for grave breaches and to 
"search for persons alleged to have committed such grave breaches and . . .  bring [them] be­
fore its own courts ." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civi l ian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 1 2, 1 949, art. 1 46, 6 U.S .T. 35 1 6, 36 1 6, 75 U.N.T.S .  287, 386;  see also Conven­
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 
l 0, 1 984, art. 5(2) ,  1 465 U.N.T.S .  85 ,  1 14 ("Each State Party shall l ikewise take such meas­
ures as may be necessary to establ ish i ts jurisdiction over such offences i n  cases where the 
alleged offender i s  present in  any territory under i ts jurisdiction and i t  does not extradite h im 
pursuant to article 8 to  any of the States mentioned i n  paragraph I of  this article ." ) .  
429. CHAYES & CHAYES,  supm note 4 1 6, a t  1 7 . 
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noncompl iance-many S tates have fai led to enact the necessary do­
mestic legislation to exerc ise i nternational criminal jur isdict ion _-nn Yet, 
as these courts are part of a community, noncompl i ance by  one State 
does not threaten the overall regime-other States and international 
i nstitutions can step in to take its place. 
There i s  a second disti nction between compliance at the i ndiv idual 
and State l evels .  At the State leve l ,  fai lure to comply "wi l l  not necessar­
i ly  unravel the regime itsel f."�' �  The obl igations of S tates to exercise 
j urisdiction over violators are merely secondary obligations .  This i s  not 
to say they are unimportant, but their purpose is to ensure that i ndividu­
als comply with the primary obl igation not to commit international 
crimes . Thus, the fai lur e  of States to comply with their obligations is 
once removed from the purpose of the primary obligations .  Moreover, at 
the State level ,  overlapping and concurrent j urisdiction ensures that, even 
where one State fai l s  to comply wi th its obligations to exercise j urisdic­
tion, other States and supranational institutions wi l l  be able to do so. 
These other States and i nstitutions can then step i n  and punish the perpe­
trators of i nternational crimes, thereby ensuring respect for the pri mary 
i ndividual obligation to refrain from the commission of in ternational 
cnmes . 
App l y i ng the rubric of l ega l izat ion to in ternat ional crimi nal  law 
at the S tate leve l brings some i mportant characteris t ics  of  the system 
i nto sharper focus .  First, in terms of ob l igation ,  i n ternational crimi nal 
law at the S tate level undeni ably consis ts of powerfu l  (arguably jus 
cogens) obli gations-"states . . .  are bound by a . . .  set of rules  or 
commitments" to enforce i nternational crim ina l  l aw. m Second, i n  
terms o f  precis ion ,  S tate ob l i gations are rel at ively i mpreci se .  They do 
not unambiguously define the conduct they require ,  authorize,  or pro­
scribe." 433 In fact ,  the in ternational legal i n struments  estab l i sh ing 
S tate obligations with respect to i nternational crim in al l aw allow 
S tates to exercise j uri sdict ion over individual  v iolators i n  any n umber 
of way s .  The variance in State practice demonstrated throughout this 
Article-including rel i ance on n at ional  courts , i nternat ional tribunals, 
mi l itary commiss ions ,  and semi- international ized courts-speaks to 
the wide range of acceptable compliance.  
Third, at  the State level, there i s  l ittle or no delegation to or empow­
erment of a h igher authority to assure compl iance. Delegation requires 
that "thi rd parties have been granted authority to i mplement, interpret 
430. See generally WELLER & B uRKE-WHITE,  supra note 63.  
43 1 .  !d. at 20. 
432. Abbott et a! . ,  supra note 1 95 ,  at 40 I .  
433. !d. 
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and app ly  the rules ."434 Whereas at the individual l evel national and i n­
ternational tribunal s have been given the authority to apply  the primary 
rules of international criminal law to i ndividuals ,  at the State level there 
is no higher authority delegated the power to force State compl iance . 
Though i t  i s  theoretical ly possible that a case could be brought before 
the ICJ based on a State ' s  fai lure to exerc ise j ur i sdiction over an interna­
t ional  criminal ,  given the structural nature of the ICJ and the l ack of 
pressing State i nterest in thi s  issue, such a case seems unl i ke ly. 
On a spectrum between hard obligations and anarchy, according to 
Abbott 's  framework of legalization,  interstate i nternational cri minal  l aw 
fal l s  somewhere in  the middle .  The State level obl igations o f  i nterna­
tional criminal law are somewhat soft. This is not to say that the 
obligations themselves are not based in h ard sources of law such as trea­
ties and custom, but rather to point out that the obl igations  on States are 
relatively i mprecise and some degree of defection i s  tolerated.m States 
thus have s ignifi cant leeway in how they comply with their  obl i gations 
under international criminal law and some l evel of defection ,  though by 
no means preferable ,  can be accommodated. 
The implications of the t1exib i l i ty of international crim inal  l aw obl i ­
gations on interstate relations are significant. Whi l e  some h ave 
"dismissed" soft obligations as an i rrelevant "factor in i nternational af­
fairs ," soft obl igations may wel l  otTer "more effective ways to deal w i th 
uncertainty" than traditional hard obl igations .416 Soft obl igations cannot 
be ignored: After all ,  many of these obligations implement an underlying 
substantive jus cogens norm. Procedural soft obligations  a llow S tates 
greater flex ib i lity to interpret and conform to these obl i gations  within the 
context of their domestic circumstances, thereby expanding the zone of 
compli ance. Soft obligations thus respect the legit imate ditierences be­
tween States whi le  sti l l  furthering the overa l l  goals of in ternational 
cr iminal l aw.437 
Soft obligat ions a lso a l low States to experiment and i mprovi se 
mechanisms of compl iance-such as the semi- international ized courts 
d iscussed previ ously. As Michael D orf and Charles S abe l  explain i n  their 
argument for "democratic experimentali sm," "the freedom of maneuver 
accorded l ocal  jurisdictions . . .  and the obligations of mutual regard [for 
434. !d. 
435 .  Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snide!  c la im that "soft law begins  once legal ar­
rangements are weakened along one or more of the d imensions of obligation, precision, and 
delegation." Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snide!, Hard and S(Jjt L(IW in Intenwtional Gm·­
emance, 54 1NT ' L  ORG. 42 1 , 422 (2000) .  
436. !d. at 422, 423. 
437.  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch .  4, at 42) (arguing that the princi­
ple of legitimate difference "reflects a desirable diversity of ideas about how to order an 
economy or society") .  
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fundamental rules]  that are its precondition . . .  both favor exploratory 
problem so lv ing and become the more effective for i t ."-u� Over t ime 
States may develop and implement more effective approaches to compli­
ance than the drafters of hard obligations could have foreseen .  This is 
what Anthony Appiah describes as "universalistic cosmopol itan ism: a 
celebration of difference that remains  committed to the exi stence of uni­
versal standards.· ·-! ''! 
The soft character of State obligations i n  i nternational crimi nal law 
al so informs the means by which compliance can be secured . Downs and 
coauthors present a model that requires a higher authority with the power 
to force States to meet their  international legal obligations .  Such a model 
i s  neither effective nor appropriate in international criminal law where 
there is no central enforcement authority, where obl igations themsel ves 
lack precision,  and where compliance by some group of States is suffi­
cient to suppress international crimes.440 I n  such cases, managing-rather 
than imposing-compliance may be a more fruitful strategy. As Chayes 
and Chayes argue, ensuring transparency, engaging i n  dispute sett l ement, 
building capacity, and effectively using persuasion are the most effective 
means of increasing State compliance with international criminal law.-14 1 
These strategies can assist States to develop compliance mechanisms 
that meet State obl igations to exerci se j urisdiction over international 
criminals,  while fitting within the domestic context and constraints of the 
particular State i n  question.  
While outright defection from the regime of international criminal 
law-such as the U . S .  repudiation of the ICC-is to be condemned, de­
viation from the regime can be managed.  Those who claim that the 
Special Panels i n  East Timor or the Rwandan Gacaca devi ate from the 
international criminal law regime must realize that deviation is seldom 
wil lful ,  but has arisen due to resource constraints .4-12 The appropriate re­
sponse, according to Chayes and Chayes, would be "financial assistance, 
to defray the i ncremental costs of compliance for developing coun­
tries ." -1-13 As discussed above, w ith  sufficient financial and j udicial 
assistance, most of the problems with the current  prosecutions in  East 
Timor could be resolved and man y  of the concerning aspects of the 
Rwandan Gacaca courts could be avoided. Even when States do 
438. Michael C.  Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experiment(i/-
ism, 98 COLUM.  L. REV. 267, 322 ( 1 998) .  
439 .  Anthony Appiah, The American University in  the Age of Globalisation, Lecture at 
Oxford Universi ty (2002) .  
440. See gen.erall\· Downs et al . ,  supra note 4 1 7. 
44 1 .  CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 4 1 6, at 22-27 (discussing the components of  the 
managerial compliance model ) .  
442 . For a discussion of such deviation, see supra Part I I I .  
443 . CHAYES  & CHAYES, supro note 4 1 6, at 1 5 . 
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intentional ly defect from the regi me�such as the United States h as 
done�the goals of international  criminal law are not directly threatened, 
as other States can step in  and exercise j urisdiction themselve s .  
I n  fact, the management o f  different approaches to compl iance may 
offer a net positive. Contl ict ,  del i berat ion,  argument, and contention can 
lead to better outcomes . '�-+ Anne-Marie S laughter refers to a kind of 
"positive confl ict,' '  which A lbert H i rschman claims can yield "the val u­
able  t ies that hold modern democratic societies together.' ' :-1, The iterative 
di scourse of discussion and negotiation in  the process of creating  en­
forcement mechanisms may wel l  strengthen the overal l  system of 
international criminal l aw. The Cambodian understanding of i nterna­
tional criminal  law today i s  very different than it was in 1 99 8 ,  primari l y  
because of the processes o f  negotiation with the U .N .446 Likewise ,  the 
trial and error of various approaches to i nternational crim inal  l aw 
enforcement wi l l  l ikely inform future agreements between S tates to 
create such courts .  The i nternational ized court in S ierra Leone, for 
example, is a far stronger institution because U . N .  negotiators learned 
from their efforts in Cambodia and East Timor.w 
M oreover, the managerial model of compl iance faci l itates a kind of 
socialization , al lowing the norms of international criminal  l aw to be­
come embedded in the domestic pol i tical system.  M anagement of 
obligations and the processes of social ization can change self-conception 
and national identity of individuals and States .  For example ,  the prefer­
ences of the Rwandan people ,  discussed above, may have s hi fted over 
t ime as Rwandan identity was social i zed and reconstructed after the 
genocide. Anne-Marie S laughter explains that "a social ized indiv idual 
[or State] may want something i ntense! y, but w i l l  not seek it  if doing so 
would contravene prevail ing soci al n orms and result in social oppro­
brium."448 Taking a s l ightly different approach to the concept, H arold 
Koh describes the "transnational legal process,  whereby global n orms of 
in ternational . . .  l aw are debated, i nterpreted, and ult imatel y  i nternal i zed 
444. See MICHAEL lGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 4 ( Amy 
Gutman ed., 200 1 ) . 
445 .  SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 5 ,  at 42) ;  ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,  A 
PROPENSITY TO SELF-SUBVERSION 235 ( 1 995) .  
446. See supra Part III .  
447 . See Alison S mith, Remarks at the Amsterdam Centre for International Law Confer­
ence on Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Jan. 25 , 2002) ;  Al ison Smith, A 
Response to "A 'Special Court' for S ierra Leone's War Crimes" (Aug. 1 5 ,  200 1 ) , 
http ://www.globalpolicy.org/security /issues/sierra/court/200 1 /cri tique .htm (describing some of 
the lessons learned in  creating the Sierra Leone tribunal ) .  
448 .  SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manusc1ipt ch.  5 ,  at  3 8 ) . 
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by don1estic legal systems_,.�.�� Cri t iqui ng social ization, Downs, Danish .  
and B arsoom describe it as a "transformational approach . . .  bel ieved to 
generate increas ingly greater commitment and deeper cooperation 
through a process of i terative State-to-State negotiat ion that promotes 
identity convergence ."450 Thi s i s ,  of course ,  a deeply constructivist ap­
proac h .  1 t  assumes, to quote A lexander Wendt, that "world politics is 
' social ly constructed"' and that social "structures shape actors ' identi­
ties ."-�' ' Particu lar ly in  cases of national reconstruction, the management 
of  l egal obligat i ons and the socialization of actors may lead to the norms 
of international criminal law becoming deeply embedded in the domestic 
po l i t i cal system, through domestic laws,  consti tutional provisions ,  or 
lasting domestic enforcement insti tutions. 
The soft character of State obligations in international law informs 
our understanding of the emergen t  community of courts .  Within the soft 
framework of State obligations ,  S tates wi l l  comply with international 
criminal law by exercising j urisdiction over i ndividual violators in any 
number of ways .  They may empower their own courts to hear in terna­
tional cri minal law cases, create semi-in ternationalized court s ,  or 
delegate authori ty to an i nternational tribunal . While States are unl ikely 
to be forced to comply with these obligations,  their compliance can be 
effectively managed. This will require commitment to transparency, per­
suasion, and, particularly, capacity building. Thereby, the norms of 
international criminal law may become embedded in the domestic sys­
tems of many S tates .  What will result  i s  a rich diversity of enforcement 
mechanisms through which States comply with their obl igations to exer­
cise j urisdiction over in ternational criminal s .  In so doing, States wil l  
ensure that  individuals comply with their own primary obligations of 
international criminal law-to refrain from the commission of interna­
tional crimes.  
Recognizing the soft character of S tate obligations also helps us bet­
ter conceptualize the i nteiTel ated community of courts that make up the 
system of i nternational criminal law. As the in terstate obligations to cre­
ate such enforcemen t  mechanisms are soft and the zone of acceptable 
compliance broad, we will see a system with a significant variety in the 
449. Koh, supra note 84, at 1 399; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1 998 Frankel Lec-
ture: Bringing international Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv.  623 ( 1 998) .  
450. George W. Downs et al . ,  The Transformational Model of International Regi111e 
Design: Triu111ph of Hope or Experience ?, 38 COLUM.  J. TRANSNAT 'L  L. 465 , 465 (2000). 
Downs and coauthors argue that "at the micro-foundational level ,  the assumption that the 
horizontal interaction that generates value changes at the small-group level wi l l  operate the 
same way and to the same extent at the state level ignores many differences between the two." 
!d. at 507. 
45 1 .  Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT' L SECURITY 7 1 ,  7 1 -
72 ( 1 995) .  
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form.  s tructure , and jurisdictional scope of  enforcement mechan i sms .  
Some States wi l l  fai l  to  create them a t  al l . Other States wi l l  cre ate courts 
and tribunals with sweeping reach . Supranational organ izat ions wi l l  step 
in where national courts fai l .  At the individual leve l ,  however. h ard law 
and an extraordinari ly  narrow zone of  acceptable compl iance suggest 
convergence around a prec ise set of  obl igations that various  j udic ial 
mechanisms-created based on interstate obligations-wi l l  un i formly  
en force a�winst  i ndividual trans gressors . In  other words , the  members of  � � 
t h i s  community wi l l  exhibi t  great variety in  the types o f  e n forcement 
mechanisms States create , but legal rules enforced by these courts  w i l l  
b e  remarkably  s imi lar and stringently enforced. 
B. Relationships in the Community 
The emerging community of  courts is l argely  self-organizing and 
se lf-regulating.  Though some of the principles that regul ate the commu­
nity are found in the Rome Statute, the community itse l f  l acks any 
contro l l ing or regulating authority. Therefore, the rel ationships and in­
teractions among these courts are essential to the effectiveness  of  the 
e merging system of i nternational criminal j ustice. National courts with 
al l o f  their rich diversity ( including the semi-international i zed courts 
di scussed above) will be the front l ine enforcement mechanisms of i n­
ternational c riminal  l aw. The horizontal connections in  the communi ty o f  
international criminal law enforcement are rel ationships between na­
tional courts .  The vertical connections within the community are the 
relationships between supranational enforcement mechanisms-such as 
the ICC or the ICTY-and n ational courts .  Whi le enforcement rests pri­
marily on the horizontal , national level,  the vertical dimension serves as 
an important backstop when n at ional courts are unable to act .  This Sec­
tion explores how interdependence and i nteraction on the horizontal and 
vertical planes create a community of  courts . 
1 .  H orizontal Relationships 
The guiding principle regulating the horizontal relationships be­
tween courts i n  this system is that of  subsidiarity. The term i s  borrowed 
from the Treaty of the European Union,  according to which the Euro­
pean Community wil l  only act outside its exclusive competence where 
"the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and c an t herefore, by reason of the scale or effects of  
the  proposed action,  be better achieved by the  Community."452 The 
452.  TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMEN I)]NG THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,  T H E  
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIT IES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2 ,  
! 997 ,  t i t le l l ,  UI1. 3 (b),  0.1.  (C 340) I ( 1 997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM ] ;  see a lso 
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French Min istry of  Foreign A ffairs expl ains that subsidiarity requires 
governance to "be c lose to the c i tizens,  entrusting the i mplementat ion of 
programmes to local authorit ies ."H According to George B ermann ,  sub­
s id iarity demands that action "be taken at the l owest level of government 
at which particul;:u· obj ectives  can adequately  be achieved."�'� In the con­
text of the system of i nternational criminal law, subsid iarity means that 
enforcement w i l l  occur as close to the affected populat ions as considera­
tions ofj ustice and fairness wi l l al low. 
As app lied, subsidiarity wi l l  regulate the overlapping and confl ict ing 
j ur isdictions of national courts .  The principle wil l l ead most prosecutions 
to be located on the territory where the i nternational crimes occurred.  
The benefits  of thi s  wil l  be substantial . First, international cri m inal law 
wi l l  be able to harness the power exerci sed by national governments .�'' 
National courts and law enforcement agencies already have the abi li ty to 
apprehend suspects, to subpoena witnesses and evidence, and to enforce 
their j udgments . S ince the maj ority of suspects, w itnesses ,  and evidence 
presumably wi l l  be on the territory where the crimes occurred, courts i n  
that S tate are best posi t ioned to apprehend those suspects and access that 
evidence. Moreover, national courts and special ized nat ional adjudica­
tory mechan i sm s  created to deal with i nternational crimes are the only 
bodies w ith the sheer capac i ty to address the overwhelming number of 
cases that may ari se after an i nternal confl ict .  
From a normative perspective, national courts in  the S tate where 
crimes occur are the preferable  enforcement mechanisms .  The prox imi ty 
of these courts to the events, evidence, and witnesses makes them best 
qualified to understand the context and c ircumstances of the case .456 
M oreover, from the perspective of restorative j ustice, local courts have a 
significant advantage.  As M artha M inow summarizes, " [r]estorative j us­
t ice emphasizes the humanity of both offenders and victims. It seeks 
repair of social connections and peace rather than retribut ion against  the 
offenders ."457 Restoring social connections means touchi n g  the lives of 
Case T-29/92, Vereniging van Samenwerkende prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouhijrerheid 
v. Comm'n, 1 995 E.C.R. II-289, 33 1 .  
453 .  French Ministry of Foreign Atlairs, Commentaries on Subsidiarity, 
http://www.diplomatie . fr/frmonde/euro/eu05 .gb.html ( last visited Feb. 5, 2003 ) .  
454. George A.  Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriousl_v: Federalism i n  the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM . L. REv.  33 1 ,  338  ( 1 994 ) .  
455 .  See SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 6, at  50-5 1 ) . 
456. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of A ccoun tability 
Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. ,  Autumn 1 996, 
at 1 27, 1 33 ( 1 996) (noting that "domestic courts can be more sensitive to the nuances of local 
culture"). 
457. MARTHA MINOW, B ETWEEN VENGEANCE AND fORGIVENESS 92 ( 1 998) . See gener-
ally Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Politico/ Constraints: Reflections on 
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vict ims.  For example ,  whereas most Rwandans are only vaguely  fami l iar 
w i th the ongoing proceedings before the ICTR a few hundred m iles  
away in  Arusha, Tanzan ia,  over 90 percent of the population partic ipated 
in the elect ions of the local Gacaca courts .4"0 This personal i nvolvement 
in  the judicial process i s  crucial to the cathartic and restorat ive qual i t ies 
of j udic ial proceedings .  Nei l  Kritz observes,  " [T]he e ffect iveness and 
local impact" of reconc i l iatory mechani sms is "undoubtedly enhanced 
by . . .  phys ical presence in the tenitory."459 Finall y, locat ing prosecutions 
c lose to home is most l ikely to advance the social i zation or transnational 
j udicial process created by in ternat ional j ustice . Norms are more eas i l y  
internal ized by  individuals who are c losely connected to  the  norm crea-
. .jf,l) t10n processes .  
National courts al so offer the normative benefit of psychological 
proximity and hence domestic l egit imacy. The sense of connection be­
tween the national population and the j udicial process is far m ore l ikely 
where domestic courts are i nvolved. Supranational enforcement mecha­
n i sms risk being seen as "an instrument of hegemony for powerful 
states ."461 National enforcement mechanisms are far more l ikely to  be 
perceived as legit imate i n  affected communities than are their suprana­
tional counterparts . A s  Jose Alvarez observes, "If R wandan society 
shares comparable not ions of j udic ial legit imacy, i t  stands to reason that 
having judges who come from the local community may i t se lf  be deter­
m inative of the legitimacy of these processes ."�62 Likewise,  Jonat han 
Charney observes that alternatives may be chosen for i nternat ional dis­
pute settlement such that a tribunal can be structured i n  a way that 
respects local "cultural factors ."463 Final ly, the use of national courts in  
the prosecution of  international crimes i ncreases the l ikel ihood of open 
debate and discussion w ithin the domestic polity, enhancing the "public 
deliberation [cruc ial  to] . . .  creating legitimacy for the undertaking .".j().l 
Whi le  the i deal approach to i nternational cri m inal l aw enforcement 
would be to locate courts as close to the v ictims and events as possible,  
Restorative Justice, in  TRUTH v .  JusTICE 68, 79  (Robert I .  Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 
2000) . 
458 .  B ishogoro, supra note 290. 
459. Kritz, supra note 456, at 1 3 1 .  
460. See generally Wendt, supra note 45 1 . 
46 1 .  See Payam Akhavan, Beyond lmpuni!)•: Can International Criminal Justice Prel'ellt 
Future Atrocities ?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 30 (200 1 ) . Akhavan observes: "The ICTR has often 
been faulted for its remoteness from the Rwandese people .  Its geographical location . . .  makes 
it visibly distant." !d. at 25 .  
462. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE 1 .  
lNT ' L  L .  365, 4 1 6  ( 1 999). 
463 . Jonathan I .  Charney, Is International Lmr Thremened hy Mu ltiple International 
Tribunals �, 27 i HAGUE ACAD. 1 NT 'L L. I O I , l 33 ( l 998) .  
464. MINOW, supra note 457, a t  55 .  
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th is  i s  not always practicable or appropriate . Other S tates must intervene 
when and where States fai l  to comply with international obligat ions to 
vest their courts with the power to hear such cases, are unable  to create 
special ized i nternationai courts ,  purposeful l y  avoid prosecution and in­
vestigation, or s i mply lack the capacity to prosecute. The first part of 
such intervention should probabl y  be managerial . Nonterritmi al States 
need to determi ne the root cause of the terri torial State' s  fai l ure to prose­
cute and to ascertai n whether such fai lure i s  clue to misunderstandings or 
capacity constraints .  Where such m isunderstandings or capaci ty con­
straints are the problem, such as in Rwanda, horizontal fore ign 
assistance�both j udicial and financial�would be an appropriate re-
--1.(1) sponse. 
When, however, a State ' s  fai lure to prosecute i s  wi l lful or when 
problems cannot be resol vee! through foreign assistance alone, then the 
right and duty to exercise jurisdiction passes to the courts of other States 
or to supranational i nstitution s .  Such concurrent j urisdiction ful ly  con­
forms with the principle of subsidiarity: Insti tutions more distant from 
the affected population can in tervene when those of the territorial State 
are unable to achieve the overall  goals of prosecution. I n  a horizontal 
network, a variety of other courts, beyond the territorial S tate, may well 
have j uri sdiction over the case. Under standard principles of j urisdiction, 
the courts of the perpetrator's or v ict im's  national ity woul d  h ave concur­
rent j urisdiction and the right to prosecute would pass across the 
horizontal p lane to alternative national forums.  
There wi l l be c ircumstances in which al l  three of these forums�the 
territorial State, the perpetrator ' s  national S tate, and the victim 's  national 
State�are unable to prosecute . In such cases, any other court i n  the 
community would be able to in tervene and exercise j urisdiction . The first 
consideration in determining which other members of the commun ity of 
com1s should exercise j ur isdiction w i l l  turn on which S tate apprehends 
the suspect, though the Pinochet case indicates that the apprehending 
State may simply be acting on a warrant i ssued by the prosecuting 
State .466 Without explicitly mentioning subsidiarity, the Princeton Princ i ­
p les  on Universal Jurisdiction�the aforementioned guideli nes on the 
exercise of universal j urisdiction-call  on States to balance a number of 
criteria i n  deciding whether to extradite or prosecute . These criteria in­
clude "the place of commission of the crime," "the nationality 
connection of the victim to the requesting state," and "any other 
465 . Kri tz, supra note 456, at 1 48 (observ ing, "the best scenario would be for the inter-
national community to provide appropriate assistance to enable a society e merging from mass 
abuse to deal with the issues of justice and accountabil i ty i tself' ) .  
466. See Aceves, supm note 74. at 1 63 ( d iscussing Spain 's extradition request for Pino-
chet). 
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connection between the requesting state and the al leged perpetrator, the 
crime, or the victim."467 Whi le the Principles do not rank these considera­
t ions,  the commentaries indicate that "almost without excepti on,  the 
territorial principle was thought to deserve precedence" because "the 
criminal defendant should be tried by his 'natural judge ."' 4"' Where 
prosecution i s  solely under the universality princ iple,  j ur i sd ict ional con­
tl icts should thus be resolved in accordance with the pri nciple of 
subsidiarity. This  may require States to exercise restraint and to extradi te 
an accused to a State with a closer tie to the crime as long as prosecution 
by the requesting State conforms to basic  norms of fairness and j ust ice . 
Subsidiarity is ful ly  compatible with l iberal theories of in ternational 
law. Liberal i nternational law theory derives from l iberal i n ternational 
relations theory, a set of positive assumptions  about how State i nteractions 
d1ive i nternational outcomes. Liberal international relations theory as­
sumes "individuals and private groups" within a State are the 
"fundamental actors in international relations ." ·169 Subsidiarity locates 
nrosecutions in i nstitutions as c lose to these fundamental actors as the in-, 
terests of justice will  allow. Liberal international law theories see the 
"primary function of pub lic international law . . .  [as] i nfluenc [ ing] and 
improv[ing] the functioning of domestic institutions."470 B y  keeping prose­
cutions as c lose to the location of the crime and affected communities as 
possible, subsidiarity enhances the effectiveness of judicial action and 
enhances the democratic  connections between individuals and the insti­
tutions that govern them .  
A final horizontal i nteraction within the community o f  c ourts arises 
from the cross-citation and application of l aw by courts of different n a­
tions.  Recent studies document "constitutional cross-ferti l ization" 
whereby courts of one State inform their constitutional decis ions through 
the j urisprudence of the courts of other States .47 1 Thi s  trend i s  even more 
common i n  i nternational crim inal law, where S tates appl y  the same sub­
stantive body of law. For example ,  the British House of L ords in the 
Pinochet Case cites to the I srael i  decis ion in the case of Adolph 
Eichmann472 and, in the E ichmann case, the I srael i Supreme Court c ites 
frequently to the decisions  of the Nure mberg Tribunal and to the n ational 
war crimes prosecutions under Control Counci l  Law 1 0  after World 
467 . PRI NCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 74, a t  32 (Principle 8 :  Resolution of  Competing 
National Jurisdictions) .  
468 . !d. at 53 (Commentary to Principle 8) .  
469. Moravcsik, supra note 1 14 ,  at 5 1 6. 
470. Slaughter, supra note 426, at 246. 
47 1 .  See, e.g. , S laughter, supra note 73 , at 1 1 04. 
472. See Regina v. Bow St .  Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex porte Pinochet Ugarte. 38 
LLM. 579, 590 (H.L 1 999) .  
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\Var I I .� ' '  l n  so do ing,  the courts of one State bonow from and c i te to the 
courts of  other S tates ,  not as binding precedent, but as the art iculation of 
common pri nciples by s imi larly s ituated j udges in  a global community 
of courts .  
2 .  Vertical Relationships 
In this global community of courts ,  vertical relationships regu late the 
i nteract ions between national and supranational courts .m Though vert i ­
cal , these re lationsh ips should n ot be seen as strictly hierarchical (as  i n  
the re la t ions between a district and appel late court i n  the United States )  
or  even as  federal (as  in  the  rel at ionship between a state supreme court 
and the U . S .  Supreme Court) , but again as part of a community of courts 
with di f erent l evels of i nternational involvement and different  degrees 
of d i stance from the crimes .  The German Federal Constitutional Court 
describes s imilar vertical i nterdependence with the European Court of 
Justice ( ECJ) as a "cooperative relationship" i n  which both courts are 
engaged i n  a s imi lar enterprise, but i n  which the ECJ has "responsibi lity 
for the entire area of the Community."m Thinking of this vertical i nter­
dependence as a cooperative relationship i s  useful for it emphasizes the 
fact that both national and supranational insti tutions wi l l  have to take 
account of one another, respect one another, and defer to one another 
when appropriate . 
The guiding principle governing these vertical relationships i s  that of 
complementarity, enshrined i n  the admissibi l ity criteria of the Rome 
Statute discussed in some detail above.m In short, complementarity re­
quires  the ICC to restrain from exercising j urisdiction unless national 
courts are unwi l l ing or u nable  to prosecute .477 National courts exercise 
primary jurisdiction, with supranational i ns titutions steppin g  i n  only 
when national courts fai l  or defer. Complementarity and subsidiarity fit 
together neatly. B oth emphasize keeping prosecution local w here possi­
ble.  Complementarity governs the allocation of j urisdiction between the 
supranational and the national l evel ,  while subsidiarity determines the 
l ocation of prosecution within the n ation al level .  
4 7 3 .  See Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann (Isr. S .  Ct. 1 962), reprinted in 3 6  I .L.R.  
277 passim. 
474. See Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1 1 03-04 . See generally Helfer & S laughter, supra 
note 2 .  
475 . BVerfGE 73,  339 (387) ;  see also Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and 
National Courts: The German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision, 3 
COLU M . J EuR. L. 229, 235 & n .20 ( 1 997) .  
4 76.  See supra Section I .  A. 
4 77.  See Rome Statute art. 1 7 .  
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A regime of complementarity has two powerful e ffects: c h ang ing in ­
centives and bolstering capaci ty. Fi rst ,  complementarity e ncourages 
action by national institutions .  Complementarity shifts incentives by 
changing the default option from i mpunity to supranat ional prosecution.  
Prior to the exi stence of  the ICC,  for example, a State would face the 
choice of prosecuti ng at home or allowing impunity. Given the pol i tical 
costs of domestic prosecution ,  m any States chose the option o f  impunity. 
With the ICC acting under the complementarity principle,  the same State 
would instead face the choice between national prosecution and suprana­
tional prosecution.  In that c i rcumstance, hav ing some control over the 
proceedings and l ocat ing the trial  i n  their own courts might  wel l  be a 
preferred outcome . Second, complementari ty bolsters capac i ty i n  two 
ways .  Under a regime of complementarity, s upranational courts become 
avai l able where national courts  fai l  to act .  Moreover, the experience and 
resources at the supranat ional  level trickle down to the n at ional level, 
providi ng national courts with precedent, personnel , and pol i t ical cover. 
An important and yet u nresolved question i n  th is  all ocat ion of j uris­
diction is how often the vertical relationships should be i nvoked and the 
forum of prosecution shifted on the vertical p lane from a national to a 
supranational forum. Some have argued that "the comple mentarity re­
gime of the Rome Statute is probabl y  too strong"m and supranational 
courts such as the ICC should play a greater role .  The accuracy of  these 
clai ms turns on the in terpretation of "unwi l l ing" and "unable," the two 
core tests for complementarity embodied in the Rome Statute . The Rome 
Statute leaves a great deal of  discretion as to the meaning of these terms 
to the Court, and thus the frequency with which i nternational courts wi l l  
assume jur isdiction.479 As M adeline MmTis observes ,  "the ICC Treaty 
articulates no principles or policies to govern . . .  dec i s ion making on  
fundamental issues."480 
Thinking of national and supranational j udicial mechan isms as p art 
of  a community of courts in a "cooperative relationship" helps guide all 
parties as to when supranational institutions should exercise j urisdiction .  
For this community of  courts to operate effectively, the i nterpretation  of  
"unwilling" and "unable" has to provide flexibi l ity. The obvious case of  
supranational prosecution  envisioned by the Rome Statute i s  where n a­
tional courts lack the capacity or the political will to prosecute and 
supranational i nstitutions must  step in .  
There are a t  l east two additional circumstances i n  which  suprana­
tional prosecutions are particularly appropriate and in  which domestic 
478. Kaul ,  supra note 24, at 59.  
479. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 1 6 . 
480. Morris ,  supra note 1 9, at 1 77 .  
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courts shou ld  refrain fro m  prosecution to al low supranational adjudica­
t ion .  First. the "Milosevic exception' ' :  Where a g lobal l y  renowned despot 
i s  tried for i nternational crimes ,  the world at l arge may h ave an i nterest 
in supranational prosecution. In such cases a purely  domestic tria l  might 
have dangerous pol i t ical  repercussions that threaten the stab i l i ty of a 
transitional State . Second, the "Kunarac exception" : Where a case i s  of  
groundbreaking precedential value, a supranational court may yie ld bet­
ter j urisprudence .-�" In such cases, experience and judicial  resources may 
be required in  order to ensure the codification of cruc ial areas of i nterna­
tional criminal law. For example ,  Dragoljub Kunarac , a low-level 
commander of  Serb parami l i taries ,  was tried before the I CTY for nu­
merous counts of  rape as a crime against humani ty. As the first 
prosecution of rape as a crime against humanity,-lsc the Kunarac case set 
an i mportant precedent in an e merging area of international l aw. I n  do­
mestic law such groundbreaking cases tend to reach the h ighest court 
through appeals procedures .  I n  i nternational l aw, however, the ICC has 
no appellate jurisdiction from n ational cases .  I n  this s i tuat ion,  deference 
to the ICC by national cou rts m ay be appropriate .-183 In these two scenar­
ios ,  domestic courts-even if abl e  to prosecute-should cooperate with 
the ICC, restraining their exercise  of j urisdiction and deferring to supra­
national courts .-ls-l If this  syste m  of complementari ty on the vertical p lane 
is  to work, the "unwil l in g" c lause of the Rome Statute m ust be inter­
preted to al low supranat ion al adj udication where domestic courts deem 
themselves unwi l l i ng to prosecute because they believe supranational 
i nstitutions woul d  be more effective in the part icu lar case .  
Adequate resolution of j urisdictional confl icts through vert ical rela­
tionships wi l l  depend upon close cooperation and coll aboration between 
national and supranational courts .485 I t  w i l l  be  i ncumbent o n  the j udges of 
supranational bodies to conv i nce their national col leagues that they are 
al l part of the same j udicial  e nterprise, "fe ll ow profess ionals  i n  a 
48 1 .  See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/ 1 -T, Judgement 
(Feb. 22, 200 I ) . 
482.  See Prosecutor of the T1ibunal Agai nst Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovac, 
Third Amended Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23-PT (Dec. I ,  1 999) (charging Kunarac 
with "Rape, a c1ime against humanity punishable under article 5 (g )  of the Statute of the Tri­
bunal") .  
483 .  S imi larly, the Akayesu case before the ICTR charging and convicting the accused of 
genocide, set  an important precedent and would be an obvious example of a case that  should 
be heard by a supranational court under the "Kunarac exception." See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement ( Sept. 2, 1 998) .  
484. See Morris,  supra note 1 9, at  1 99 (noting that there are certain cases i n  which "ne-
gotiations" should be used "in forestall ing national prosecutions") .  
485 .  In r e  Application of Euromepa, S .A. ,  5 1  F.3d  1 095 , I 1 0 1  (2d Cir. 1 995)  (Judge 
Calabresi describing this type of rel ationship as an "ongoing d ialogue between the adjudica­
tive bodies of the world community") .  
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profession that transcends national borders ."-lob Such rel at ionships are not 
bui l t  th rough the ratification of a treaty, but rather by ongoing contact, 
cooperation.  trust bui lding, and mutual respect . Anne-M arie Sl aughter 
observes that the positi ve rel ationship between the ECJ and national 
courts i n  Europe required "convincing national judges o f  the desirabi l ity 
of using the ECJ. Through seminars,  dinners, regular invitations  to Lux­
embourg, and visits . . . the ECJ j udges put a human face on the 
institutional l inks they sought to bu i ld ."4�7 The future judges of the I CC 
should fol low i n  the footsteps of  their ECJ counterparts by building rel a­
tionsh ips with national courts .  If the ICC is to become an e ffective body 
and have a meani ngful caseload, these relationships must  be fostered.  
Social interactions and seminars i n  The Hague as wel l as good j urispru­
dence wi l l  be essential . 
Borrowing by national courts of  supranational jurisprudence i s  the 
final element of the vertical in teractions within this communi ty of court s .  
I n  East Timor, Judge Sylver N tukamazia "frequently rel ies on the  ICTY 
and ICTR."-��x Likewise, Stuart Alford, one of  the international prosecu­
tors in East Timor, consults the Rome Statute Preparatory Commission 
material s and the "judgments of the two ad hoc tribunals ."4xy Whi le these 
sources are not binding precedent i n  East Timor, there i s  an impl ic i t  as­
sumption among many national j udges and legal offic ials that 
supranational institutions with their comparatively l imitless  resources 
and greater intern ational criminal law experience will reach sound, well­
reasoned decisions.  These decisions should, therefore, cany great 
weight. These then are soft relationships, created through respect and 
persuasive j udicial reasoning,  rather than through formal h ierarchy. Yet, 
even soft l inkages can ensure a relat ive uniformi ty of l aw. As Guenael 
Mettraux explains, "[c]ri mes against  humanity has now come of legal 
age . . .  The ICTY [has] played a crucial role in  this transformation . . .  
Whereas national courts sometimes rel ied upon distinctively domestic 
defi ni tions of this offense" the tribunal has e nsured a common j urispru­
dence .490 Given the i mportance of uniformi ty and the need to further 
codify international crim inal law, vertical in teractions between courts are 
crucial ,  as is deference to supranat ional courts for cases i n  which new 
legal questions are raised. Even where entire cases are not deferred to the 
ICC, there is nothing i n  the Rome S tatute which would prohibit ,  for ex­
ample, a national court submitting a question of law to the ICC.  This i s  
486. Slaughter, supra note 73, at 1 1 24.  
487.  Anne-Marie Burley [now Slaughter] & Walter Matt l i ,  Europe Before the Court: A 
Political Theory o.l Legal lnteFration, 4 7 I NT' L ORG. 4 1 , 62-63 ( 1 993) .  
488.  Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329.  
489.  Interview with Stuart Alford, supra note 244. 
490. Mettraux. supra note 36 1 ,  at 2 3 8 .  
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comparab le ,  at the domestic leve l ,  to the certified question process used 
by U . S .  federal courts in ascertain ing state law where there are "unset­
tled questions of state l aw."49 1 S im ilarly, national courts of the European 
Union Member States can refer interpretative questions to the ECJ, 
thereby ensuring a relativel y  uniform interpretation of EU l aw among 
Member States . .j 9 2  The s ituation would remain,  nonetheless ,  one of defer­
ence out of respect and i nterdependence, and not of subordination or 
h ierarchy. 
C. The Common Enterprise ofludging 
The primary actors i n  this community of courts are j udges .  Judges 
determine how courts interact vertical ly  and horizontal l y. Thinking of 
judges as key actors within a global community of courts transforms the 
nature of their j ob and, possibly, even their self- identity. M any interna­
tional criminal law judges already see themselves as part of a global 
process of accountabi l ity. When Patricia Wald ,  a former j udge on the 
U . S .  Court of Appeals for the D istrict of Columbia, sat on the bench of 
the ICTY, she was no longer specifical l y  serving the United States ,  but 
rather the global pursuit of j ustice . .JY} Likewise ,  when Sylver N tukamazi a  
hears cases i n  East Timor, he  i s  n o t  working merely for East Timor o r  h i s  
home State o f  B urundi :  "[M]y goal i s  a n  i nternational move toward j us­
tice." .jg.j Identities of i nternat ional j udges thus shift from a purely 
domestic focus to dual loyalty to both national and i nternational j udicial 
processes. This i s  a modern version of Georges Scel le ' s  "dedoublement 
fonctionnel"-international jur ists have a tru ly  double function and dou­
ble identity, both domestic and i nternational .495 Anne-Marie Slaughter 
argues that such j udges have both an " internal and external face" and 
should "see themselves as representing a l arger transnational or even 
g lobal constituency" i n  l ight of a "global public interest ."496 
I n  thi s  context, i nternational criminal law judges and officials be­
come what Peter Haas refers to as an epistemic community, "a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence i n  a particu­
l ar domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
49 1 .  Arizonans for Official Engl ish v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 ( 1 997) .  While the 
process of certified questions i s  part of a federal system-which the community of courts is 
not-the concept itself could well be appl icable. 
492. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM art. 234. 
493 . See Wald, supra note 56. 
494. Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supra note 329. 
495. Georges Scelle, Le Phenomene Juridique de Dedoub!ement Fonctionne!, in 
RECHTSFRAGEN DER lNTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION 324 (Wal ter Schatzel & Hans-Jtirgen 
Schlochauer eels . ,  1 956). 
496. SLAUGHTER, supru note 272 ( manuscript ch.  6, at 22) .  
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within that domain or i ssue-area."m They share a set of "normative and 
principled beliefs" in  the rule of law as well as the "common policy en­
terprise" of accountabi l i ty. 498 Seeing themselves as an epistemic 
community w ith shared values and methods may help  generate the mu­
tual respect and coordination essential to the successfu l  operation of the 
emerging community of courts .  While,  in  Haas 's  model ,  epistemic 
communities provide "information and adv ice" to dec i s ion makers, here 
the epistemic community of international j udges has been delegated the 
power to m ake policy through j udicial dec is ions .  Thus the power and 
i nfluence of this community of judges "in shaping patterns of interna­
tional policy coordination," is great. 499 
If international criminal law j udges are actively aware of belonging 
to a larger epistemic  community, they may be more able to serve and 
assist one another in countless ways .  As argued above, m anaging S tate 
compl iance with international obl igations requires the provision of assis­
tance and capacity building.  Who better to do so than the judges 
themselves? Horizontal ly, this ass istance could i nvolve more interna­
t ionalized domestic courts sharing j udges .  This  i s  the bas is  of the East 
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodian models .  Self-aware cooperation i s  
i nherent i n  the recent offer o f  the government o f  India t o  send a judge to 
Cambodia even if agreement with the U . N .  is not reached .500 Verticall y, 
thi s  self-aware cooperat ion might  i nvolve sending j udges wi th  experi­
ence in supranational courts to national courts .  Judge Sylver N tukamazia 
in East Timor remarked on h i s  desire "to bring an ICTY j udge to sit on 
the panel here."501 Likewise,  Patric ia  Wald,  the former U . S .  judge at the 
ICTY, expressed a willingness to serve on  the bench in a nat ional court 
hearing war crimes cases, such as the Spec ial Panels in East Timor.50" 
The ICC might well consider an outreach program where i t s  judges were 
seconded out to national courts for particular cases.503 S uch j udge-to-
497. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-
ordination, 46 lNT' L 0RG. I ,  3 ( 1992) . 
498. !d. 
499. !d. at 3 5 .  
500. His Excellency Sok An, Senior Minister In  Charge of the Office of the Council of 
Ministers, President of the Task Force for Cooperation with Foreign Legal Experts and Prepa­
ration of the Proceedings for the Trial of Senior Khmer Rouge Leaders, Presentation to the 
Stockholm International Forum :  Truth, Justice And Reconci l iation (Apr. 23-24, 2002) (thank­
ing "the Prime Minister of the Republic of India who has just pledged to send a judge" to 
Cambodia) . 
50 1 .  Interview with Sylver Ntukamazina, supm note 329. 
502. See Wald, supra note 56; Interview with Pat1icia Wald, Former Judge, ICTY, in 
Cambridge, Mass. (Feb. 7, 2002 ) .  
503 . Such programs were noticeably absent in the  early years of the  ICTY and ICTR. 
David Tolben argues that the ICTY suffered from a ''strategic fai lure in  that [ i t] has not had 
much impact on the development of courts and justice systems in the region ." David Tolbert, 
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judge contacts and ass i stance could strengthen the vertical and horizon­
tal i nteract ions ,  i mprove the qual i ty of  j ustice rendered,  enhance the 
capacity of national courts ,  and generate respect and cooperation among 
the epistemic coJrtmunity of j udges .  As judges come to see themsel ves as 
part of a common community-the bearers of dual nat ional and in terna­
t ional obl igat ions-they wi l l  enhance the global pursuit of 
accountabi l i ty. 
CONCLUSION 
U ndeniably, in ternational criminal law has come of age . There now 
exists a clear set of  rules of proscribed conduct and a body of juri spru­
dence articul at ing and apply ing those rules .  We are now witness ing the 
development of a system of international criminal l aw enforcement. Th is 
new system chal lenges basic notions of  publ ic international l aw en­
forcement, merging i nternational and domestic institutions in  the 
creation of a highly interconnected , independent global community of 
courts .  The relationships within this community are the key to the suc­
cess of the system. 
Enforcement of international criminal l aw begins with pol i tics .  
States must create or  delegate authority to adj udicatory bodies­
domestic and supranational-for i nternational criminal l aw to have bite. 
The creation of supranational mechanisms began at Nuremberg, was re­
kindled i n  the 1 990s with the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals ,  and 
reached fruition in July 2002 with the entry into force of the Rome Stat­
ute of the ICC. Likewise, enforcement by n ational i n stitutions began 
with the I srael i  trial of Adolph Eichmann, was fostered through laws al­
lowing the exercise of universal j urisdiction, and was embodied in the 
Pinochet case.  
A careful analysis  of the polit ics underlying the creation of i nterna­
tional criminal law enforcement mechanisms anticipates that 
supranational courts wi l l  h ave only a l imi ted role and future enforcement 
of i nternational criminal l aw wi l l  l argely occur at the national leve l .  Ad 
hoc tribunals were l ikely  a phenomenon of the 1 990s and the ICC 's  
mandate i s  l imi ted. However, poli tical  opportunit ies for the creation of  
enforcement mechanisms at the domestic l evel are numerous .  First, as in  
Cambodia, c leavages within pol i t ical e l i tes  may foster the creation of 
courts to hear i nternational criminal cases .  Second, U . N .  administration, 
such as in East Timor and Kosovo, may yield semi - international ized 
The International Criminal Tribunal ./(1r the Former Yugoslavia: Un{oreseen Successes and 
Foreseeable Shortcoming\ , 26 FLETC H E R  F. WORLD AFF. 7 ,  I 2 (2002) .  
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courts .  Thi rd, the cxternal ization of polit ical costs vis-�1- vis  powerful 
neighbor States, as in the relationship between East Timor and Indone­
sia, may also support the creat ion of such adj udicatory bodies .  F i n al ly, 
demands for j ustice among domestic i nterest groups-as i n  Rwanda­
may push l iberal and quasi-l iberal States to enforce i nternat ional  
criminal law and resource constraints may yield i nn ovative new ap­
proaches .  For polit ical reasons , then,  the future system of international 
criminal l aw i s  l ikely to be predominantly horizontal , comprised of a 
variety of d ifferent domestic and semi-in ternationalized court s .  A s  the 
East Timor situation demonstrates ,  such courts wi l l ,  undoubtedly, face 
numerous challenges .  B ut these chal l enges can be overcome with suffi ­
c ient outs ide assistance and cooperation w ithin the growi ng commun ity 
of courts . 
B y  its very nature this communi ty of courts i s  decentral ized, inter­
dependent, self-organizing,  and nonhierarchical . Yet, for the system to be 
effective, i t  requ ires order. Such order, and the power i t  imp l ies ,  comes 
from relationships and from shared information. Thi s  community of 
courts must be self-aware and must build trust and understanding 
amongst an epistemic community of i nternational judges .  
The relationships among courts i n  thi s  community poss ibly can be 
guided by grand principles inc luding those of accountabi l i ty, subsidiar­
i ty, and legitimate difference .  I n  such a framework, States and domestic 
pol ities must enforce i nternational criminal l aw, but shoul d  be given the 
flexibi l i ty to tai lor i n stitution s  to their own domestic circumstances50� 
and a "marg in  of appreciat ion" within which to fulfi l l  thei r  obl igations . 505 
The successfu l  organization and relations of this c ommunity of 
courts wi l l  require the art iculation and appl icat ion of general overarching 
norms to guide courts and j udges alike. I n  the m ore immediate term, 
however, narrower norms,  closely tailored to the operation of a commu­
nity of courts, are needed. In a system in which informatio n  is  power'111' 
and in  which compl iance at the i n terstate l evel  can be managed through 
col l aborative guidance and assistance,507 regul atory norms and imple­
mentation guidel i nes w i l l  enhance the effectiveness of  the overal l  
system. To that end,  a code of conduct for the enforcement of in terna­
t ional criminal l aw-particularly at the national level-would prove an 
extraordinari ly powerful too l .  
504. See generally Anne-Marie B urley [now Slaughter] , La w  Among Liherol States: 
Liberal lnternmionalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1 907 ( 1 992) .  
505.  Handyside v .  United Ki ngdom, 24 Eur. Ct . H.R. (ser. A) at 22. 
506. See generally SLAUGHTER, supra note 272 (manuscript ch. 5 ) . 
507 . CHAVES & CHAVES, supra note 4 1 6, at 22-26. 
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In  the past decade , codes of conduct have emerged as an i mportant 
means of regul ating the i nternational system. '08 They are effective i n  part 
becattse they are "vol untary norms . . .  selected by individual actors ."50'J 
Dorf and S abel have described such codes as "rol l ing best practices 
rules" whereby best practices are identi tied and complied w ith by a 
community of actors . 5 1 0  As soft l aw, a code of conduct can deal with un­
certainty and the changing nature of the system over time.5 1 1  Such a code 
shouicl give substance to clue process rights such as the presumption of 
innocence, the right to speedy adjudication, the right to representation,  
the ri ght to confront evidence, and the right to appeal . 5 1 2 I t  should specify 
how equal i ty of anns-the balance of resources between prosecution and 
defense-can be achieved . I t  should create mechanisms for vertical and 
horizontal exchange of l aw and judges within the system.  Given that 
many national courts,  such as those in  Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, 
and Rwanda, w i l l  depend on outside aid and capacity bui lding,  thi s  code 
of conduct could become a benchmark for the provis ion of aid, leading 
to convergence around and uniform implementation of the b as ic  princi­
ples of the code . 
·wh ile the development of such a code of conduct for i nternational 
criminal l aw enforcement offers i mportant future potential , the most 
immediate challenge i s  to recognize thi s  emerging community of courts 
as a global system of i nternational criminal j ustice. Rather than separate 
508. Codes of conduct and s imi lar types of soft law have proliferated in the past decade, 
particularly in  economic and environmental areas. 
509. Slaughter, supra note 426, at 243. 
5 1 0.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 438, at 350. 
5 1 1 .  See Abbott & Snide!, supra note 435, at 422-23 .  
5 1 2 . Each of these concepts is generally accepted as paz1 of i nternational customary law 
and articulated in, among others, the Ame1ican Convention on Human Rights, the Banjul [Af­
rican] Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam, and the European Convention. On the presumption of innocence, see American Con­
vention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica," Nov. 22, 1 969 , art. 8(2) ,  1 1 44 
U.N.T.S .  1 23 ,  1 47 (entered in to force July 1 8 , 1 978) ;  Banju l  Charter on Human and Peoples' 
R ights art. 7 (  I )(b), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67 /3 , 2 1  I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered i nto force Oct. 2 1 ,  
1 986); Cairo Declaration on Human Rights i n  Islam, Aug. 5 ,  1 990, art. l 9(e) ,  available at 
http://www l .umn.edu/humanrts; European Convention. supra note 97, 2 1 3  U .N .T.S at 228. 
On the right to a speedy trial ,  see American Convention, supra, arts. 7(5) , (6) ,  1 1 44 U.N.T.S at 
1 46, 1 47 ;  Banjul Charter. supra, arts . 6, 7( l ) (d) ,  2 1  I .L .M. at 60; Cairo Declaration, supra, art. 
l 9(e) ;  European Convention, supra note 97, arts. 5 (3 )-(5 ) ,  2 1 3  U.N .T.S .  at 226--28 .  On the 
right to counsel of choice, see American Convention, supra, art. 8(2)(d) , (e) ,  1 1 44 U.N.T.S at 
1 47 ;  B anjul  Charter, supra, m1. 7 ( l )(c) ,  2 1  I .L .M.  at 60; Cairo Declaration, supra, art. 1 9(e) ;  
European Convention, supra note 97,  art. 6(3)(c) ,  2 1 3  U.N.T.S. at  228 .  On the right to 
confront evidence and witnesses i n  a public forum,  see American Convention, supra, art. 
8 (2 ) ( f) ,  I 1 44 U .N.T.S at 1 48 ;  Banjul Cha11er, supra, art. 7 ( 1 ) (c ) ,  2 1  I .L.M. at 60; Cairo 
Declaration, supra, m1. 1 9(e);  European Convention, supra note 97, art. 6(3) (d) ,  2 1 3  U.N.T.S .  
at  228 .  On the right to an appeal, see American Convention, supra, art. 8(2) (h) ,  1 1 44 U.N.T.S 
at 1 48 ;  Banju l  Charter, supra, art. 7 ( l ) (a) ,  2 1  I .L .M.  at 60. 
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ad hoc attempts to e n force international iaw, this community o f  courts at 
the supranational and, particularly, at the national level ,  i s  an i nterde­
pendent system engaged in a common enterprise.  Thi s  reali zation wi l l 
require self-awareness among j udges and recognition by lawyers that 
they are part of a larger commun ity. Such a realization,  and the coopera­
t ion,  resource exchange, and i ntellectual cross-ferti l ization it i mplies ,  
may greatly enhance the effectiveness of international criminal law en­
forcement. 
The community of courts outl i ned here may help bridge the growing 
d ivide between the Uni ted S tates and Europe, which manifests itse l f  
particularly i n  relation t o  the ICC . c 1' Compatible with the B ush admini­
stration approach, th is commun ity l ocates the primary right to exercise 
international criminal j ustice in the domestic courts of the local State . In 
l ine with the European approach,  i t  stresses the i mportant ,  but l imited 
role of supranational bodies as a backstop for their domestic counter­
parts . Such supranational bodies change the i ncentives facing domestic 
actors, encouraging them to enforce international law at home. This sys­
tem is  compatible with Piene Prosper's argument that "we should be . . .  
helping the [ local] S tates to develop the j ustice mechanisms necessary" 
to prosecute international crimes . 5 1 4 In fact,  the system wi l l  be greatly 
benefited if Prosper's unofficial proposal for U . S .  aid to domestic courts 
engaged in i nternational criminal j ustice becomes a reality.5 1 5  Such aiel 
could well solve the problems cunently facing East Timor explored i n  
Part I I I .  Yet, for the syste m  t o  function well ,  the United S tates must ac­
cept and acknowledge that supranational adjudicatory bodies wi l l  be 
i nvolved i n  giving national courts powerful new incentives to act and 
backing them up where they fail .  If the U nited States cannot move in that 
d irection, the community of courts wil l  be compromised by the absence 
of one crucial State . 
Thomas B uergenthal ,  a judge for the International Court of Justice, 
has observed that "the proliferation of i nternational tribunals c an . . .  
have adverse consequences."5 1 6  Whi le  he  i s  right that there are reasons  to 
5 1 3 . The recent passage by a U  .S. House of Representatives Committee of  the American 
Servicemembers' Protection Act would authorize the President to invade the Netherlands to 
rescue any American who comes before the ICC. See American Servicemembers' Protection 
Act of 200 1 ,  H .R .  1 794, 1 07th Cong .  ( 200 1 ) . But see Adam Clymer, House Panel Approves 
Measures to Oppose New Global Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 1 1 , 2002, at A3 ( noting Representa­
tive Delay's comment that " ' i t  was not a setious question' that the b i l l  might requi re the 
[United States] to i nvade the Netherl ands") .  
5 1 4. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Remarks at  the Harvard Colloquium on  In ternational Af-
fai rs (Apr. 1 3 , 2002) (on fi le with author) . 
5 1 5 .  /d. 
5 1 6. Thomas Buergenthal, Prolifemtion of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It 
Good or Bad ?, 1 4  LEIDEN J. l NT ' L  L. 267, 272 (:�00 1 ) . 
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be concerned, if  internat ional  crimi nal l aw enforcement i s  seen as a 
community of courts engaged in  a common enterprise,  connected by ver­
t ical and horizontal relationsh ips ,  many of h i s  concerns can be 
overcome.  Order is needed. General principles of i nternati onal const i tu­
t ional magnitude and spec i fic best practices in a proposed code of 
conduct for i n ternational cri minal law enforcement can provide the in­
formation and guidance needed for a self-regulating system. Such a 
system, such a community of  courts ,  may offer an i mportant solution to 
the chal lenges of i nternational cri mi nal law and for enforcement of in­
ternational l aw more general ly. 
